College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1978

The Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification
Glenn E. Coven
William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Coven, Glenn E., "The Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification" (1978). Faculty
Publications. 505.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/505

Copyright c 1978 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Volume 45

Number 4

Summer 1978

THE AFFINITY PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: A CASE
STUDY IN NONSIMPLIFICATION
GLENN

I.
II.

E.

COVEN*

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AFFINITY PROVISIONS IN GENERAL

. ..

A. Classification . . . . . . . .
. ...... .
B. Historical Development ....
C. Sections Involved . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .....
III.

AFFINITY BY FAMILY CONNECTION

A.
B.

IV.

TRUST AND FAMILY AFFINITY

A.
B.
C.
V.

IX.

. .... .

....... .

Partnership Relationships
Partnership Attribution ....

CORPORATE AFFINITY ..

Corporate Relationships ............ .
Corporate Attribution ......... .
Nature of Stock . . .
....... ..

600

OPTIONS AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES ....
MISCELLANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS ...
REATTRIBUTION
..... .

617
628
628
629

A.
B.
C.
VII.
VIII.

. .. .. .

Trust and Estate Relationships . . . . . . . . .
Definitions . . . . . . . . . . ..
Trust and Estate Attribution ............. .

PARTNERSHIP AFFINITY

A.
B.
VI.

The Family Relationship . . . . . . . . . . ..... .
Family Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

558
561
561
564
571
572
572
575
580
580
585
587
593
593
599
600

A .. In General ........... .

609
611

• B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., Columbia University; Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.

557

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

558
B.

X.

XIV.
XV.

"Indirect" Ownership . . . . ....... .
The Special Case of Dividend Equivalence

USE OF AFFINITY SECTIONS BY CROSS-REFERENCE

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

XII.
XIII.

Nature of Operating Rules ...

NONSTATUTORY AFFINITY GROUPINGS .

A.
B.

XI.

(Vol. 45

Cross-References to Basic Sections ..
Multiple Cross-References . . ....
Cross-References to the Family Definition
Cross-Refennces to Miscellaneous Sections .
Defining Relationships by Cross-References to
Attribution Rules ......... .

THE ULTIMATE IN ATTRIBUTION: SECTION 958
THE AGGREGATION FORM OF ATTRIBUTION
TOWARD UNIFORM RULES
. . ....
CONCLUSION

I.

633
634
635
640
643
643
652
652
656

660
663
669
675
700

INTRODUCTION

The long-overdue surge of public and congressional sentiment for reform of the federal income tax laws that culminated_
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 1 had the unintended consequence
of dram~ticallv increasing the overall complexity of the reformed
Internal Reve~ue Code. 2 Critics of the resulting Code have questioned whether, on balance, meaningful reform can be achieved
within the framework of such a complex law. It has been suggested that the sheer complexity of the Code is undermining the
voluntary compliance system upon which the administration of
the tax iaws is based while at the same time rendering the laws
substantially unenforceable. 3 This criticism has resulted in focus."
ing for the first time the attention of the draftsmen of our tax laws
on complexity as a separate factor to be considered in the drafting
of addit\ons to and revisions of the Code.~
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 599 [hereinafter referred to as the 1969
Act].
2. Compare the pre-1969 sections 170 (charitable contributions) and
1201(b) (alternative tax on capital gains applicable to individuals) with their
post-1969 counterparts. Ali references herein to the Code are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
3. Committee on Tax Policy of New York Bar Association, A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REv. 325, 329-30 (1972).
4. Section 507 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
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The results of this attention to complexity have been somewhat mixed. Title V of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, "Tax Simplification in the Individual Income Tax,"~ amended six provisions
of the Code, with changes ranging from reducing the distance that
a taxpayer must move before becoming eligible to deduct his
moving expenses• to replacing the child care deduction with a
credit. 7 The twenty other, generally more lengthy titles of the
1976 Act, however, contained few, if any, changes related to simplification.
· The following year Congress passed the Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977, 8 which contained a series of minor
technical amendments related to changes made by the 1976 Act.
The "simplification" of the 1977 legislation was limited to repealing the standard deduction and incorporating its relief into the
tax rate tables.' No doubt these changes have simplified the tax
laws for many low-income taxpayers-particularly those eliminated from the t"ax rolls-whose problems were never very complex in the first place. But the unquestionable effect of the
changes made by the 1976 and 1977 Acts on businesses and
upper-income bracket taxpayers was to complicate significantly
the preparation of their tax returns. 10
Perhaps the continued, even increased, substantive complexity of the tax laws applicable to such taxpayers is unavoidable
and even desirable. Given the complexity of the wide variety of
transactions entered into by taxpayers, a vastly simplified code
would not be adequate to allocate equitably the burden of taxation. Furthermore, much of the Code's complexity is a result of
1520, 1569 [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act] required the Joint Commit.
tee on Taxation to make a "full and complete study" with respect to simplifying
the tax Jaws.
5. Title V of the 1976 Act might just as well have been entitled, and in
past years would have been, "Miscellaneous Changes Affecting Individuals."
6. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 506, 90 Stat. 1568 (amending LR.C. § 217(c)
(1969)).
7. ld. § 504, 90 Stat. 1563 (codified at I.R.C. § 44A).
8. Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 [hereinafter referred to as the 1977
Act).
9. Id. § 101, 91 Stat. 127-30.
10. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat.
1531 (adding the "at risk" provisions to LR.C. § 465); id. § 602, 90 Stat. 1572
(adding the foreign conventions rules to LR.C. § 274).
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its use by Congress to achieve a variety of social and fiscal objectives, often through the deliberate grant of tax concessions. While
such provisions themselves may not be unduly complex, subsequent congressional refinement, perceived as necessary to prevent
taxpayer abuse of the concession, often eclipses in length and
complexity the original provision. 11 Halting this cycle would obviously require that Congress abandon the use of the Code as a
tool for social engineering. While there may be merit to such a
course of action, it is unlikely that Congress would so limit itself.
Nevertheless, the complex nature of the Code exists on several levels, and the probability of continued substantive complexity does not mean that improvement cannot be sought and
achieved on other levels. Below the basic structure of the Code·
and its substantive policies, lies the mechanical detail employed
by the draftsmen in the execution of those policies. 12 In contrast
to the ·substantive tax law, there is no offsetting benefit or social
justification for the overwhelming complexity of this mechanical
detail. A major improvement in consistency and ease of understanding and application of the Code could be achieved by reform
on this level. Because such revisions would, by their nature, have
a relatively minor impact on the application of the substantive
provisions of the tax law to any given taxpayer, resistance to such
changes should be minimal. Therefore, the attainment of mechanical simplification is far more feasible than is enactment of
the substantive, structural reforms more commonly suggested in
the name of simplification.
As an illustration of the need for simplification at the mechanical level and as an indication of the improvements that
11.

See Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem

of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 673, 686 (1969).
12. While the line between questions of policy and "mechanical detail" is
not always sharp, the distinction is more than a matter of degree. Altering the
details of a statute may affect a small proportion of the taxpayers subject to the
provision but will not significantly alter its overall impact. Thus, for Congress
to require that a single tax benefit be shared by a taxpayer and his family is
clearly a question of policy. Whether the family definition for this purpose is to
be broad or narrow may or may not be a matter of congressional policy. But
whether the family is to include the brothers and sisters of the taxpayer or the
spouses of his lineal descendents is not likely to be more than mechanical detail-reflecting more the preferences of the draftsmen than any question of
policy.
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could be achieved, the following study has been undertaken of a
single class of provisions-herein referred to as the affinity provisions-that appear throughout the Code.
II.

AFFINITY PROVISIONS IN GENERAL

Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 193413 it has been
recognized that in certain circumstances to maintain the integrity of the tax laws it will be necessary to treat two or more
otherwise independent taxpayers as a single entity or to accord
different consequences to transactions among taxpayers standing
in a specified relationship to each other than would be the case
if the transactions were between totally unrelated taxpayers. Accordingly, the substantive law contains hundreds of exceptions
and limitations addressed to related taxpayers. Each such provision, either directly or by way of a cross-reference to another
provision of the Code, must define those family, economic, or
other interests that for the purpose of the particular provision will
be regarded as sufficiently close to warrant application of the
exception or limitation. These definitions constitute the affinity
provisions of the Code.

A.

Classification

Affinity provisions are used throughout the Code in a variety
of ways and for a variety of purposes. Substantially all of these
provisions, however, fall within the two major categories that are
of present concern: relationship provisions and attribution proviswns.
The relationship provisions constitute definitional adjuncts
to specific substantive law provisions that require for their operation a defined relationship among two or more taxpayers. The
attribution rules, on the other hand, are used for the purpose of
expanding the scope of the relationship provisions.
The relationship provisions are used in the Code to define a
class of persons, each member of which constitutes a separate
taxpayer for most purposes under the Code but shares a relationship that must be taken into account for a specific substantive
law purpose. The most common uses of relationship provisions in
13. Ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
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the Code occur in substantive sections that either require persons
in the prescribed relationship to share a single tax benefit otherwise available to each such taxpayer individually or alter the
income tax consequences of transactions among members of the
group relative to the tax effect of such transactions among unrelated taxpayers. Within this second category are a large number
of relationship provisions governing the income tax consequences
of changes in corporate structure, particularly reorganization and
liquidation. These provisions generally require a close relationship, generally referred to as "control," among a class of corporations or between a corporation and a class of its shareholders.
The second type of affinity provision might properly be referred to as secondary relationship provisions, since the function
of these provisions is to supplement the definition of the primary
relationship by reference to the secondary relationships existing
among the parties. The most common form of such provisions are
the attribution rules. If, for example, a particular substantive law
provision defines the relevant relationship as that existing between a corporation and an individual owning fifty percent of its
stock, the Code may not merely take account only of stock actually owned by the individual because a relationship so narrowly
defined might easily be avoided. Rather, the individual may be
deemed to own stock that is actually owned by another if such
treatment is justified by the relationship existing between the
individual and that other person. The attribution provisions define the scope of this secondary relationship and the circumstances under which attribution is to be made.
In more general terms, because of a secondary relationship
between two taxpayers (marriage, for example), their interests in
a third party (the corporation) are combined for the purpose of
determining the existence of the primary relationship (fifty percent stock ownership) between them and the third party. These
objectives can be achieved through methods other than attribution. For example, the Code could first define the secondary relationship and then define the primary relationship by reference to
the secondary. Thus, the Code could specify that the primary
relationship existed if a husband and wife together owned fifty
percent of the corporate stock. Such a provision would read very
differently from a traditional attribution provision, particularly
if a complete set of relationships were used, but would accomplish
precisely the same substantive result. This technique is in fact
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used in the Code, particularly in more recently enacted sections. u
While such provisions have the appearance of relationship sections, they are functionally equivalent to attribution sections and
are referred to herein as aggregation forms of attribution. 15 Because of the manner in which the aggregation forms of attribution
have been drafted in practice, the secondary relationships defined
by such provisions differ from the secondary relationships defined
by the traditional attribution rules. 1'
Normally the attribution rules have the effect of lowering the
relationship threshold because of the existence of other indirect
relationships among the taxpayers in question. We have used the
example of a substantive law provision that requires for its operation the ownership of fifty percent of a corporation's outstanding
stock. However, by attributing to a husband the thirty percent
interest held by his wife, for example, the husband will be
deemed to fall within the prescribed relationship even though he
actually owns, for example, only twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock. This result is thought to be justifiable because of
the taxpayer's indirect relationship, through his wife, to the corporation.
There is no inherent reason that the persons included in a
relationship provision must be the same persons from whom attribution is to be made for the purpose of expanding the relationship
provision. For example, it might be concluded that an individual's siblings should not be included in the defined relationship
for the purpose of a given transactional provision of the Code on
the ground that these persons normally lack a sufficient economic
identity of interest. Nevertheless, in measuring the individual's
relationship with a corporation for the purpose of the same provision, it might quite consistently be concluded that stock owned
by a sibling should be attributed to the individual. Arguably, that
14. See, e.g., LR.C. §§ 163(d)(7)(B), 613A(c)(8)(B).
15. The attribution rules have been defined in general terms. However, in
the overwhelming majority of uses of the attribution rules, the interest being
attributed is corporate stock because the corporate relationship is far more
commonly used in the Code than is the partner-partnership relationship. However, the primary section of the Code defining the partnership relationship
(section 707(b)) employs the same attribution rules for defining ownership of a
partnership interest that are applicable to sections defining corporate relationships (section 267(c)).
16. See Part XTI infra.
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is, a lesser identity of interest may be required for attribution
than for relationship inclusion. The Code rarely draws such distinctions, however, and generally, for the purposes of a given
substantive law provision, the taxpayers included in the defined
relationship are the same ones from whom attribution is made for
the purpose of expanding the defined relationship.
B.

Historical Development

Before examining the current Code, it will be useful to review
briefly the historical development of the affinity provisions. This
history provides valuable insight into how the existing complexity
and irrationality of the Code evolved and, it is to be hoped, how
further aggravation of the situation may be avoided.
Not surprisingly, the early internal revenue laws contained
few provisions designed to prevent taxpayers from reducing their
share of the income tax burden through advance planning. However, even the draftsmen of the first internal revenue law 17 enacted after the adoption of the sixteenth amendment recognized
the avoidance potential inherent in the different tax rates applicable to individuals and corporations. While the one percent normal tax was applicable to both, only individual taxpayers were
subject to the "additional" tax on net incomes in excess of
$20,000, ranging from one percent to what was undoubtedly regarded as an outrageous six percent. Accordingly, the draftsmen
provided that for the purpose of the additional tax, an individual's taxable income would include his allocable share of the
undistributed income of a corporation "formed or fraudulently
availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax
through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed. "u Further, the
fact that such a corporation had accumulated income beyond the
reasonable needs of its business or was "a mere holding company"
constituted uprima facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape such tax,"" This provision is the direct ancestor of both the
present accumulated earnings tax 20 and the personal holding
17.
18.
19.

20.

Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
/d. § ll.A. Subdivision 2, 38 Stat. 166.
/d. 38 Stat. 166-67.
I.R.C. § 531.
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company provisions21 of the Code.
Although the Collector actively litigated a wide variety of tax
avoidance devices during the subsequent two decades, Congress
paid relatively little attention to tax avoidance techniques until
the Revenue Act of 1934. 22 Experience with a tax avoidance provision based upon a reasonableness test had demonstrated the inadequacy of such an approach and the need to enact selfexecuting provisions. 23 The solution adopted by the 1934 Act was
to retain the predecessor of the accumulated earnings tax 24 while
carving out a specific type of corporation-the personal holding
company-that would automatically be subject to an additional
surtax on its income. This new provision, geared to status rather
than conduct, required the adoption of precise definitional tests.
In addition to a test relating to the nature of the corporate income, section 351(b)(1) of the 1934 Act adopted a relationship
provision defining personal holding companies in terms of ownership by not more than five individuals of more than fifty percent
in value of the outstanding· stock of the corporation. This precision in definition raised the possibility that the impact of the new
provision could be negated, without significantly changing the
economic benefits from the use of a personal holding company,
by causing the stock of such a corporation to be dispersed among
a number of legally distinct but economically related individuals
or business entities.· To prevent that result, the first attribution
provision of the Code was adopted. Section 351 provided that
[f]or the purpose of determining the ownership of stock in a
personal holding company . . . (C) stock owned, directly or indirectly, by a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust shall be
consid~red as being owned proportionately by its shareholders,
partners, or beneficiaries; (0) an individual shall be considered
as owning, to the exclusion of any other individual, the stock
owned, directly or indirectly, by his family, and this rule shall
be applied in such manner as to produce the smallest possible
number of individuals owning, directly or indirectly, more than
50 per centum in value of the outstanding stock; and (E) the
21.
22.
23.
C.B. (pt.
24.

I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
Ch. 277, 48 Stat. 705.
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1
2) 554, 562.
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 852, § 104, 45 Stat. 814-15.
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family of an individual shall include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendants. u
Congress had also become concerned that tax losses were
being artificially created by the purported sale of property among
members of an integrated economic group, particularly among
family members and between an individual and a controlled,
closely held corporation. Thus, the 1934 Act added paragraph 6
to section 24(a) disallowing a deduction for a
llloss from sales or exchanges of property, directly or indirectly, {A) between members of a family, or (B) except in the
case of distributions in liquidation, between an individual and
a corporation in which such individual owns, directly or indirectly, more than 50 per centum in value of the outstanding
stock. For the purposes of this paragraph-(C) an individual
shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by his family; and (D) the family of an individual shall
include only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or
half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. 26
The affinity provisions of section 351 were primarily attribution rules applicable to the most elementary relationship-stock
ownership. Section 24(a)(6), on the other hand, was the earliest
relationship provision of appreciable scope. Section 24 supplemented its relationship definition with farpily attribution rules
that were identical to those contained in section 351. Interestingly, however, the entity attribution rules contained in section
351 were not incorporated into section 24. Thus, for example, an
individual could not escape personal holding company classification of a corporation by causing a material portion of the stock
of the corporation to be held by another controlled corporation or
in trust for the individual. Had the individual chosen to so structure his ownership of the personal holding company, however,
losses on transactions between the individual ·and the personal
holding company would not be disallowed. The committee reports to the 1934 Act do not disclose the reason for this disparity
in treatment; from their very inception, inconsistency has been
the rule, not the exception, in the affinity provisions of the Code.
25.
26.

Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 451-52.
ld. § 24(a), 48 Stat. 691.
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A further characteristic of the attribution rules in these initial affinity provisions should be noted. Both of the substantive
law provisions contained relatively high threshold requirements
for their application. That is, more than fifty percent of the stock
of a corporation must be controlled by five or fewer persons in the
case of section 351 or by the individual and his family in the case
of section 24 for personal holding company status to arise or for
losses to be disallowed, respectively. Thus, the proscribed taxpayer relationships were relatively narrowly defined. On the other
hand, the attribution rules adopted in 1934 were very broad.
Under section 351 stock was attributed from a corporation, partnership, trust, or estate proportionately to shareholders, partners,
or beneficiaries regardless of how nominal the interest of the individual may have been in the entity. Furthermore, except for certain unusual provisions discussed below, 27 the definition of family
is the broadest ever adopted in the income tax laws.
The affinity provisions of both the personal holding company
section and the disallowance of loss section were significantly
expanded in the Revenue Act of 1937, 2 ~ which, in these and other
areas, largely implemented the recommendations made by the
Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance.Z» The attribution rules contained in the personal holding company provisions
were expanded in two major respects. Partners were to be treated
in the same manner as family members because of the "close
business relationship existing between members of a partnership. " 30 Second, ownership of stock was to be attributed to the
holders of options to acquire the stock and to holders of securities
convertible into stock. 31
27. See text accompanying notes 52-53 & 229-31 infra.
28. Pub. L. No. 75-815, 50 Stat. 813.
29. See JoiNT CoMMITTEE ON TAX EvASION AND AvOIDANCE, H.R. Doc. No.
337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
30. S. REP. No. 1242, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. (pt. 2) 703, 709.
31. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 354, 50 Stat. 815. The Revenue Act of
1937 also added the foreign personal holding company provisions to the law. The
substantive tax avoidance problem attacked by the foreign personal holding
company provisions was essentially identical to that which occasioned the adoption of the personal holding company rules: the shifting of income to an incorporated entity that was subject to a lower tax rate or no tax at all. Accordingly,
Congress adopted a similar substantive law vehicle to attack the problem and,
further, employed identical attribution of stock ownership rules.
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The loss-disallowance provision of section 24 of the 1934 Act
could have been expanded in several ways. For example, Congress
could have enumerated the entities subject to the provision and
disallowed losses with respect to transactions among any persons
so enumerated. The Joint Committee, however, had focused on
specific transactions and, presumably as a consequence, section
24 was expanded by listing the pairs of individuals or entities
between which transactions establishing losses would not be permitted. Furthermore, the attribution provisions of section 24 were
expanded to include the provisions governing attribution from
entities that in 1934 had been added to the personal holding
company section but not to section 24. Direct attribution from a
partner was also added to section 24 but with a novel and important qualification: such attribution was not to be permitted unless the individual to whom the stock was to be attributed otherwise owned stock in the corporation either directly or by attribution. Further, for this purpose, only attribution from entities
would be counted; attributed ownership from family members
would not suffice to permit attribution from an individual's partner. As this provision illustrates and other provisions discussed
below confirm, the Revenue Act of 1937 originated the trend that
has continued to the present day of establishing highly complex
attribution rules varying in minor particulars from section to section.
The 1937 Act also added a new substantive provision disallowing deductions under certain circumstances for interest or
other expenses incurred but not paid within two and one-half
months following the close of a taxable year. This new section
24(c) was to be applicable if "both the taxpayer and the person
to whom the payment is to be made are persons between whom
losses would be disallowed under section 24(b)." 32 Thus, the 1937
Act also introduced the concept of applying attribution rules by
cross-reference to other Code provisions.
The next major development of the attribution rules came
with the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Prior to
that time, the corporate distributions and reorganization provisions had not been subject to these statutory attribution rules
permitting tax results that in certain circumstances were unjusti32.

Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-815, § 24(c), 50 Stat. 813.
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fiably favorable to taxpayers. Accordingly, the 1954 Code added
section 318 to provide for attribution of stock ownership under a
limited number of designated sections of the Code (principally
within Subchapter C) governing corporate distributions and adjustments. Much of section 318 constituted a distinct improvement over the attribution rules previously contained in the Code,
but unfortunately the preexisting rules were not conformed to the
changes contained in section 318. 33
33. In one respect, however, section 318 contained a provision resulting in
overly broad attribution. Section 318 introduced the concept of "backattribution" whereby stock owned by a shareholder, partner, or beneficiary
could be attributed to the corporation, partnership, trust, or estate if certain
threshold requirements were met. While back-attribution itself was, and is,
controversial, as section 318 was originally adopted, back-attribution brought
with it so-called "sidewise" attribution. Stock held by a shareholder (or partner
or beneficiary) could thus be attributed back to the corporation and then reattributed from the corporation to any other shareholder. Sidewise attribution
commonly had the effect of treating individuals who were only incidentally
fellow partners or shareholders in a business activity as owning stock in the
taxpayer's personal and wholly unrelated ventures.
Back-attribution remains in section 318, but sidewise attribution under
section 318 was eliminated in 1964 by Pub. L. No. 88-554, § 4, 78 Stat. 762. After
ten years of struggling with sidewise attribution, Congress realized that the tax
avoidance prevented by this section was indeed marginal and that general application of the provision was improper since it had "the effect of attributing one
person's stockholding to another even though there is neither an economic nor
a family connection between the two persons." S. REP. No. 1240, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964-2 C.B. 701, 705.
Nevertheless, sidewise attributio'l had existed, to a limited extent, under
the Code since 1937 when attribution from partners was added to both the
personal holding company provision, section 544, and to the predecessor of
section 267(c). Moreover, such attribution was directly between these persons
and not indirectly through the partnership. Thus, the result of attribution pursuant to these earlier provisions was far more extensive since all of a partner's
stock would be attributed to the taxpayer and not merely an amount equal to
the taxpayer's proportional interest in the partnership. Consistent with the
normal inconsistency in this area, when section 318 was modified in 1964 to
eliminate sidewise attribution, the more Draconian provisions of sections 267(c)
and 544 were not changed.
As noted previously, many of the attribution rules of section 318 are not
applicable unless there is a certain threshold relationship between the entities
subject to attribution. For example, in the case of corporations, there was to be
no attribution in either direction unless the shareholder owned actually or constructively 50% of the stock of the corporation. The threshold requirements for
other entities, however, were substantially lower.
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The only major addition to the affinity provisions since 1954
occurred in the Revenue Act of 1964, which added sections 1561
through 1564 in substantially their present form.:U Section
1563(a) provided for the first time in the Code a complete definition of a controlled group of corporations, including not only vertical chains but also horizontally related corporations. For the
purposes of determining stock ownership under section 1563, the
section provided its own set of attribution rules in subsections
(d) and (e). The attribution rules contained in section 1563 drew
heavily upon the criticism that had been leveled against section
318 and thus in many respects constituted a considerable advance
in draftsmanship. Nevertheless, as in 1954 the adoption of this
new set of attribution rules was not accompanied by improvements in existing provisions.M
In one particular, the attribution rules of section 1563 are not
appropriate for general use. The purpose of these rules is to define
a related group of corporations for the purpose of limiting all such
corporations to a single surtax exemption and certain other credits. In a surprisingly early recognition of the independence of
women, however, Congress concluded that it would be inappropriate to require that separate businesses run by a husband and
wife share a single exemption. 3• Accordingly, attribution from
family members under section 1563(e), particularly from spouses,
is highly limited.
While section 1563 is the only basic addition to the 1954
Code, in the sense that it is widely used by cross-reference, every
piece of tax legislation of any significance has included additions
to or modifications of the affinity provisions, and the Tax Reform
Acts of 1969 and 1976 were no exceptions. The 1976 Act is particularly worthy of mention in this historical summary since by that
year the need for simplification apparently had been accepted by
those responsible for the drafting of tax legislation. Nevertheless,
the 1976 Act developed the "double cross-reference." For exam34. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116.
35. Section 1563 did not adopt back-attribution but rather employed a
sufficiently extensive definition of the intercorporate relationships that were to
be subject to the substantive law restriction, so that back-attribution became
unnecessary.
36. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963), reprinted in 1964-1
C.B. (pt. 2) 123, 244.
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ple, section 999, the new provision governing international boycotts, defines a controlled group of corporations by a crossreference to section 993(a)(3), one of the domestic international
sales corporation (DISC) sections 37 that does not itself define a
controlled group of corporations but rather refers, with certain
modifications, to the definition in section 1563(a). In addition,
section 464(c)(2)(E), also added by the 1976 Act, provides the
most unusual definition of family in the Code. The definition is
extraordinarily broad and includes not only aunts and uncles and
all of the descendants of aunts and uncles, but also great-aunts
and great-uncles. However, the definition appears to exclude the
individual's own spouse (presumably through a drafting error).
C.

Sections Involved

The result of all of the foregoing legislative developments has
been considerable diversity, inconsistency, and confusion. Section 267(b) contains the only general relationship provision focusing on individuals. A single provision governing partnership relationships is contained in section 707(b). There are two principal
provisions describing corporate relationships, contained in section 1504 and section 1563(a), which are used throughout the
Code by a cross-reference; but similarly complete definitions are
also contained in section 368 and section 1551. There are three
commonly used, relatively complete attribution sections: sections
267(c), 318, and 1563(e). There are also three complete attribution provisions used to a lesser extent throughout the Code: sections 544, 554, and 958. In addition to these provisions, there are
a large number of sections that prescribe relationships for the
purposes of a single section that may or may not vary in significant degree from the sections of broader application; a smaller
number of sections supply attribution provisions for only a single
section. In all, over eighty sections employ either the relationship
provisions or the attribution provisions contained in these sections, ranging from a mere cross-reference to the definition of
family to a full incorporation of both the relationship and attribu37. I.R.C. §§ 991-997. A domestic international sales corporation or DISC
is a domestic corporation, substantially all of whose income is derived from
export sales. In general effect, through the DISC device the income from such
sales is taxed at a reduced rate.
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tion rules of a provision. As shall be seen, most of these sections
also modify the relationships or attributions specified in the basic
sections. The lack of uniformity is staggering indeed.
The statutory inconsistency can be better appreciated if the
various types of commonly used relationships and attributions
are considered as a unit rather than on a section-by-section basis.
There is necessarily a degree of artificiality in such classifications.
Nevertheless, the general pattern of the relationship and attribution sections should become apparent.
Ill

AFFINITY BY FAMILY CoNNECTION

A.

The Family Relationship

The family relationship is the one most commonly used in
the affinity provisions of the Code. In view of the constant modifications that have been made in other areas, it is noteworthy that
the definition of family relationships contained in section 267(b)
remains unchanged and is the only definition used with any frequency throughout the affinity provisions of the Code. That definition, which has remained unchanged since 1934, 38 includes the
taxpayer, his or her spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and
br9thers and sisters by the whole or half blood.
Neither the Code nor the regulations thereto modify the reference to a spouse, and thus the term presumably must be given
a broad interpretation. 30 More recently enacted affinity provisions, however, exclude from the definition of "spouse" individuals legally separated under a decree of separate maintenance or
divorce. A similar rule prevails under other major Code provisions.~0 Since the different statutory language of section 267 may
be either deliberate or unintended, the absence of regulatory clarification is regrettable.
The regulations to the section 267 definition of family provide that "the term 'ancestors' includes parents and grandpar38. The apparent consistency of the family definition is somewhat misleading. The principal use of the section 267(c)(4) definition is by crossreferences from other Code sections and a great number of such sections modify
the definition of family. See Part X infra.
39. See Deyoe v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 904 (1977).
40. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 152 (defining a dependent); I.R.C. § 6013(d)(2)
(defining eligibility for filing joint returns).
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ents, and the term 'lineal descendants' includes children and
grandchildren." 41 The use of the word "includes" in this regulation is obviously ambiguous, and it is not at all clear whether the
regulation suggests a limitation on the normal definition of those
terms or is merely, and pointlessly, illustrative. The regulation
further provides that in determining the existence of these relationships, full effect shall be given to a legal adoption. This construction is consistent with the express statutory language of
more recently enacted affinity rules and finds strong factual support in contemporary society. The statutory basis for this expansion of the family definition is weak, however, since the term
"lineal descendant" suggests biological issue and may be contrasted with the broader word "children," which is used elsewhere
in the Coden and which more appropriately would include
adopted children. While it is not being suggested that the regulations are invalid, it is interesting to compare the more aggressive
construction of "lineal descendants," used to expand section 267,
with the absence of any definition of "spouse," any narrowing of
which would be favorable to taxpayers.
Section 544 (and the virtually identical section 554), added
to the law at the same time as section 267, contains the identical
statutory definition of family. However, there are no regulations
under the personal holding company definition. Given the historical relationship of these definitions, a forceful argument can be
made that they should be interpreted similarly and that the regulatory modification of section 267 should be equally applicable to
section 544. Nevertheless, in the absence of any authority, the
status of great-grandparents, great-grandchildren, and adopted
children for personal holding company purposes is uncertain.
Section 704(e) also contains a definition of family for relationship purposes, but that section has application only to section
704(e) itself, which pertains to family partnerships, and to section
1375(c), which pertains to family stockholders of Subchapter S
corporations. The definition of family contained in section 704(e)
is identical to the section 267 definition except that section 704(e)
does not include brothers and sisters. As in the case of section 544,
there are no regulations concerning this definition of family. For
41.
42.

Treas. Reg. § 1.267(c)-l(a)(4) (1960).
E.g., I.R.C. § 318(a)(l).
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certain purposes of the collapsible ·corporations provision, section
341(e)(8)(A)(i) also contains a definition of family. This provision, not used elsewhere in the Code, is also identical to section
267 except that it does not include brothers and sisters.
A small number of sections contain even more limited definitions of family. Section 613A, which limits the quantity of oil
subject to percentage depletion, requires that the allowance be
allocated among members of the same family, which is defined
in subsection (c)(8)(D)(iii) as including only an individual's
spouse and minor children. 43
Section 1239, which treats gain on the sale of certain depreciable property as ordinary income rather than capital gain, also
contains a family definition for relationship purposes that is limited to a husband and wife. This extreme limitation on the family
definition is particularly striking when contrasted with the broad
definition in the somewhat related section 267.H Section 1313(c),
which defines related taxpayers for purposes of the complex mitigation of the statute of limitation provisions, also limits the definition to a husband and wife.
Section 672(c) defines a "related or subordinate party" for
the purposes of the grantor trust rules. Presumably under the
influence of the estate planning purposes of a grantor trust, this
section defines "family" to include a spouse who is living with the
grantor and the grantor's parents, issue, and brothers and sisters.
Grandparents, but not grandchildren, are thus excluded from the
definition.
Section 152 defines "dependents," rather than "family," for
the purpose of the personal exemption and for certain similar
purposes, such as the designation of persons related to the taxpayer who may be included in a medical reimbursement plan
under section 105(b) or the cost of whose medical care is deducti43. The inclusion of only minor children in an affinity provision was first
introduced as a drafting technique in section 1239 and later much expanded in
section 1563. These are both attribution sections and are discussed in the following text. Section 613A is the first use of the minor children limitation in a
relationship section.
44. Sections 1239 and 267 both attack techniques of obtaining a tax benefit through artificial dispositions of property although the techniques are quite
different (the substantial provisions of section 267(a) disallow losses on the sale
of property).
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ble under section 213. On rare occasions when Congress has intended a very broad definition of family, reference has been made
to the definition in section 152. For example, section 50B, which
defines the wages for which a work incentive program credit is
allowed, excludes wages paid to most of the individuals enumerated in section 152.
In addition to the above provisions, two Code sections contain a definition of family relationships for the purpose of defining
"prohibited" transactions with various types of exempt organizations. The definition of "disqualified persons" with respect to
private foundations in section 4946(d) contains its own definition
of family, which is identical to the language of section 267 but
eliminates references to brothers and sisters and includes spouses
of lineal descendants. This same definition of family was adopted
in the prohibited transaction provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974~~ (ERISA) and is contained in
section 4975(e)(6).
B.

Family Attribution

In contrast to the single, widely applied family relationship
definition of section 267, there are several frequently used family
attribution rules, each of which has been the subject of considerable modification. As a result, these provisions are the most inconsistent of the Code's affinity rules.
The definition of family for attribution purposes contained
in section 267(c), the oldest of the affinity rules, is identical to the
definition used for relationship purposes.
Section 318 was added to the Code in 1954 to serve as a
uniform rule, at least for the purposes of Subchapter C, governing the attribution of stock ownership. The section provides
somewhat more precise definitions than are contained in the
earlier provisions. The members of an individual's family are
defined in section 318 to include his spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents. Deviating from sections 267 and 544, section 318 excludes from the definition of a spouse an individual
who is legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance. In addition, this section specifically provides that
45.

Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3, 88 Stat. 879.
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a legally adopted child shall be treated as a biological child.
Thus, by 1954, brothers and sisters were no longer included in
the family affinity group, and recognition had been extended to
the realities of separation agreements and adoption. A grandparent continued to be regarded as possessing economic control
or identity of purpose with his grandchildren, although grandchildren were no longer regarded as dominating their grandparents.
The most recently enacted of the basic attribution rules is
contained in section 1563(e) and marks a considerable departure
in the definition of family. In part, these rules reflect an attempt
to limit attribution to circumstances having the strongest factual
basis. The resulting statutory distinctions have produced an inordinately complex set of attribution rules. To some extent, however, these rules reflect policy considerations that are unique to
section 1561, and therefore certain of the limitations on attribution contained in section 1563(e) are not suitable for general application. Nevertheless, as discussed in greater detail below, section 1563 is applied by cross-reference to a significant number of
unrelated sections.
Congress wished to exclude from the definition of corporations under common control the separate businesses of a husband
and wife. Accordingly, attribution between spouses is subject to
special limitations. This policy seems to have influenced the limitations on attribution among other family members as well.
Under section 1563(e)(5), stock is generally attributed from a
spouse unless the parties are legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance. This section, however, specifies
that the decree of divorce may be either interlocutory or final and
thus extends the limitations added by section 318. This general
rule is subject to the exceptions that stock is not to be attributed
to an individual from his or her spouse if (1) the individual does
not directly own stock in the corporation and is not a director or
employee of the corporation and does not participate in the management of its business, (2) not more than fifty percent of the
corporation's gross income was derived from passive sources, and
(3) the stock owned by the spouse is not subject to any restrictions
on his or her right to dispose of the stock that run in favor of the
individual or his or her minor children. 48 In other words, under
46.

These requirements must be met not only at the time of the transac-
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1563(e) the stock of a corporation actively engaged in business is
not attributed between spouses if the attributee spouse has no
actual contact with the business or ownership rights in the stock.
Whatever the merits of such a rule for the purposes of section
1563, it appears to be too restrictive for general application.
Attribution under section 1563(e) involving parents and children is more limited and far more complex than under prior attribution rules. Stock is universally attributed to an individual from
his children only if the children have not attained the age of
twenty-one years. However, if the individual owns more than fifty
percent of the stock of the corporation in question (measured
either by value or by vote) stock owned by adult children is also
attributed to him. 47 For the purpose of determining whether the
individual owns more than fifty percent of the corporation's
stock, his ownership is determined after the application of all of
the other attribution rules provided by section 1563(e) except the
rules attributing stock owned by an individual's ancestors, grandchildren, or adult children. Thus, in computing this fifty percent,
stock attributed to an individual from his or her spouse and minor
children is taken into account. This "domination" test is, of
course, far more restrictive of attribution than is the limitation
on attribution from spouses and is unique to this section.
Stock owned by an individual's parents is attributed to him
only if he has not attained the age of twenty-one years or if he
has met the fifty percent test referred to above. Stock owned by
an individual's grandparents and grandchildren is only attributed to him if he has met the fifty percent test. As in the case of
tion in question but throughout the entire taxable year of the corporation in
which the transaction occurs.
47. This provision is the first use of the domination test in family attribution. The test, however, resembles, and may have been derived from the threshold requirements for attribution from corporations introduced by section :ns.
See text accompanying note 135 infra. In connection with corporate attribution,
however, the test serves a somewhat different purpose of defining whether the
relationship between the corporate-attributor and its shareholder-attributee is
sufficiently close to justify attribution, and under section 318 the relationship
is not deemed sufficiently close unless the shareholder owns 50% of the stock of
the corporation. In family attribution, the family relationship itself between the
attributor and the attributee has been regarded as sufficient to support attribution. The domination test imposes the further requirement that the attributee
also have a close relationship with the corporation, the stock of which is to be
attributed.
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section 318, a legally adopted child is included within the definition of child.
Thus, under section 1563, brothers and sisters remain ex~
eluded from the family group, and grandparents have reappeared, albeit in limited circumstances. A domination test for
family attribution has been introduced; and a distinction first
drawn in section 1239, between adult and minor children, has
been expanded and joined with the precondition introduced in
se~tion 267(c)(3) that the attributee otherwise own stock.
Section 1563 is a classic example of the tension between substantial justice and undue complexity that faces the draftsmen
of tax legislation. The factual basis for family attribution under
the highly refined section 1563(e) doubtlessly is far greater than
under other attribution sections, but the price for such precision
in terms of mechanical complexity is obviously very high, particularly in view of the position of section 1563(e) as only one of
several different family attribution provisions.
In addition to these basic provisions, other sections define
the family for particular attribution purposes. Section 544 prescribes the attribution rules that are to be applied for certain
purposes under the personal holding company provisions. The use
of this section has been limited to these provisions with only rare
exceptions. At present, section 341(d) is the only unrelated section that adopts, by cross-reference, the family attribution rules
of section 544. 4~ The definition of family in section 544 has remained unchanged since the enactment of the predecessor to that
section in 19344• and is identical to the definition contained in
section 267(c). This definition also appears in section 425(d). 110
The 1976 Act, for no apparent reason, relied heavily on the
aggregation form of attribution; 51 and, in the course of prescribing
these rather awkward new rules, it introduced two definitions of
family, one quite narrow and the other uniquely broad. Section
163(d)(7)(B) provides an aggregation type of attribution rule for
the purpose of determining whether fifty percent or more of the
48. Prior to its amendment by the Revenue Act of 1964, section 1551 also
employed such a cross-reference.
49. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 751-52.
50. These attribution rules are used only for the substantive purposes of
the statutory stock option sections. See I.R.C. §§ 421-425.
51. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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stock in a corporation is owned by members of the same family.
Consistent with the current trend, family is defined relatively
narrowly to include only the taxpayer, his spouse, and his children. None of these terms are elaborated upon in the statute.
Section 447 and the related section 464 form part of a series
of provisions that were added to the Code in 1976 and designed
to limit the availability of several popular types of tax shelters.
Both sections seek to reduce the attractiveness of farming operations as a tax shelter by changing the tax accounting rules that
previously had applied to such ventures. However, neither section
was designed to change the tax accounting rules available to
family-owned farms, even when most of the family interest was
held by individuals not actively engaged in farming. For the purposes of these exclusions, Congress evidently thought it desirable
to adopt an extraordinarily broad definition of family.
Section 447 is only applicable to incorporated farms and excludes farms in which fifty percent of the stock is owned by members of the same family. In this section, family is defined as
including the individual, his brothers and sisters, the brothers
and sisters of both his parents and grandparents, the ancestors
and lineal descendants of all of the foregoing, and the spouses of
all of the foregoing (apparently including the spouses of ancestors
and lineal descendants). The section specifically provides that
legally adopted individuals shall be treated as though they were
biologically related, but it does not define the word "spouse." In
view of the number of spouses that the definition includes, this
omission is most regrettable. The general effect of this provision
is to include all of the descendants (and their spouses) of each of
an average individual's four pairs of great-grandparents. In a typical family, the number of persons so described will be in the
hundreds, and the degree of identity of economic interest among
them will be far less than is the mutuality of interest with one's
neighbors. 52 In any event, section 447 has added a new and perhaps unfortunate dimension to the definition of family.
The related section 464, applicable only to unincorporated
52. In any such family group, one might suppose, there would be several
individuals who may think that their farming tax shelter is no longer attractive.
One can conceive of an entire new line of business for the nation's genealogists:
locating wealthy members of the same section 447 family so they can join together in a farming tax shelter.
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farms, also exempts from its application family-owned farms and
employs a broad definition of family. Interestingly, however, the
family definition here employed is not only different in substance
from section 447 but is also different in form. Rather than providing its own definition, section 464 proceeds by way of a highly
modified cross· reference to section 267. Because the problems
presented by section 464 are characteristic of the "affinity by
cross-reference" provisions, section 464 is considered in detail
be-low in connection with the other cross-referencing provisions. 53

IV.

TRUST AND ESTATE AFFINITY

Although there are numerous inconsistencies throughout the
Code in the definition of family for attribution and relationship
purposes, with minor exceptions the various rules are relatively
clear and unambiguous. By contrast, the provisions governing
relationships among and attribution to and from entities are more
uniform throughout the Code but are subject to considerably
greater interpretive difficulties.

A.

Trust and Estate Relationships

As in the case of family affinity rules, section 267(b) is the
primary provision setting forth relationships between trusts and
various taxpayers that is employed through cross-reference by
various substantive provisions throughout the Code. Section
267(b) lists the following specific pairs of relationships:
(a) a grantor and a fiduciary of a trust;
(b) different fiduciaries of different trusts having the
same grantor;
(c) a fiduciary and a beneficiary of the same trust;
(d) a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of a different
trust if both trusts have the same grantor; and
(e) a fiduciary of a trust and a corporation more than
53. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra. Prior to 1976, section 1239
also contained a highly limited aggregation form of attribution rule that served
a purpose similar to the present section 163(d){7)(B). The 1976 Act replaced this
special rule with a cross-reference to section 318. The former version of section
1239 is of historical interest because the scope of the family was limited to minor
children and minor grandchildren, the first distinction in the Code between
adult and minor descendants.
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fifty percent in value of the outstanding stock of
which is owned by either the trust or the grantor of
the trust.
Section 267(b) makes no reference to estates or executors of
estates in its enumerationof related taxpayers.u This omission is
one of several substantial defects in section 267 that have undermined its usefulness as a generally applied relationship provision.
The Commissioner has taken steps through litigation to remedy
this omission, but after an initial hint of success55 it is now apparently established that section 267(b) cannot be expanded to encompass estates. In Estate of Hanna 56 the taxpayer's estate had
sold stock to a corporation more than fifty percent of which was
owned by the beneficiaries of the estate. The Commissioner
argued that since under the attribution rules of section 267(c) the
beneficiaries of an estate are treated as owning stock owned by
the estate, the sale should be regarded as a transaction between
such individual beneficiaries and the corporation. The court rejected this analysis on the ground that the sale was in fact between the estate and the corporation, rather than between individuals and the corporation and that sales by estates were not
included in section 267. 57 The Commissioner has only recently
conceded the existence of this omission in section 267. sM
The only other provision of the Code containing a comprehensive list of trust-oriented relationships is section 1313, which
provides rules that are applicable to the mitigation provisions. In
somewhat more concise language, section 1313(c) lists the following categories:
54. It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service, however, that if the
administration of an estate is unduly prolonged, the estate will be regarded as
a trust for all income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3 (1960).
55. See Estate of Ingalls, 45 B.T.A. 787 (1941), aff'd on other grounds. 43·
1 U.S.T.C. ~ 9276 (6th Cir. 1943), nonacq. 1942-1 C.B. 24.
56. 320 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1963).
57. Minor variation of this argument succeeded in expanding the scope of
section 267 fo partnerships. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra. On the
other hand, the Commissioner was not permitted to expand the application of
section 267 to transactions between trusts and corporations prior to the amendment of section 267(b) to specifically include those relationships. See John A.
Snively, Sr., 20 T.C. 136 (1953); Lexmont Corp., 20 T.C. 185 (1953). But see
Wisconsin Memorial Park Co., 20 T.C. 390 (1957) (trust was regarded as a mere
conduit).
58. Rev. Rul. 77-439, 1977-2 C.B. 230.
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grantor and fiduciary;
grantor and beneficiaries;
fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir; and
decedent and decedent's estate.

While common sense suggests that certain limitations on these
categories must be made, the regulations have not addressed the
issue. Presumably, the grantor, fiduciary, and beneficiary must
be of the same trust.
A few sections create limited trust or estate relationships.
Section 704(e), which establishes special rules for family partnerships, includes rather vaguely in its definition of members of a
family any "trusts for the primary benefit of such person."~• The
prohibited transaction provisions applicable to private foundations include as a disqualified person the owner of a twenty percent or greater beneficial interest in a trust that is a substantial
contributor to the charity 80 as well as trusts or estates in which
persons who are otherwise disqualified persons in the aggregate
hold more than thirty-five percent of the beneficial interest. 81 The
similar prohibitions enacted by ERISN 2 include trusts or estates
in which disqualified persons hold more than fifty percent of the
beneficial interest. 83
The most flagrant omission from the Code relationship provisions is the absence of a generally applicable definition of related
entities of all types. As discussed below in connection with crossreferencing to relationship provisions, 64 most sections imposing a
broader scope on the defined relationship rely on cross-references
to several different relationship provisions: generally section
267(b) for family and trust relationships, section 707(b) for partnership relationships, and section 1563(a) for corporate relationships. These separate cross-references, however, do not result in
59. Section 704(e)(3) reads in pertinent part: "The 'family' of any individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and any
trust for the primary benefit of such persons." This definition also applies, by
cross-reference, to section 1375(c), which deals with distributions of electing
small business corporations.
60. LR.C. § 4946(a)( 1)(C)(iii).
61. I.R.C. § 4946(a)( 1)(G).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 978 (1974).
63. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(E)(iii).
64. See Part X infra.
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the inclusion of relationships between the different types of entities (for example, between trusts and partnerships).
Beginning in 1969, the draftsmen of tax legislation began
experimenting with new forms of all-inclusive relationship provisions, each of which is used only by a single Code section. While
each such section is different, two basic approaches have been
taken. The initial approach is contained in section 613A, which
disallows, with several exceptions, the use of percentage depletion
with respect to oil and gas production. One exception is for a
specified quantity of production by so-called independent producers. The independent-producer allocation must be shared by
specified related persons, and for this purpose section
613A(c)(8)(B) provides that any two or more trusts and estates,
together with corporations, that are under common control must
share a single allocation. The distinguishing feature of this approach is that common control is defined by an aggregation fotm
of attribution rule. 65 Common control exists if fifty percent or
more of the beneficial interest in two or more entities is owned
by the same or related persons. However, only the holdings of
persons owning a five percent or greater interest in the entity are
counted. The required secondary relationship among the beneficial owners is defined by the traditional cross-reference with certain modifications to the relationship provisions contained in sections 267, 707, and 1563.
Section 613A contains two additional trust and estate relationship provisions. Section 613A(c)(9) creates an exception to
the independent-producer exception for production derived from
proven property acquired by the taxpayer after December 31,
1974. This exception does not apply to acquisitions from certain
related persons as defined in section 613A(c)(9)(B). Trusts, estates, and corporations that are related for the purpose of paragraph (8)(B) are also regarded as related for the purpose of paragraph (9)(B). Paragraph (8)(B), however, does not regard individuals as related to entities. The draftsmen of paragraph (9)(8), on
the other hand, desired to exempt acquisitions between individuals and related trusts, although evidently not acquisitions between individuals and related estates or corporations. Thus, section 613A(c)(9)(B) provides, in effect, that a trust is related to
65.

The aggregation formula is criticized below. ld.
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individuals to the extent that the individuals are beneficiaries of
the trust.
Finally, the entire independent-producer exception is not
applicable, with several exceptions, if the taxpayer either directly
or through a related person sells oil or gas products at retail. For
this purpose, an extremely broad definition of related person was
desired, and therefore section 613A(d)(3) provides that a trust or
estate (or partnership or corporation) will be regarded as related
to the taxpayer if the taxpayer owns five percent or more of the
beneficial interest in the trust, the trust owns a five percent interest in the taxpayer, or a third party owns a five percent interest
in each. For the purpose of computing this five percent interest,
the subsection prescribes limited rules of attribution. 66
In 1976 the section 613A(c)(8) form of relationship provision
was adopted in section 48(k), which governs the investment tax
credit on motion picture film and video tapes. Section 48(k), an
all-inclusive relationship provision, expanded the list of related
business entities to include not only trusts, estates, and corporations but also partnerships, proprietorships, and "other entities."
As under section 613A, section 48(k)(3)(D) provides that two or
more trusts or estates or other entities will be regarded as related
if fifty percent or more of the beneficial interest in each entity is
owned by the same or related persons. Related persons are defined by the same cross-reference to sections 267, 707, and 1563.
The five percent de minimis rule is increased to ten percent in
section 48(k).
Draftsmen of the 1974 ERISA amendments adopted a different approach to the drafting of an all-inclusive relationship provision. The approach taken in section 414 was to adopt by crossreference the rules of section 1563, which defines a group of commonly controlled corporations, and to require the adaptation by
regulation of those rules to ·trusts, estates, and other entities.
While this provision, along with the similar section 52 that was
added in 1977, creates new trust and estate relationship provisions, they can better be understood after the corporate relationship provisions of section 1563 are consideredY
66. I.R.C. § 613(A)(d)(3) (flush language).
67. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3, 88 Stat. 879.
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B. Definitions
The Code does not provide a definition of a trust, an estate,
or a beneficiary for use in connection with the affinity rules.
These terms are defined, however, in substantially identical language in the regulations to sections 318"" and 1563. 6 Under these
sections, property is considered to be owned by an estate if the
property is subject to administration for the purpose of paying
claims against the estate and expenses of administration regardless of whether under local law title to the property vested in the
decedent's heirs immediately upon his death. The property that
is subject to these attribution rules, therefore, is essentially the
property included within the probate estate and not the property
included in the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. For
the most part, this regulatory definition is adequate, and there is
little ambiguity concerning commencement or termination dates
of a trust or estate.
On the other hand, there has been somewhat greater difficulty in determining the beneficiaries of an estate or trust and
their proportionate interest in the assets. Regulations to both
section 318 and section 1563 provide that with respect to an estate
a "beneficiary" includes any person entitled to receive property
pursuant to a will or the laws of descent and distribution. A
person ceases to be considered a beneficiary when (1) he has
received all the property to which he is entitled, (2) he no longer
has a claim against the estate attributable to his having been a
beneficiary, and (3) there is only a remote possibility that it will
be necessary for the estate to seek payment from him to satisfy
claims against the estate or the expenses of administration. The
Service has ruled that this definition of a beneficiary is equally
applicable to the attribution rules contained in section 544. 70
While a definition of beneficiary for the purposes of section 267
has never been provided, the statutory language of section 267(c)
j

68. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 129.
69. Id. § 1.1563-3(b)(3)(ii), T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 291.
70. Rev. Rul. 71-353, 1971-2 C.B. 243. Technically, this ruling was limited
to construing the definition of "beneficiary" in section 544 for the purposes of
applying that section by a cross-reference from section 341. However, it is unlikely that a different definition would be used for any other purpose unless the
deviation were clearly mandated in order to prevent avoidance of the substantive law provision.
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with respect to the beneficiary of an estate is identical to the
language contained in section 544. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that a definition of "beneficiary" similar to that of sections 318, 544, and 1563 would be used.
It is not clear whether a residuary legatee may cease to be
regarded as a beneficiary prior to the formal closing of an estate.
The Service has ruled that the regulatory language governing
when a person ceases to be a beneficiary pertains only to a specific
legatee and is not applicable to a residuary legatee whose interest
cannot be determined prior to the closing of the estate. 71 In a prior
case, Renton Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 77 the Third Circuit
held that if an estate were insolvent and no assets would be distributed to a residuary legatee, the legatee would not constitute
a beneficiary for the purposes of the attribu~ion rules contained
in the predecessor to section 544. 73 Although the later ruling did
not refer to Renton Investment, it hypothesized that the assets
of the estate were insufficient to make any payment to the
residuary legatee but nevertheless required attribution, thereby
clearly indicating disagreement with the earlier decision.
The conflict between these authorities raises the more general problem of the extent to which these rules must be applied
solely on the basis of technical definitions rather than with regard
to underlying realities. While the position of the Service is doubtlessly based in part upon a desire to protect revenues, it also
evidences an understandable disinclination to permit affinity def.
initions to be controlled by difficult questions of valuation and
legitimacy of claims. Traditionally, affinity definitions have not
turned on such factual inquiries. Recently, however, the Treasury
Department has adopted flexible rules of attribution involving
trusts 74 that seem more consistent with Renton Investment than
with the conflicting ruling of the Service. The rule of Renton
Investment, with its stronger factual basis, is the preferred ap·
proach and, given substantial proof of the estate's insolvency,
should be followed. 75
71. Rev. Rul. 60-18, 1960-1 C.B. 145.
72. 131 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1942).
73. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 354, 50 Stat. 815.
74. See the discussion of the regulations to sections 958 and 1563 at text
following notes 94 & 257 infra.
75. The adoption of the Renton Investment rule with respect to estates
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Clearly, the assets held by an estate may vary from time to
time by virtue of interim distributions or for other reasons. Under
the regulatory definition of a beneficiary, the identity of the beneficiaries of an estate and the extent of their proportional interest
may also change occasionally. In Revenue Ruling 58-111, 78 the
Service acknowledged this fluctuation and required that attribution be made as of the date of the transaction subject to the
attribution provision.
In at least one context, the Service has ruled that a trust that
was not in existence nevertheless constituted a trust. Stock
owned by the decedent passed under his will to a residuary trust
that was not to be formed until the conclusion of the estate. The
question presented was whether the stock held by the estate could
be attributed to the beneficiaries of the trust under the attribution rules of section 318. Literally, attribution from the estate
would be limited to the trust, and there would be no attribution
from the trust to its beneficiaries since the trust did not exist.
However, under Revenue Ruling 67-24, 71 a residuary testamentary trust is to be treated as if it were in existence even if no assets
have been transferred to the trustee.
C.

Trust and Estate Attribution

The same three Code sections that provide the basic family
attribution rules also provide the trust and estate attribution
rules that are used in most sections of the Code.
Section 267(c), the oldest of the attribution rules, provides
only for attribution from entities to their owners. Thus, section
267(c)(1) provides that stock owned by an estate or trust shall be
considered owned proportionately by the beneficiaries. For years
it was unclear whether the beneficiaries to which the section referred were the present beneficiaries of a trust or whether remaincould open similar avenues of inquiry with respect to other entities, although
there does not appear to have been any litigation in analogous areas in the 30·
plus years that have elapsed since the decision. For example, should stock
owned by a corporation be attributed to the corporation's shareholders at a time
when the corporation has a negative net worth? Presumably, attribution should
be made at least until such time as the corporation has formally entered bankruptcy or receivership.
76. 1958-1 C.B. 173.
77. 1967-1 C.B. 75.
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dermen, either vested or contingent, were also included. In
Steuben Securities Corp., 1" a case arising under the predecessor
to section 544 (which made applicable for the purposes of the
personal holding company provisions an attribution rule identical
to section 267(c)(l)), the Tax Court was faced with a factual
setting in which the corporate taxpayer would escape classification as a personal holding company if its stock were regarded as
owned by the remaindermen constructively through a trust as
well as by the holders of a present interest in the trust. The court
concluded that to give full effect to congressional basis intent, it
was required to hold that the term "beneficiary" was limited to
those having a ''direct present interest" in the trust and excluding
those whose interest "will or may become effective at a later
time." 71 After fifteen years of silence, the Service issued a ruling
adopting the Steuben Securities rule, apparently settling the
question. 110
Within a year following this ruling, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Phinney v. Tuboscope Co., 81
reviewed the definition of beneficiary contained in the predecessor to section 544 in connection with the application of an obscure
provision of the Excess Profits Act of 1950.~ 2 The trust involved
was a spendthrift trust for the benefit of an individual's children.
While the children were the sole beneficiaries of the trust, the
trust income was being currently accumulated, and the father
argued that the children did not have a present interest under the
Steuben Securities rule. On these facts the court held for the
government without expressly overruling Steuben Securities. 83
78. 1 T.C. 395 (1943).
79. /d. at 399.
80. Rev. Rul. 58·325, 1958-1 C.B. 212 (issued under section 421(d)(l)(C),
now repealed but substantially replaced by section 425(d), which contains an
attribution provision identical to sections 267(c)(1) and 544).
81. 268 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1959).
82. Pub. L. No. 909, 64 Stat. 1137.
83. The holdings of the trust could have been attributed to the children
without disturbing the application of the Steuben Securities rule to trusts pursuant to which the income was not being accumulated for the benefit of the
remaindermen.
Judge Brown summarized his decision in Tuboscope as follows:
As we struggle through this intricate web of definitions, exclusions,
provisions, exceptions, cross references, limitations, provisos and a
general but unavoidable obscurity, it is our conclusion that § 430(e)

19781

AFFINITY PROVISIONS

589

Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service determined that its
interests would be better served by the Tuboscope rule and accordingly announced its intention to follow the rule of the Fifth
Circuit, thereby revoking its earlier adoption of the Steuben
Securities formula. This new ruling provided that henceforth
stock held in trust would be considered as owned by "its present
or future beneficiaries in proportion to their actuarial interests." 84
Curiously, both Steuben Securities and Tuboscope involved
an interpretation of the predecessor to section 544. ~ Both rulings
involved an interpretation of section 421(d) (now section 425(d)),
although Revenue Ruling 62-155 stated that its holding was also
applicable to section 544.~ None of these authorities, however,
made any reference to the identical attribution provision contained in the much more frequently applied section 267(c), nor
has there been any authority arising under that provision interpreting the word beneficiary. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
presume that the rule applicable to section 267, whatever its current form may be, would be the same as the rule applicable to
identical provisions found elsewhere in the Code. Indeed, the
trend has favored the actuarial rule currently applicable to section 544, and it would be safe to assume that section 267 would
be similarly interpreted, at least with respect to attribution from
trusts. 87
In an attempt to avoid the interpretive problems arising with
respect to beneficiaries of trusts under prior laws, section 318
adopted explicit provisions governing the determination of pro(2)(B)(i), expressly incorporating § 445(g)(2)(B), impliedly carries
with it § 445(g)(3), though not necessarily that portion of § 461 im·
pliedly incorporated by reference to § 462(g) in § 445(g)(l), so that
the attribution rules of § 503(a)(1)(2)(5) make ownership of the
corporate stock by the minor beneficiaries of a trust the ownership of
the father, and thus pushes the stock ownership beyond the critical 50
per cent to make thereby a new corporation an old one.
Perhaps this needs some elaboration.
268 F.2d at 234.
84. Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 132.
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 503, 53 Stat. 106.
86. Rev. Rul. 62-155, 1962-2 C.B. 133. It is difficult to evaluate the signifi·
cance of the fact that all four authorities held against the taxpayer.
87. It is difficult to predict on what basis stock would be attributed under
section 267 from an estate to its beneficiaries. See text accompanying notes 90·
92 infra.
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portional ownership. Thus, section 318(a)(2)(D) provides that
stock owned by a trust shall be considered owned by its beneficiaries in proportion to their actuarial interest in the trust. This
rule is subject to two exceptions: (1) there is no attribution from
an exempt trust described in section 401(a), and (2) stock owned
by a grantor or Clifford trustM is treated as owned by the person
who is considered the owner of the trust under sections 671-678.K9
Shortly before the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue
Ruling 58-325 adopting the Steuben Securities rule for trusts,
regulations were issued under section 318. 90 By way of an example
in these regulations, and without textual discussion, the Treasury
adopted the Steuben Securities rule for estates. 91 The example
provided that the interest of an individual to whom a remainder
interest in property passed under a will shoul_d be disregarded in
determining the proportionate interest of other beneficiaries in
stock held by the estate since the remainderman had "no direct
present interest" in the estate assets.j2 Although the Internal Revenue Service has now reversed its endorsement of Steuben
Securities with respect to trusts under other provisions of the
Code, the regulatory provision under section 318 remains with
respect to estates.
Section 318 also provides for "back-attribution"-attribution to entities from their owners. Thus, stock owned by the
beneficiary of a trust or estate is considered owned by the trust
88. If the grantor or another retains or acquires greater than a defined
interest in, or powers over, a trust, all or the affected portion of the items of·
income and expense incurred by the trust are taxed directly to such person. The
trust is in general effect disregarded.
89. It is not clear whether the general rule attributing stock to beneficiaries is applicable to a grantor trust so that stock held by the trust may be
attributed both to grantors and beneficiaries. In general, the attribution rules
permit stock held by one person to be attributed to various other persons depending upon which attribution would result in the greatest attributed ownership. Presumably, therefore, stock held by a grantor trust may be attributed
either to the deemed owner or to the actuarially determined beneficiaries.
90. T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-3(a), ex. (2), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 129. As noted
above, this situation renders it somewhat unclear how attribution from estates
is to be made under section 267 and similar provisions in which express authority is lacking and the analogies are in conflict.
92. Id. This was the same language employed in the Steuben Securities
opinion.
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or estate. However, back-attribution is not made from a beneficiary holding only a remote contingent interest, defined a·s including a value (computed actuarially and assuming a maximum
exercise of discretion in favor of the beneficiary) of five percent
or less of the value of the trust property. 13 Similarly, stock
owned by the grantor (or other person considered the owner) of
a grantor trust is considered as owned by the trust. 14
Section 1563(e) substantially modified the rules governing
attribution from trusts and estates applied by section 318. Attribution on an actuarial basis was extended to include estates as
well as trusts, thus eliminating the Steuben Securities rule from
this provision altogether. Furthermore, section 1563 introduced a
five percent threshold requirement for attribution from all entities including trusts and estates.
The most significant change introduced by section 1563 was
an attempt to limit attribution to those beneficiaries of a trust
or estate who actually held a beneficial interest in the stock being
attributed. It had long been recognized that ownership interests
in entities are not always of the same quality. The dissimilarity
is most acute in the case of a trust or estate where quite commonly either the remainder interest in a particular asset or the
income attributable thereto would be the exclusive property of
less than all of the beneficiaries. Under the prior attribution rules,
if an estate consisted of only two items, land and stock, and A
held a present interest in the stock, B held a remainder interest
in the stock, and C was entitled to the entire interest in the land,
ownership of the stock would be attributed to A, B, and C in
accordance with their actuarial interest in the trust or estate.
Even less justifiably, under the Steuben Securities rule, ownership of the 'stock would be allocated between only A and C even
though the interest of B in such stock was clearly superior to the
interest of C.
Under section 1563, attribution of the ownership of stock
held by trust or estate is made on the basis of the acuarial interest
of each beneficiary in the stock alone and not in accordance with
93. The five percent threshold requirement was added to the backattribution provision of section 318 in order to blunt the criticism that backattribution did not accord with economic reality to the same extent as did the
normal attribution rule.
94. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B)(ii)_
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his interest in the trust or estate assets generally .'s The interest
of a beneficiary who cannot under any circumstances obtain an
interest in the stock, including income attributable to the stock
or the proceeds of any disposition, is ignored. Thus, in the illustration above, no interest in the stock would be attributed to C.
The interests of A and B would depend upon their actuarial interest in the stock as if the stock were the only asset of the trust or
estate.
As noted, sections 544 and 425(d) contain estate and trust
attribution rules identical to those contained in section 267(c).18
On the other hand, section 447 is unique in several respects, including the combination of the aggregation with the traditional
form of attribution. The primary relationship subject to this section, a family-owned incorporated farm, is defined as a farm in
which fifty percent of the stock is owned by members of the same
family-the aggregation form of attribution. Stock owned by
trusts, partnerships, and corporations is attributed in the traditional manner to the individual family members, but stock owned
by estates is not. Instead, the members of the family are uniquely
defined as including estates of deceased family members. Thus,
all stock owned by an estate is taken into account in establishing
the primary relationship, regardless of whether any of the surviving members of the family are beneficiaries of the estate and
regardless of the extent of their interest. This treatment of an
entity as an individual and attributing the entire amount of its
holdings is most uncommon. Assuming that this breadth of attribution was deliberate, it seems peculiar that traditional attribution from estates was omitted. By virtue of that omission, stock
held by the estate of an individual who was not a member of the
defined family is not taken into account even though a member
of the family is a principal beneficiary of the estate. The differing
treatment of trusts and estates can produce questionable results.
If stock passes from the estate of a nonfamily member to a trust,
attribution commences. If stock passes from the estate of a family
member to a trust having nonfamily beneficiaries, attribution is
reduced-even if the family interest in the trust is greater than
their interest in the estate as a whole.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-3(b)(3}, T.D. 7181, 1972-1 C.B. 300.
96. Compare I.R.C. § 267(c)(l) with I.R.C. §§ 544(a)(1) and 425(d)(2).
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PARTNERSHIP AFFINITY

Partnership Relationships

Neither section 267(a), pertaining to the disallowance of
losses incurred on transactions between related taxpayers, nor
section 1239, which characterizes gain on the sale of depreciable
property as ordinary income in similar although more restricted
situations, directly applies to partnership transactions. However,
section 707(b) provides rules analogous to both such sections and
establishes its own definition of the relevant relationship for each
provision. Thus, paragraph (1) disallows losses on transactions
between a partnership and a partner owning more than fifty percent of the interest in the partnership or between two partnerships in which the same persons own more than fifty percent of
the interest in each partnership. 87 Paragraph (2) of section 707(b),
which characterizes gain as ordinary income, contains the same
definition of relationship except that, consistent with the narrower section 1239, the partner or partners must own eighty percent of the capital or profits interest. For all purposes under section 707(b), a partnership interest is defined as either an interest
in capital or an interest in profits, and satisfaction of the fifty
percent or eighty percent requirement with respect to either interest is sufficient to invoke disallowance or recbaracterization
under this section. The relationship definition contained in section 707(b)(l) is commonly used throughout the Code in defining
partnership relationships.uR
Section 707(b)(3) provides that for the purposes of both paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, ownership of a capital or profits
interest is to be determined by the attribution rules contained in
section 267(c), excepting the provisions of section 267(c) providing for direct attribution from one partner to another. This requirement conforms the disallowance-of-losses provisions of section 707 to the similar provision contained in section 267.
While the Code does not establish partnership relationship
provisions under section 267 (the 1954 Code appeared to leave
this area exclusively to section 707), the omission of partnerships
97. In the latter respect, section 707(b)(l) is broader than section 267(b),
which lacks a general brother-sister corporation relationship definition.
98. See Part X infra.
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from the enumeration of related taxpayers opened an obvious
avenue for tax avoidance. In Commissioner v. Whitney•• the
Commissioner challenged, pursuant to section 267(a)(1), the allowance of losses incurred in connection with the sale by a partnership of all of its assets to a corporation, 78.2% of the outstanding stock of which was owned by the partners and members of
their family. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the predecessor to section 267(b) 1110 did not encompass transactions involving partnerships but undertook to determine whether the transaction in question could be characterized as occurring between the
corporation and the partners in their individual capacity. After a
lengthy review of the conflicting characterization of partnerships
under the tax laws as entities or as mere aggregations of individuals, the court held that for the purposes of section 267, a partnership should be treated as an association of individual co-owners
and the partnership entity disregarded. Since each partner constructively owned over fifty percent of the stock of the corporation
by virtue of the direct attribution from partners permitted by
section 267(c) and its predecessor, the court disallowed the losses
taken on each of the partner's individual tax returns. Although
the validity of the characterization of partnerships by the court
under the 1954 Code may be questioned, regulations to section
267, adopted in 1958, incorporated the aggregation concept used
in Whitney. 101
The regulations to section 267 concede that transactions between partnerships and the members of the partnership are not
within the scope of section 267 but rather are governed by section
707. However, the regulations provide that transactions between
a partnership and a nonpartner shall be. deemed as occuring between the nonpartner and each member of the partnership separately. Accordingly, if a partner and the nonpartner, after application of the attribution rules (which includes direct attribution
from a partner), fall within a section 267(b) relationship, a portion of the loss or deduction subject to section 267(a) shall be
disallowed. Specifically, if the transaction results in a loss or
deduction to the partnership, the portion thereof allocable to the
99. 169 F .2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948).
100. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(b)(l)(B), 53 Stat. 16.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(b)-l(b)(l) (1958).
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related partner under the partnership agreement is disallowed.
When the transaction results in a loss or deduction to the nonpartner, a portion of such loss or deduction equal to the interest
of related partners in the partnership is to be disallowed.
Pr.escribing a proportion.al application of a substantive law
provision when the prescribed relationship exists is extremely
rare in the Code. Presumably, this position ·was adopted in the
regulations because of the case support provided by Whitney and
because· a greater extension of section 267 to partnership transactions clearly would constitute an impermissible construction of
the statutory provision. Viewed in isolation, the compromise
adopted in the regulations is not necessarily an unsatisfactory
approach for substantive law provisions based upon taxpayer relationships. In some contexts, at least, its effect may be more
precise and tailored to the abuse under attack than the complete
disallowance otherwise provided by the Code if the prescribed
relationship, which may involve a low threshold definition, exists.
Nevertheless, it is totally inappropriate for a single provision of
the Code to provide for a proportionate disallowance with respect
to one entity while prescribing a different rule in all other circumstances. Indeed, the results obtained through the application of
this regulatory rule for partnerships is completely inconsistent
with all other Code affinity provisions. Thus, for example, if a
sixty percent partner sells property at a loss to his partnership,
section 707(b)(l)(A) disallows the loss entirely. Similarly, if a
sixty percent shareholder sells property to his corporation at a
loss, section 267(a)(l) and (b)(2) completely disallow the loss.
Furthermore, if an individual owns one hundred percent of each
of two corporations and property is sold at a loss from one to
another, the entire loss is allowed because of the omission of a
general brother-sister corporation relationship in section 267, 102
However, under the above regulations, if A is a sixty percent
partner in a partnership that sells property to a corporation
wholly owned by A, sixty percent of the loss is disallowed. While
the need to close an obvious gap in the statutory pattern is clear,
the approach of the regulations to section 267 is not satisfactory.
Rather, the regulations evidence the need for a complete congressional overhaul of section 267.
102.

Fort Walton Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 653, 658 (1970).
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In Liflans Corp. v. United States 1n3 a court considered the
other side of the partnership relationship question-the situation
in which the other entity, not the partnership, is the taxpayer in
question. This decision, arising under the 1954 Code, expressly
approved the analysis of the Whitney case and reached the result
prescribed by the regulations to section 267 but without referring
to those regulations. In Liflans a partnership owned debentures
issued by a corporation, sixty-seven percent of the stock of which
was actually and constructively owned by one of the partners and
twenty-eight percent of the stock of which was constructively
owned by the other partner. The Commissioner disallowed a deduction to the corporation for interest accrued but unpaid on the
debentures under section 267(a). The court sustained that disallowance with respect to the fifty percent of the interest deduction attributable to the debentures proportionately owned by the
partner owning sixty-seven percent of the stock but permitted a
deduction for the fifty percent of the interest apportioned to the
partner who owned less than fifty percent of the stock of the
corporation. In view of the judicial adoption of this approach, the
proportional relationship prescribed by the regulations to section
267(b) is probably beyond challenge. Legislative action, therefore, will be required to correct this inconsistent application of
section 267.
Solely for the purposes of section 267, the regulatory provision, while undesirable because of its inconsistency, appears
workable. As discussed below, however, the sections of the Code
that cross-reference the relationships established under section
267(b) presumably incorporate the regulatory elaboration of that
subsection, including the special partnership rule. It is not at all
clear how the partnership rule is intended to operate for the various purposes of these cross-references. Consider, for example,
section 179, which excludes from the definition of a "purchase,"
for the purpose of that section, acquisitions of property from a
person whose relationship to the person acquiring the property
would result in the disallowance of a loss under section 267. An
acquisition of property by a corporation from a partnership in
which a partner owns over fifty percent of the stock of the corporation would, under section 267, result in a partial disallowance
103. 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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of a loss. But there is no suggestion in either section 179 or the
regulations thereto that an acquisition can be treated as a purchase in part, and it would seem unlikely that such an assertion
by the Service would be upheld. Yet it is not at all clear whether
the transactions described would fall within the exception to the
definition of purchase provided under section 179. The interaction between the general relationship provisions and the sections
cross-referencing to these provisions is perhaps the best argument
against the sort of ad hoc patching of inadequate relationship
provisions exemplified by the section 267 partnership regulations.
The need for legislative clarification is apparent.
Of the three complex relationship provisions of section 613A,
only the related retailer provision of section 613A(d)(3) includes
partnership relationships. 104 The provision is analogous to the
trust provision described previously 105 and requires ownership of
a five percent interest in "profits or capital." As seen in connection with trusts, HHI section 48(k) was drafted along the general
lines of section 613A(c)(8)(B). While the earlier section does not
include partnerships, such entities are included as business entities under section 48(k) in the same manner as trusts. Again, the
primary relationship is established by reference to the relationship among the owners of fifty percent of the beneficial interest
in the partnership. As under section 613A(d)(3), ownership of a
beneficial interest is defined as ownership of an interest in profits
or capital. However, the application of this "either/or" test to
section 48(k), in which control can be found in a large number of
related (aggregated) persons, is somewhat more complex than
under section 613A(d)(3), in which normal attribution is used and
ownership of a five percent interest must be found in one person.
Presumably, under section 48(k) only like interests may be
added. For example, if there were only two related partners, one
owning a thirty percent interest in profits and a fifteen percent
interest in capital and the other owning a fifteen percent interest
in profits and a thirty percent interest in capital, control should
be lacking since the related persons only own a forty-five percent
104. For the purposes served by the other relationship provisions, partnerships are "looked through" under the aggregate conception and thus the substantive law operates at the partner level. Set? LR.C. § 613A(c)(7)(D).
105. See text preceding note 66 supra.
106. See text following note 66 supra.
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interest in profits and a forty-five percent interest in capital.
Section 163(d)(7), also added by the 1976 Act, contains a
similar but far simpler entity-owner relationship provision. As in
the case of sections 613A and 48(k), the substantive law operates
with respect to a fifty percent owned partnership or corporation,
and the ownership must be held by a defined group of related
persons. Under section 163(d)(7)(B), however, the only related
persons are the taxpayer, his spouse, and his children. Also, in
contrast with the other two sections, ownership under this provision is defined solely in terms of capital interest-different ownership interests in profits are ignored.
Partnerships are included in both section 414 and section 52,
the all-inclusive provisions that rely upon an adaptation of section 1563. These sections are considered below .107
Section 1313 provides that a partner is a related taxpayer for
the pu-rpose of the mitigation provisions. Since a partnership is
not a taxpaying entity, it was not necessary to define a partner
and a partnership as related taxpayers.
The prohibited-transaction provisions 108 also include partnership relationships. For purposes of the private foundation rule,
a disqualified person includes (1) the owner of a twenty percent
interest in profits of a partnership (interest in capital is ignored)
if the partnership is a substantial contributor to the private foundation10~ and (2) a partnership in which disqualified persons own,
in the aggregate, more than a thirty-five percent interest in the
profits. 110 On the other hand, the usually similar section 4975(e),
defining a disqualified person for ERISA purposes, includes a
partnership if over fifty percent of the interest in profits or capital
is owned by a disqualified person. 111 In addition, section 4975(e)
includes a partner of specified disqualified persons provided that
the partner owns a ten percent or greater interest in capital or
profits. 112
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See text accompanying note 267 infra.
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 4946(a)(1)(C)(ii).
§ 4946(a)(l)(F).
§ 4975(e)(2)(G).
§ 4975(e)(2)(1) ..
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Partnership Attribution

Although section 267 does not include partners and partnerships within its enumeration of relationships, section 267(c) attributes stock owned by a partnership to its partners under the
entity attribution rules of paragraph (1). ~n addition, section 267,
together with the similar and historically related section 544, discussed below, are unique in requiring so-called sidewise attribution from one partner in a partnership to another. 113 Such attribution can be quite broad. For example, stock owned by a partnership and attributed to each of its partners may again be reattributed, under the sidewise rules, to each of the partners. The
result is that each partner is not merely treated as owning an
interest in the stock that corresponds to his proportionate interest
in the partnership but is treated as owning all of the stock owned
by the partnership. In the case of section 267, this rule is limited
by requiring as a precondition to sidewise partner attribution that
the attributee partner otherwise own stock in the corporation. For
this purpose, an individual is treated as owning the stock that he
actually owns and stock that is attributed to him from entities
in which he owns an interest. However, stock may not be attributed to an individual from his partner merely because a member
of the individual's family owns such stock. It has been observed
above that this precondition, while not common under the various attribution provisions of the Code, has been used by Congress as a device to limit the normal reach of attribution. As a
technique of avoiding the arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of a
person whose relationship to the taxpayer is marginal, the concept is deserving of additional attention.
The attribution from partnerships rule contained in section
318 is identical to that used in section 267. In addition, section
318 requires back-attribution 114 from a partner to his partnership.
In neither situation are there threshold requirements. Section 318
does not permit attribution from one partner to another as is
permitted under section 267, sidewise attribution having been
eliminated from this section in 1964. 115
113. The very broad attribution resulting from sidewise attribution has
been discussed at note 33 supra. It becomes even more pronounced under the
reattribution rules.
114. I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A).
115. Pub. L. No. 88-554, § 4, 78 Stat. 763 ( 1964).
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As is the case under section 1563 in connection with trust and
estate attribution, this section does not employ back-attribution,
and it imposes a threshold requirement for entity attribution.
Thus, stock is attributed from a partnership proportionately to its
partners but not to a partner having less than a five percent
interest in the partnership. Neither section 267 nor section 318
undertook to define what was meant by a partner's proportionate
interest in a partnership. This area of uncertainty assumed importance with the increased popularity of widely, if not publicly,
held investment vehicles cast in partnership form in which the
interests of "inside" partners in profits varied over time and was
different from their interest in partnership capital. To resolve
these doubts, section 1563 adopted the specific rule that a partner's proportionate interest was to be determined with reference
to either capital or profits, whichever produced the greater attribution.11• As in the case of section 318, direct partner-to-partner
attribution is not permitted.
Section 544, the personal holding company attribution provision, contains the entity attribution rule providing that stock
held by a partnership is considered to be owned proportionately
by its partners. This provision also retains attribution directly
from partners in the form in which it was introduced into the tax
laws in 1937 .m Thus, partner-to-partner attribution is required
under this section without regard to whether the person to whom
the stock is attributable otherwise owns stock in the corporation.
Sections 425(d), 447(d)(2), and 613A(d)(3) similarly adopt the
standard proportionate attribution rule from partnerships to
partners but do not provide for back-attribution or for attribution
directly between partners. A special partnership rule, of the aggregation type, is contained in section 1237(a)(2), which attributes to a taxpayer activities by a partnership that includes the
taxpayer as a partner.
VI.

A.

CORPORATE AFFINITY

Corporate Relationships

The provisions contained in the Code involving relationships
that include corporations are much more extensive and complex
116.
117.

I.R.C. § 1563(e)(2).
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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than the other relationship provisions because of the large number of sections prescribing, for a variety of special purposes, relationships with or among corporations. The welter of provisions
may logically be divided into two categories: general relationship
provisions that include corporations within their ambit and limited provisions that only describe relati()nships among corporations. The second form of relationship, usually referred to as
"control," is generally outside the scope of this article although
it will be useful to describe the more commonly used control
sections for purposes of comparison.
Section 267, the original Code relationship provision, established the pattern of corporate relationships that continues to be
the one most commonly used. Section 267 encompasses the relationships between (1) a corporation and an individual who owns
more than fifty percent in value of the stock of such corporation, 11 s
(2) a corporation and a fiduciary of a trust if either the trust or
the grantor of the trust owns more than fifty percent in value of
the corporation's stock, 111 and (3) two corporations if more than
fifty percent in value of the outstanding stock of each is owned
by the same individual, provided that one of such corporations is
either a domestic personal holding company or a foreign personal
holding company .•zo
Section 267 is the only section of the Code that establishes
corporate relationship rules that are widely used throughout the
Code for a variety of purposes. 121 Other Code sections set forth
special relationship rules for corporations that are used solely by
that particular section. Section 341, governing the sale or exchange of stock in a collapsible corporation, contains what may
be the most confusing use of attribution and relationship rules in
the Code. Section 34l(e)(8), which defines a related person, prescribes relatiom{hips according to whether the stockholder who
has sold his interest is an individual or a corporation. If the shareholder is an individual, a corporation in which he owns at least
fifty percent of the stock measured by either voting power or
118. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2).
119. I.R.C. § 267(b)(8).
120. I.R.C. § 267(b)(3).
121. Sections 1504 and 1563, described below, are also used by crossreference but only for defining relationships among corporations. See text accompanying notes 209-11 & 225 infra.
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value is regarded as related to him.-Ifthe shareholder is a corporation, the corporation in question is regarded as related to its parent, its subsidiary, and a sister corporation. However, the definitional tests for these relationships vary slightly. Thus, the same
fifty percent ownership test of either voting power or value is
employed in defining the parent and subsidia·ry relationship. A
related sister corporation, however, is defined as a corporation
more than fifty percent in value of whose stock is owned by the
same person who also owns more than fifty percent in value of the
corpotation in question; voting power is not a part of this test.
In defining a sister corporation, the stock interests must be owned
by only a single person although the attribution rules of section
267(c), with certain modifications, are applicable to this determination. This attribution approach to ·related business entities is
consistent with section 267 but should be contrasted to the aggregation approach of more recently enacted sections.
Section 954(d)(3) defines a person related to a controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) for the purposes of defining "Subpart
F income." Generally, the CFC is related to the same persons to
whom a corporation having a corporate shareholder under section
34l(e) would be related. However, the "parent" of a CFC may be
an individual, partnership, trust, or estate. For the purpose of
defining the parent and subsidiary relationships, the same fifty
percent test is used except that it refers only to voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote and does not refer to value.
Similarly, a sister corporation is defined as a corporation more
than fifty percent of the voting power of which is owned by the
same person or persons who own fifty percent of the voting power
in the CFC. As under section 341(e), attribution rules are applicable, thereby expanding the reach of the section. Section 954(d)
cross-references the attribution rules contained in section 958,
which adopts, with considerable modification, the rules provided
by section 318.
The definition of a related sister corporation in section 954
is far broader than the section 341 definition since the fifty percent control can be found in an unlimited number of persons
rather than just a single taxpayer. The section 954 definition is
also notably broader than the aggregation approach because no
further relationship is required among the controlling stockholders to find the specified relationship between the brother-sister
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corporations. By contrast, under the aggregation form of sections
613A(c)(8) and 48(k), two corporations will not be regarded as
related, even though over fifty percent of the stock of both is
owned by the same person, unless those stockholders are related
to each other in the manner specified, that is, within the tests of
sections 267, 707(b), and 1563. As noted above, the scope of these
more recent sections is also significantly limited by the existence
of a de minimis rule pursuant to which stock held even by related
persons is not counted towards the fifty percent requirement if
the related person owns less than five percent of the stock in
either corporation in the case of section 613A and ten percent in
the case of section 48(k).
These sections also differ with respect to the nature of the
stock to be taken into account. The clear reference to voting
power in section 954 may be contrasted with the short-hand reference to voting stock in section 48(k), which does not expressly
account for stock possessing unequal voting power, and the absence of any definition at all in section 613A.
In contrast to both sections 341(e) and 954, neither section
613A nor section 48(k) employs attribution rules for the purpose
of concentrating stock ownership in the corporation in question.
Presumably the cross-reference to sections 267, 707(b), and 1563
carry with them references to the attribution rules applicable to
those sections. However, such attribution would be only for the
purpose of determining which taxpayers would be regarded as
related. The effect of attribution at this level is far more difficult
to visualize than is the effect of the attribution under sections
341(e) and 954-a difficulty that pervades the approach of sections 613A and 48(k). Nevertheless, the effect of attribution only
to expand the list of related parties is generally less extensive
than the effect of attribution under the earlier sections and can
be illustrated in the following simplified way. Assume that F
owns all of the stock of corporation X and forty percent of the
stock of corporation Y, his son S owns forty percent of the stock
of corporation Z; and Z owns the balance of sixty percent of the
stock of Y. The issue is whether corporations X and Yare related
for these various sections. Under section 341(e), Sis regarded as
owning twenty-four percent of Y through his ownership of Z, and
this holding is attributed to F. Thus, F is regarded as owning
sixty-four percent of Y, and X and Y are related. Under section
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48(k), X and Y will be regarded as related only if F and Z are
related within the meaning of section 267. For this purpose, the
holdings of S in Z are attributed to F, but since S only owns forty
percent of Z, F and Z are not related. Thus X and Y are not
related for the purpose of section 48(k).
Two provisions added by the 1976 Act define relationships
between corporations and a single family group. Under section
163(d)(7), the relationship exists if the taxpayer together with his
spouse and children own fifty percent or more of the value of all
classes of stock in the corporation and no attribution is required.
On the other hand, section 447 contains an extremely broad definition of family 121 and requires ownership of at least fifty percent
of the combined voting power of all classes of voting stock and at
least fifty percent of the number of shares of all other classes by
the several members of the family in the aggregate. In addition,
section 447(d) prescribes its own unique set of attribution rules. 123
The relationships specified in section 1239, as expanded by
the 1976 Act, extend to (1) a corporation and an individual owning eighty percent or more in value of the corporation stock and
(2) two corporations if the same individual owns eighty percent
or more in value of the stock of each corporation. For both purposes, a modified form of the attribution rules of section 318 is
applicable.
The stylistic differences between such traditional attribution
sections as 341(e), 954, and 1239 and the more recently adopted
aggregation provisions in sections 613A, 48(k), 163(d), and
447(d), although considered more fully below, should be noted
here. Each of these provisions, at least in part, undertakes to
define for tax purposes what is meant by a closely held corporation. The result reached under each section is that all of the stock
held by defined members of a family are taken into account in
determining whether the stock holdings are sufficiently concentrated. Thus, each of these sections achieves the same substantive result although by two quite different procedures. The need
for two paths to the same result under the same Code is dubious.
Section 1237 exemplifies corporate affinity in its most vague
form. An improvement to property is deemed made by the tax122.
123.

See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
S'ee text accompanying notes 95 supra & 136-38 infra.
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payer if it is ~ade "by a corporation controlled by the taxpayer."
The Code contains no further elaboration of the meaning of
"controlled," but section 1.1237-l(c)(2)(i)(b) of the regulations
defines control in terms of ownership of more than fifty percent
of the corporation's voting stock. This regulation provides that
ownership may be either direct, constructive, "or otherwise."
While it is quite clear that the draftsmen of this regulation intended a broad definition of corporate ownership, there is no definition, such as by cross-reference, of either constructive ownership or "otherwise" ownership. It is unclear whether this statement in the regulations indicates the Treasury Department's be~
lief in a common law of constructive ownership or whether the
regulations were somewhat casually drafted. 124
In a similarly vague style section 613(c) includes as a related
person a person under common control with the taxpayer. The
statutory provision does not contain a definition of control, but
the regulations refer to the definition contained in section 482. 12 ~
Neither section 482 nor the regulations thereto contain a precise
definition of control although ownership of fifty percent of the
voting stock of a corporation has been found to constitute control.121
The two prohibited-transaction provisions also include corporate relationships. Section 4946, pertaining to private foundations, defines a disqualified person as including the owner of more
than twenty percent of the voting power of a corporate substantial
contributor 127 and a corporation in which other disqualified persons own more than thirty-five percent of the voting power .m The
ERISA provisions contained in section 4975(e)(2) include a corporation more than fifty percent of the voting power or value of
which is owned by certain disqualified persons. 12u
The most common of the corporate control provisions are
section 368(c) (pertaining to reorganizations), section 1504 (defin124. The limited scope of nonstatutory attribution is considered below.

See Part IX A infra.
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(e)(5) (1965).
126. See B. Forman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1114, 1153-55 (2d
Cir. 1972); Cayuga Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 18 (1975).
127. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(l)(C)(i).
128. LR.C. § 4946(a)(l)(E).
129. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2)(G).

606

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

ing corporations eligible to file consolidated returns), and sections
1551 and 1563 (disallowing certain multiple tax benefits). The
controlled group definitions contained in these sections, except
for that contained in section 1563, are not widely employed in the
Code.
For the purposes of the corporate reorganization provisions,
section 368(c) defines control as the ownership of stock possessing
at least eighty percent of the voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote plus at least eighty percent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock. However, section 368(c) is
not a complete relationship provision by itself since it does not
specify in whom control must be found. That element is added
by the various substantive provisions that incorporate the stock
ownership requirements of section 368(c) and varies from a single
shareholder to an unlimited number of shareholders that have
another attribute in common (such as having transferred property to the corporation).
Section 1504, in defining an affiliated group, describes a related group of corporations that is quite different from those considered above. The requisite degree of stock ownership, with inconsequential differences in wording, is identical to the section
368(c) requirement. However, a corporation is included in the
group if one or more other corporations that are also included own
the defined eighty percent of its stock. The common parent is
separately defined as owning eighty percent of one of the members of the chain. The group thus described constitutes a vertical
chain of related corporations. Under this form of definition, if the
chain progresses through several tiers and minority stock is outstanding at each tier, the proportional interest of the common
parent in the lowest tier corporation may actually be quite small.
Section 1563 and the similar section 1551'30 employ a quite
different stock ownership requirement in defining control. While
under sections 368 and 1504 the two eighty percent requirements
are cumulative and designed to restrict the scope of control,
under section 1563 control exists by the ownership of either eighty
percent of the combined voting power of all classes of voting stock
130. Section 1551 might be described as an unsophisticated version of
section 1563. Common ownership must be by individuals only and the section
1563(c) definition of stock is lacking. Otherwise, the controlled groups described
are substantially identical.
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or eighty percent of the value of all shares (including voting
shares). Pursuant to section 1563( c), certain categories of stock,
including nonvoting stock that is limited and preferred as to dividends, is entirely excluded from the computation. The definition
of a controlled group of corporations contained in section 1563 is
the most carefully drafted of such provisions contained in the
Code and is the most widely used by cross-reference. The definition distinguishes between vertically and horizontally related
groups of corporations and defines such groups separately. With
respect to vertical groups, section 1563 adopts the section 1504
chain concept, changing only the definition of stock ownership.
However, the definition of a horizontal or brother-sister group was
a considerable advance in the art of defining controlled groups.
The requisite stock ownership of the potentially related corporations may be held by five or fewer individuals, estates, or trusts
rather than by a single individuaL 131 To ensure that a mutuality
of interest existed among the corporations, it was necessary to
specify the extent to which the ownership of each must actually
overlap, that is, the extent to which each shareholder must own
stock in each of the corporations. Section 1563 adopted a twopronged approach to this problem. To the extent of fifty percent
of the stock of each corporation, the ownership interest of each
stockholder must be identical. That is, each shareholder's stock
ownership is counted only to the extent that it is identical in each
corporation. For example, if A owns seventy-eight percent of X
corporation and twenty-two percent of Y corporation and B owns
the balance of the X and Y stock, "five or fewer" individuals own
over fifty percent of the stock in each corporation, but the test will
not be met because, counting only their identical interests in
each corporation, they own only forty-four percent (twenty-two
percent from each of A and B).
The second requirement under section 1563 is that at least
eighty percent of the stock of each corporation must also be
owned by five or fewer individuals, trusts, or estates. Unfortunately, the brevity of the statutory language leaves several questions unanswered. The regulations provide that the five persons
131. The definition of common control contained in such sections as
954(d}(3) is broader than in section 1563 but is too imprecise, and possibly too
broad, for general use.
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owning eighty percent of the stock must be the same five persons
that own the identical fifty percent interest; that is, there can be
only one group of five or fewer persons. 132 Thus, if X owns fiftyfive percent of both corporations M and N and A, B, C, and D
own forty-five percent of M and individuals E, F, G, and H own
forty-five percent of N, corporations M and N are not related.
However, the regulations also provide that it is not necessary that
each person counted in the eighty percent test own stock in each
of. the corporations. In other words, the Treasury Department
interprets the eighty percent requirement as essentially unrelated
to the definition of control and as merely establishing the requirement that to be regarded as related, the corporations must
be closely held. Under this construction of section 1563, in the
above example, corporations M and N would be related if A and
B owned forty-five percent of M and E and F owned forty-five
percent of N-a single group of five persons would own eighty
percent of each corporation. It is not at all clear that the draftsmen of section 1563 intended such a limited role for the eighty
percent requirement. The Tax Court, with both the majority and
dissenting opinions reviewing and relying on the legislative history to section 1563, has twice held this aspect of the regulation
invalid. 133 In the view of the Tax Court majority, the eighty percent test must be met by counting only stock held by persons
whose stock was counted in meeting the fifty percent test. In the
above example, only X's stock would qualify, and since he does
not own eighty percent of the stock of each corporation, M and
N would not be related. The Tax Court was reversed in both
cases on appeal; and thus, for the present, the regulatory construction must be regarded as controlling. 134 While the technical
position of the Tax Court might appear to be the sounder position, the appellate courts evidently agreed with the Treasury
Department that a sufficient identity of interest was present
among corporations having fifty percent of their stock subject to
common control.
132. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1563-l(a)(3) (1978).
133. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 966,972 (1976),
rev'd, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts ofN. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798,802 (1976), rev'd, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
134. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
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Corporate Attribution

As we have seen elsewhere, section 267, the oldest of the Code
attribution rules, provides for proportionate attribution from entities to their owners. This rule is also applicable to corporations.
Thus, stock owned by a corporation is treated as owned proportionately by its shareholders.
The attribution rules added by section 318 in 1954 substantially restricted attribution from corporations by imposing a high
threshold requirement that must be met before this provision is
triggered. No similar threshold requirement was imposed for attribution from trusts, estates, or partnerships. Section
318(a)(2)(C)· provides that stock shall be attributed proportionately from a corporation to its shareholders, but only if the shareholder owns or is considered as owning, after the application of
specified attribution rules, fifty percent or more in value of the
stock of the corporation from which holdings are to be attributed.
Thus, under this provision stock is not attributed to a shareholder
whose holdings, together with the holdings of persons economically related to him, do not permit control of the corporation.
Similarly, the back-attribution rule adopted by section 318 only
attributes to a corporation stock owned by a shareholder who
owns or is considered to own fifty percent or more of the stock of
the corporation .. 35
The high threshold requirement of section 318 was not followed under section 1563. Rather, this provision adopted the
nominal-interest rule for corporations that is applied by this section to other entity attribution provisions. Thus, stock owned by
a corporation is attributed to a shareholder, provided that such
shareholder owns five percent or more of the value of the stock of
the corporation. As in the case of section 318, the attribution rules
of section 1563 are first applied in determining whether the shareholder owns five percent of the stock.
· The unusual affinity provisions of section 447(d) have previously been noted in connection with its extraordinarily broad
definition of the family and its overall character as an aggregation
provision.J38 It has also been observed that, in contrast to the
other recently enacted aggregation provisions, section 447 also
135.
136.

I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C).
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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employs traditional attribution rules. While the attribution from
trusts and partnerships rules are commonplace, patterned exactly on the proportional attribution rule of section 267, the
corresponding corporate attribution rule is unique. 137
As under section 318, stock owned by a corporation is attributed to its shareholders only if the shareholders own (directly or
by virtue of attribution from trusts or partnerships) fifty percent
or more in value of the stock in the corporation from which attribution is to be made. The computation of the required fifty percent ownership under section 447, however, is quite different from
the computation of the section 318 threshold requirement in that
the aggregation style generally applicable under section 44 7 is
also employed here in place of the usual attribution rules. That
is, the fifty percent ownership is to be found among members of
the same family in the aggregate. Again, the substantive result
is the same regardless of whether the approach of section 318 or
section 447 is used. Section 447(d)(3) is significant because it
constitutes a further extension of the substitution in the Code of
the aggregation form for the traditional attribution rule.
One striking aspect of the aggregation test for the fifty percent threshold requirement under section 447(d)(3) is that it does
not parallel the family aggregation test used in section 447(c)(2)
for the purposes of the basic relationship definition. In defining
those corporations that are exempt from the substantive application of section 447, the basic relationship provision requires that
the family own fifty percent of the voting power and fifty percent
of the number of nonvoting shares of the corporation. However,
the threshold requirement for attribution is ownership of fifty
percent of the value of all stock-obviously, a very different test.
Normally the value test will be more easily met, and attribution
will be made from corporations that would not be regarded as
controlled for the substantive purposes of the section. While that
result cannot be criticized, except on the basis of unnecessary
complexity, the opposite result may also arise. Thus, it is not
difficult to hypothesize situations in which attribution cannot be
made from corporations that are regarded as controlled for purposes of the substantive law, and that result does not appear
sensible . 13K
137.
138.

I.R.C. § 447(d)(3).
The most obvious situation in which this could arise is when the
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The corporation attribution rules also address for the first
time a question that has remained unanswered under other attribution sections: whether voting stock owned by a corporation
should be attributed to the holders of its nonvoting stock. Under
section 447 it appears clear that such attribution is to be made-a
result that might well be criticized. Section 447(d)(3) provides
that if the threshold requirement is met, the family is regarded
as owning its proportional interest in each class of stock in a
second corporation that is owned by the corporation from which
attribution is to be made. In the particular case of section 447,
with its high threshold requirement, attributing voting stock to
the family without regard to whether any member of the family
owns voting. stock in the attributor corporation does not seem
inappropriate since the fifty percent threshold requirement provides a basis for presuming de facto domination.
Since section 447 does not contain a general corporate attribution rule but rather attributes stock to the family from a corporation controlled by it, the section as thus far described would not
provide for attribution from second-tier corporations. This problem of reattribution, which is very briefly and most unsatisfactorily covered by a parenthetical insertion in section 447(d)(3), is
considered below in connection with reattribution.
Sections 544, 425, and 613A(d)(3) contain the same rule applied under section 267: stock owned by a corporation is regarded
as owned proportionately by its shareholders. A similar rule is
prescribed by section 904(d)(2) but only with respect to stock
owned by a foreign corporation.

C.

Nature of Stock

The relationships established by section 267(b) require only
that the individual or fiduciary own more than fifty percent of the
value of the outstanding stock of the corporation; it is unnecescorporation had outstanding two classes of voting stock having unequal voting
power. Assume, for example, the corporation had outstanding 100 shares of
Class A Common possessing five votes per share and 400 shares of Class B
Common possessing one vote per share, the classes otherwise having equal rights
and priorities. If the family owned all of the Class A but none of the Class B,
the corporation would be related to the family but attribution could not be made
unless the value of the 100 shares of Class A exceeded the value of the 400 shares
of Class B.
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sary for the shareholder to have any voting interest in the corporation. Very early constructions of the predecessor to section 267
established that the required relationship could exist even though
the individual owned only nonvoting preferred stock. m More recent authority has established that the fifty percent ownership
requirement can be met, even though the relationship between
the shareholder and the corporation has been characterized by
the parties as a creditor relationship, if the Internal Revenue
Service can persuade the court that the investment in the corporation more nearly resembled equity than debt and that, accordingly, the purported lender should be regarded as an owner of an
equity interest in the corporation . 1411
The attribution rules contained in section 267(c) do not distinguish between voting and nonvoting stock or between common
and preferred stock. w Where the substantive law purpose for
which attribution is being made is geared to value, such as in the
case of the relationships defined by section 267(b), this lack of
discrimination is immaterial since the application or nonappfication of this section is not altered by the fact that the individual,
who owns only nonvoting preferred stock in the parent company,
may be regarded as owning a portion of the voting common stock
of its subsidiary. Furthermore, most of the provisions throughout
the Code that adopt the attribution rules of section 267 are also
premised upon ownership of a specified value of outstanding
stock. On occasion, however, the attribution rules of section
267(c) are used in a section of the Code that determines substantive relationships based upon the ownership of a percentage of
voting stock. This situation exists in the definition of a disqualified person for private foundation purposes under section 4946
and in the similar ERISA provisions in section 4975. For example,
under section 4946(a)(l)(C)(i), a "disqualified person" includes
an owner of twenty percent of the total combined voting power
139. See Wolf Bergman, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1118 (1947).
140. In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Stewart, 448 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1971); Harbour Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (1973).
See the excellent analysis of the debt-equity problem in Plumb, The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal,
26 TAx L. REv. ~69 (1971).
141. See Goldstein, Attribution Rules: Undue Multiplicity, Complexity
Can Create Liabilities, 15 TuL. TAX INST. 384 (1965).
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of a corporation that is a substantial contributor to a private
foundation. For the purposes of computing this twenty percent
interest, the attribution rules of section 267( c) are applicable. 142
Assume that an individual had invested in a class of preferred
stock of corporation A in which he owned no voting stock and that
the value of his preferred stock equaled sixty percent of the value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation. Assume further that
corporation A owned forty percent of the single outstanding class
of stock of corporation B and that the balance of this voting stock
in corporation B was controlled by unrelated persons. If those
unrelated persons cause corporation B to become a substantial
contributor to a private foundation, does the individual become
a disqualified person with respect to the foundation? If voting
stock in corporation B is to be attributed to the individual by
virtue of his ownership of nonvoting stock in corporation A, the
individual will be regarded as owning twenty-four percent of the
voting power in corporation B and thus will be a disqualified
person with respect to the private foundation. Although there is
no textual basis in the law for avoiding attribution to the individual, that result is so incongruous that it must be erroneous. If
corporation A, to which the individual is far more closely related,
became a substantial contributor to the private foundation, the
individual then would not become a disqualified person because
he owns no voting power in corporation A.
Similarly, section 4946(a)( l)(E) includes as a disqualified
person a corporation more than thirty-five percent of the combined voting power of which is owned by certain other defined
disqualified persons. Assume that an individual is on the board
of trustees of a private foundation, thereby constituting a disqualified person with respect to the foundation; and that the individual has made an investment in nonvoting preferred stock of corporation C, which stock constitutes forty percent of the value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation. That corporation would
not constitute a disqualified person with respect to the private
foundation. However, if the corporation had a wholly owned subsidiary, the subsidiary would constitute a disqualified person
since the individual would constructively own forty percent of its
outstanding voting stock.
142.

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(3).
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Section 318 also refers only to stock, without elaboration.
The problems presented by attribution under section 318 might
have been substantially greater than the problems involved in
applying section 267 because many of the provisions using section
318 attribution do involve determinations of voting power. 14:1
However, the very high fifty percent threshold requirement for
the application of the corporate attribution rules of section 318
have tended to eliminate applications of that section that might
be. regarded as unjustifiably prejudicial to taxpayers since nonvoting stock will rarely comprise fifty percent of the value of a
viable corporation. While many of the sections that use section
318 attribution rules lower the threshold requirement, such sections tend to employ value rather than voting control tests.
The most egregious absence of legislative or administrative
guidance in this area occurs in section 425(d), which contains a
set of attribution rules that are expressly for use in determining
stock ownership for the purposes of three enumerated sections.u 4
Each of the cross-referencing sections requires the computation
of voting power, but neither the statute nor the regulationsur,
provides any hint of how nonvoting stock is to be handled in the
attribution formula. 146 As previously discussed, section 447(d)(3)
contains the first express statutory solution to this problem and
literally appears to mandate attribution of voting stock to the
holders of nonvoting stock in the first-tier corporation. 147 The
drafting of that provision is so subject to criticism in other respects that it is not fully clear that Congress actually intended
such attribution. Furthermore, section 447 is unusual in that it
provides for attribution, not to an individual, but to a class of
persons in the aggregate. Perhaps the best analysis of section
447(d)(3) is that it is unique and should not be regarded as a
143. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(2)(c), 304(c).
144. Section 425(d) begins: "For the purposes of this part, in applying the
percentage limitations of sections 422(b)(7), 423(b)(3), and 424(b)(3) . . . . "
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.425-l(d) (1966).
146. The definition of a controlled group of corporations contained in sec·
tion !563(a) also requires the computation of voting power although the attribution rules to that section similarly do not address this question. However, since
section 1563(c)( t }(A) excludes nonvoting preferred stock from the section 1563
computations, the problem is here limited to the much rarer nonvoting common
stock.
147. See text following note 138 supra.
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precedent for attributing voting stock to the holders of nonvoting
stock under other sections. Section 447, however, contains a fifty
percent threshold requirement that tends to eliminate the problem for the purpose of that section. It would seem appropriate,
therefore, to examine critically the precedential value of section
447 to a proportional attribution section, such as section 267, that
lacks a threshold requirement.
Regardless, of the substantive merits of the stock attribution
rules contained in sections 267 and 318, the application of those
rules to nonvoting preferred stock is clearly established. A somewhat different situation prevails under section 1563. Section
1563(c)(1) specifies that for the purposes of sections 1561 through
1564, which pertain to multiple tax benefits in the case of controlled corporations, the term "stock" does not include nonvoting
stock that is limited and preferred as to dividends. Obviously, for
the purpose of applying the attribution rules of section 1563(d)
and (e) to the substantive provisions of section 1561 through
section 1564, nonvoting preferred stock is disregarded. Such stock
is not attributed and does not form the basis for an attribution
of other stock. However, several provisions of the Code adopt by
cross-reference the attribution rules contained in section 1563.
Fortunately, most of these cross-references are to a "controlled
group" of corporations within the meaning of section 1563(a), for
which purpose the definition of stock contained in section 1563(c)
clearly would be applicable. However, a few sections cross-refer
solely to the attribution rules contained in section 1563(d) and
(e). For example, section 1551 is closely related to section 1561
both in purpose and language. Section 155l(b) provides that for
its purposes, the attribution rules of section 1563(e) shall apply.
However, neither section 1551 nor the regulations thereto contain
a definition of stock; the definition contained in section 1563(c)
literally is not applicable since it is not within the cross-reference.
Furthermore, the language of section 1551 predates the exclusion
of nonvoting preferred stock in section 1563 (the cross-reference
was added when section 1563 was enacted). In such circumstances, it is uncertain whether or not the reference in section
1551(b) to section 1563(e) carries the implication that stock is
not to be attributed to the holder of nonvoting preferred stock.
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Even more difficult is a cross-reference contained in section
993(e), which defines a "related foreign export corporation" for
the purpose of defining the qualified export assets of a DISC.
Such a corporation is defined in part in section 993(e)(3) as a
corporation, less than ten percent of the total combined voting
power of which "is owned (within the meaning of section 1563(d)
and (e))" by a controlled group of corporations, within the meaning of section 1563, which includes the taxpayer. In defining the
controlled group, clearly nonvoting preferred stock is ignored, but
it is unclear whether such stock is to be ignored for the purpose
of determining the extent of ownership of the foreign export corporation by the controlled ·group. Certainly it is needlessly complex to include nonvoting stock for one purpose under section 993
and exclude it for another. On the other hand, if a reference to
the attribution rules of section 1563(e) is deemed to include a
reference to section 1563( c) and its exclusion of nonvoting stock,
attribution pursuant to a cross-reference to section 1563 will be
quite different in this respect from attribution under the other
commonly cross-referenced attribution sections. It seems unlikely
that attribution with respect to nonvoting stock is one of the
factors taken into account by the draftsmen of tax legislation in
selecting the section to be cross-referenced. The choice here is not
between consistency and inconsistency but between different
forms of inconsistency. Perhaps the better case can be made for
consistency among the several attribution provisions, but the
stronger case can be made for regulatory clarification. 1 ~s
Even where section 1563 is not applicable to nonvoting stock,
as when applied to section 1561 and possibly elsewhere, the section may nevertheless be applicable to purported indebtedness
found to constitute a form of equity capital. In a case arising
under section 1561, the Service argued that an investment in the
form of notes, which the court held constituted stock for the purpose of the relationship provisions of section 267(b), should,
under the facts of that case, be regarded as stock that was not
nonvoting and limited and preferred as to dividends. uv While the
148. There is some relatively weak analagous authority for ignoring section 1563(c) in the application of section 1563(e) by cross-reference in the construction of the option rule contained in that section. See text accompanying
note 163 infra.
149. Harbour Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580
( 1973).
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court disagreed and did not take the purported debt into account
in determining the existence of a section 1561 controlled group,
the question may be one of fact. In an appropriate case, the de
facto possession of control over the corporate affairs might be
sufficient.
VII.

OPTIONS AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES

It is evident that a taxpayer may easily avoid the impact of
a substantive rule of law that is dependent upon his ownership
of specified stock in a corporation by permitting others to hold the
stock while he owns the right to obtain or regain the stock through
the exercise of an option or otherwise. In such circumstances, the
taxpayer can maintain his economic interest in the corporation
but avoid the tax liability of such ownership. In spite of these
realities, section 267(c) has never contained a provision attributing stock to the holder of an option on such stock. In this respect,
section 267 is seriously deficient. In light of the omission, it might
be anticipated that the Treasury would assert considerable pressure for creative judicial interpretations. However, since either
taxpayers have not been inclined to take advantage of this deficiency or the Treasury has not been inclined to challenge them,
there has been little case law expanding the concept of ownership
under section 267(c) to include options. 150
By contrast, the other early attribution rules, pertaining to
the ownership of stock in a personal holding company, adopted
the extensive rules governing options that were recommended by
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance. 151 The tightening of the tax laws that took place in the Revenue Act of 1937
was largely directed to the elimination of specific abuses that the
Joint Committee had discovered. Thus, while the Committee rec150. In Prentiss D. Moore, 17 T.C. 1030 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.
1953), the taxpayers had entered into the agreement to acquire all of the stock
of a corporation, and the stock was placed in escrow pending the payment of
the purchase. price. Thereafter the taxpayers sold property to tqe corporation at
a loss. However, it was stipulated at trial that the transfer of the property was
not effective until the closing of the purchase of the stock and the rel~:ase of the
escrow. Accordingly, the court held that, since on the date on which the sale was
effective the taxpayers had acquired all of the stock of the corporation, the
predecessor to section 267 forbade recognition of the loss.
151. H.R. Doc. No. 337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1937).
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ommended extending the then-existing attribution rules for holding companies to the relationships described in the predecessor
to section 267, 15t it did not recommend that its proposed attribution rules in the personal holding company area should also be
applied to the disallowance of losses provision. With respect to
personal holding companies, the Joint Committee and Congress
were persuaded that circumvention of the stock ownership test
had occurred through the use of options and convertible securities; 153 apparently evidence of a similar circumvention of the
predecessor to section 267 was lacking.
Under section 544, options and convertible securities are separately and differently treated. Section 544(b) provides that securities convertible into stock, even though the conversion date
is deferred, shall be considered as stock but only where the effect
of so considering the security is adverse to the taxpayer. This last
qualification is entirely appropriate. Otherwise, the present actual owner of over fifty percent of the outstanding stock of a
corporation, for example, could avoid personal holding company
status by issuing convertible securities to an unrelated person. On
the other hand, this section also expressly requires that if any
securities are to be treated as stock, then all securities outstanding and having contemporaneous or earlier conversion dates shall
also be treated as stock. u~ The requirement that securities other
than those owned by the taxpayer also be treated as stock is in
recognition of a significant difference between the convertible
securities rule and all other attribution rules. For the purpose of
determining the existence of a personal holding company, as well
as for the purpose of resolving most questions involving attribution, it is necessary to determine not only the number of shares
of stock owned by one or more taxpayers, but also to determine
the total number of shares of the corporation's stock that are
regarded as outstanding. That is, to determine whether the prescribed percentage of ownership has been obtained, it is necessary
to know the denominator as well as the numerator of the fraction.
The application of all other attribution rules does not change the
152. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 24, 49 Stat. 1662.
153. S. REP. No. 1242, supra note 30, at 9.
154. The effect of this requirement, of course, is taken into account in
determining whether the application of the option rule will be adverse to the
taxpayer.
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denominator of this fraction; however, attributing stock to the
holder of a convertible security increases the total number of
shares considered to be outstanding. If only the stock subject to
options held by the taxpayer were considered to be outstanding
(in addition to the stock actually outstanding), his proportionate
interest in the corporation would be unfairly inflated because the
assumption that only the taxpayer would convert his securities is
unrealistic. While the assumption of section 544(b) that all securities that could have been converted would have been will also
often prove to be inaccurate, the statutory rule is clearly more
realistic. It is also probably the fairest possible rule, short of an
intolerably burdensome case-by-case financial analysis of each
security.
With one exception, the option rule of section 544(a)(3), in
contrast, contains none of the operating rules applicable to convertible securities. The exception is that for the specific purposes
of the personal holding company provisions, which section 544
accompanies, all of the attribution rules, other than attribution
from entities, are applicable only if the effect is adverse to the
taxpayer. Thus, the option rule does not provide that an option
shall be treated as stock, but rather states that if a person has
an option to acquire stock, "such stock" shall be considered as
owned by that person. The section is totally silent with respect
to stock subject to options held by one other than the taxpayer.
The evident explanation for the different treatment is that Congress in 1937 only contemplated that stock would be attributed
under the option rule from an actual holder of outstanding stock,
in which event the special problems inherent in applying the
convertible securities rule to unissued stock do not arise.•~~ Regardless of the evils sought to be corrected in 1937, the most
common form of option in existence today is the compensatory
option issued to employees. Such options are almost exclusively
issued by the corporate employer and are options to acquire stock
·155. The record ownership of stock may be split up among more
than five individuals but less than five individuals may have an option
to acquire the stock at any time they desire. In the case of an option to
acquire stock such stock may be considered as being owned exclusively
by the holder of the option or the owner of the stock . . ..
JoiNT CoMM. ON TAx EvASION AND AVOIDANCE, supra note 29, at 11. See also S.
REP. No. 1242, supra note 30.
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of the employer that is not outstanding and is normally unissued.
Since the option rule of section 544(a)(3) only calls for the
attribution of "stock," it is not at all clear that the rule can be
applied to attribute stock that is not in existence or at least not
outstanding. Thus it is not clear whether stock can be attributed
to the holder of a compensatory or investment option issued by
the corporation itself. Assuming that the option rule can be so
applied, it is also unclear to which holders of options attribution
should be made. There is no textual basis for attributing stock to
one class of holders but not to others in the manner of the convertible securities rule. Neither of these questions has ever been answered under section 544.
Section 318 contains an option rule that is substantially
identical to the rule of section 544. However, because section 318
is a rule of general application, it does not contain the restriction
that it only applies if the result is adverse to the taxpayer; nor is
such a limitation contained in the sections that use section 318
by cross-reference. Thus, section 318 not only contains the same
ambiguities as section 544, with respect to unissued stock, but
also adds a troublesome question of its own: is the application of
the option rule to persons other than the taxpayer mandatory?
With respect to all other rules of attribution, it is of no consequence who, other than the taxpayer or taxpayers in question,
owns stock in the corporation. Thus it is irrelevant whether the
attribution rules are regarded as applicable to them. However, if
the option rule is applied to unissued stock subject to options
held by persons other than the taxpayer, the taxpayer's constructive interest in the corporation will be reduced.
Finally, these operational aspects of the option rule assume
a greater importance under section 318 than under section 544
because section 318lacks an express provision governing convertible securities. Therefore, to the extent that attribution can be
made to such a security under section 318, it must be made under
the general option rule.
The general boundaries of the option rule are not statutory.
What little light has been shed on the issue has come from case
law development and a single revenue ruling. It is instructive to
follow the evolution of these authorities in some detail to see how
the courts have dealt with complex ambiguities in the affinity
provisions. The application of the option rule of section 318 in
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connection with compensatory options has been considered by
two courts, but regrettably, resolution of the issue was not material to either decision. Even more regrettably, the courts adopted
opposing views. Both cases involved the application of the substantially disproportionate redemption rules of section 302(b)(2)
in a situation in which the taxpayer did not hold any options
but compensatory options were outstanding in the hands of
employees. In J. Milton Sorem 158 both the Tax Court and the
court of appeals assumed, without discussion, that unissued
stock should bt! attributed to all holders of options and that the
entire amount of such attributed stock should be regarded as
outstanding. However, in Bloch v. United States 157 the court indicated that if the issue were squarely before it, a contrary result
might have been reached because attribution with respect to options that might never be exercised would be unduly speculative.
The court did not specify on what theory the seemingly mandatory language of section 318 might be ignored. us
In Revenue Ruling 68-601 15u the Internal Revenue Service
announced its agreement with the basic principle of Sorem that
the option rule of section 318 could be applied to unissued stock.
While that ruling dealt with warrants, that is, investment options, there is no basis for distinguishing such options from the
compensatory options involved in Sorem. While the uncertainty
can hardly be regarded as settled by this ruling, a contrary rule
would open a wide gap in the scheme of section 318. It is probable,
for this reason alone, that most courts would give effect to the
ruling.
Revenue Ruling 68-601 actually went beyond merely agreeing
that the option rule of section 318 could be applied to unissued
stock. It also addressed the long-unsettled question of whether
that rule could also be applied to convertible securities. 1' 0 With
15-6. 40 T.C. 206 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 275 (lOth Cir.
1964).
157. 261 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
158. For such a theory, see Northwestern Steel & Supply Co v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 356 (1973), involving the option rule of section 1563.
159. 1968-2 C.B. 124.
160. In their early article on attribution under the 1954 Code, Ringel,
Surrey, and Warren observed that it could be argued that convertible securities
were merely a form of option but noted that the history of separate treatment
under section 544 might preclude that interpretation of section 318. Ringel,
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little discussion, the ruling asserted that warrants and convertible debentures are not "realistically different" from the options
referred to in section 318 and that both such securities would be
regarded as options for the purpose of that section.
While the foregoing discussion has suggested that convertible
sec uri ties are indeed different from the options originally intended to be included in the option rule of the predecessor to
section 544, m it is unquestionably true that convertible securities
are not realistically different from other options to acquire unissued stock. If the application of the option rule to•compensatory
options is sustained, the extension to convertible securities contained in Revenue Ruling 68-601 would almost necessarily follow.
While agreeing that the option rule should be applied to
unissued stock, Revenue Ruling 68-601 ~isagreed with the
method by which the rule was applied in Sorem although the
Service appeared to confine its disapproval to the specific provisions of section 302 rather than to section 318 generally. In Sorem
stock subject to options had been treated as outstanding for the
purpose of computing the disproportionality of a redemption by
a nonoptionee. Seemingly, this approach required reading the
option rule of section 318 as both mandatory and applicable to
all options. The ruling, however, relying on the statement in section 1.302-3(a) of the regulations that the test of section 302(b)(2)
shall be applied to each shareholder separately, took the position
that the option rule should not be applied to the holders of options whose stock would not be attributed to the shareholder in
question. 152 It seems clear, however, that this regulation does not
support the position taken in the ruling since the question presented is how many shares are considered to be outstanding for
the purpose of applying the test of section 302 separately to each
shareholder; the regulations to section 302 clearly do not address
that question. To the extent that this limitation on attribution is
peculiar to section 302, it is not important here. Subsequent
Surrey, & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue
Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 209, 223-24 (1958).
161. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 503, 53 Stat. 107.
162. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.422-2(h)(l) (1966), which somewhat obscurely indicates that for the purposes of that section, stock subject to options
held by the taxpayer should be included in the numerator of the fraction but
not in the denominator.
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cases, however, have indicated that this limitation may be more
broadly applicable.
The conflicting authorities under section 318 were reviewed
in Northwestern Steel & Supply Co. v. Commissioner 113 in which
the court was required to apply the option rule of section 1563(e)
to unissued stock. The Tax Court treated the option rule of section 1563(e) as identical to the rule of section 318 and did not
question that the option rule of section 1563 could be applied to
unissued stock. With respect to the method of applying that rule,
however, the court preferred to follow Revenue Ruling 68-601
rather than its prior suggestion in Sorem, which it characterized
as dicta. The specific issue presented was whether the petitioner
was part of a section 1563(a) controlled group. During the years
in question, one corporate stockholder owned over eighty percent
of the actual outstanding stock of the petitioner, and the balance
was owned by a single individual who also possessed an option to
acquire from the corporation an amount of stock that would have
given the individual a twenty-five percent ownership interest in
the petitioner. The court stated that it was only concerned with
determining the ownership interest of the corporate shareholder,
not the interest of the individual, whether actual or constructive.
Thus, the court held that stock subject to the option should not
be taken into account for any purpose. While the court's premise
is indisputable, it does not support its conclusion because the
question presented is not how many shares the individual owned
but how many shares are deemed to be outstanding for the purpose of determining the proportionate interest of the corporate
shareholder. 1M Since the constructive ownership rules deal in hypothetical ownership, these two questions are quite distinct.
The court's approach in Northwestern Steel, focusing on the
taxpayer in question in order to bar attribution to others, is
163. 60 T.C. 356 (1973).
164. That this decision may have resulted in part from a failure by the
court to distinguish between options to acquire issued and unissued stock is
suggested by a second aspect of the opinion. The court stressed that under the
usual operation of the attribution rules, more than one person may be deemed
to own the same stock. This aspect of attribution would be relevant if the option
had been to acquire outstanding stock but does not appear relevant to the facts
of the case. Attribution of unissued stock does not involve multiple ownership
but only the number of shares deemed outstanding.
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identical to the position of Revenue Ruling 68-601 with respect to
the application of section 302. While the ruling relied upon specific language in the regulations to the substantive law section,
the approach taken by the Tax Court would appear to apply
equally to every application of the option rule of each attribution
provision. If this construction prevails with respect to compensatory options, it is difficult to see how a different rule could be
applicable to warrants or to convertible securities.
However the option rule of section 318 is applied to convertible securities, it would appear inevitable that the result must be
different than that reached under the special convertible securities rule of section 544. That result is unsatisfactory. Certainly
the procedure suggested in Sorem was far more favorable to the
taxpayer than the section 544(b) rule would have been; since the
attribution was favorable to the taxpayer, section 544(b) would
not have permitted attribution. Conversely, the result in
Northwestern Steel is consistent with this aspect of section
544(b), but the rationale of that case and Revenue Ruling 68-601
would prevent attribution to persons other than the taxpayer in
question regardless of whether the taxpayer also held an option.
In that respect, these authorities are more hostile to taxpayers
than is section 544(b).
The problem, of course, is that the application of the option
rule to unissued stock in the absence of the operating rules contained in section 544(b) with respect to convertible securities will
frequently produce unjustifiable results-generally favorable to
taxpayers. The need is for corrective legislation.
Regardless of the rigor of the reasoning of the court in
Northwestern Steel, the case is consistent with the views of the
Service and is the first clear judicial determination with respect
to the attribution of unissued stock. Unfortunately, in the following year the Tax Court was again presented with the identical
issue under section 1563. In North American Industries, Inc. v.
Commissioner 1 '~ Judge Tannenwald pursued a completely different approach. North American also presented the question of
whether a section 1563(a) controlled group could be broken
through the issuance of options. After first stating that the case
was controlled by the prior decision in Northwestern Steel and
165.

33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275 (1974).
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that stock could not be attributed to the holder of the option, the
court held in the alternative that section 1563(e) applied only to
stock that is actually outstanding. It will be recalled that section
1563(c), for the purposes of sections 1561 through 1564, defines
the term "stock" to exclude certain categories of stock, one of
which is treasury stock. The Service argued, and the court agreed,
that if treasury stock were not to be taken into account under
section 1563, unissued stock certainly should be excluded.
Whether the Service was well advised to present this argument
is not clear. If the court's analysis of section 1563(e) is followed,
the attribution provisions of section 1563 cannot be applied either
for or against the government to unissued stock, including stock
subject to compensatory options, warrants, and convertible securities.
This analysis seems wrong, both from the perspective of the
proper functioning of the attribution rules in general and the
construction of section 1563(c). When it was to its advantage, the
Internal Revenue Service rejected a similar analysis. us The purpose of the attribution rules is to define stock ownership and thus
define what stock is considered to be outstanding. If the option
attribution rule is applied to unissued stock, such stock is then
deemed to be outstanding in the hands of the optionee; for the
purposes of the substantive section involved, it is no longer regarded as unissued. Furthermore, the purpose of the exclusion of
treasury stock in the context of defining relationships among corporations is to prevent the artificial inflation of the denominator
of the fraction, thus pushing the required ownership below the
specified percentage. Clearly, Congress did not intend this exclusion to bar attribution of unissued stock to one who dominated a
166. In the course of its criticism of the suggestion in Sorem, the court in
Bloch indicated that regardless of whether the option rule of section 318 in
general could be applied to unissued stock, when applied to section 302(b)(2),
§ 1.302-3(a) of the regulations might bar such attribution. 261 F. Supp. at 604.
In common with section 1563(c), the regulation provides that section 302(b)(2)
"shall be applied only with respect to stock which is issued and outstanding in
the hands of shareholders." While Revenue Ruling 68-601 did not refer to the
Bloch case, it undertook to blunt the suggested limitation of the option rule of
section 318 by observing that "no mention is made (in the disproportionate
redemption regulation] as to what shares, if any, that may be acquired through
the exercise of options are to be considered as issued and outstanding stock for
this purpose." Rev. Rul. 68-601, 1968-2 C.B. at 125.
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corporation through ownership of options or convertible securities.
The result in North American does have the merits of not
using the existing option rule to attribute unissued stock, for
which the rule is not well suited, and of creating a more neutral
approach between taxpayers and the Service than did the prior
authorities. Nevertheless, attribution should be made to the holders of such options for the same reasons that attribution is made
to the holders of options to acquire outstanding stock. The solution to the problems arising under the option rule is not to discard
the major application of the rule but to provide appropriate operating rules.
The court in North American was not unaware of the impact
of its decision and undertook to limit its scope in a somewhat
confusing footnote that stated:
In so holding, we deal only with sections 1561 through 1564,
noting that a different result may obtain, for the purposes of a
section 302 redemption, in respect to increasing the percentage
of stock owned by the person whose shares are being redeemed
and who has an option to acquire additional shares which are
neither issued nor outstanding. 117
Of course, this decision under section 1563 would have no
application to section 318, which does not contain a limiting definition of stock. Perhaps the court was suggesting that the section
1563(c) definition of stock constituted a modification of the attribution rules contained in section 1563(e) only when·such rules
were applicable to sections 1561 through 1564 and that when the
attribution rules of that subsection are applied by cross-reference
to other sections of the Code, the limiting definition would be
inapplicable. Assuming that the option rule of section 1563(e) is
not applicable to unissued stock for the purposes of sections 1561
through 1564, it does not necessarily follow that such stock may
not be attributed in other contexts. The issue presented is the
same as whether the rules of section 1563 are applicable to nonvoting preferred stock. In that connection it was suggested that a
mere cross-reference to section 1563(d) and (e) should not be
deemed to include a cross-reference to section 1563(c). 188 While
167. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1278 n.6. (citing Northwestern Steel & Supply
Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 356 (1973)).
168. See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.

1978]

AFFINITY PROVISIONS

627

the question remains open under both the corporate and the option rules, Judge Tannenwald's footnote is encouraging.
The few authorities that have arisen under the various option
attribution rules have not contributed significantly to the definition of an "option" to acquire outstanding stock. Options can
assume a wide variety of forms, from an immediately exercisable
right to acquire stock at a bargain price, to the deferred and
contingent rights held by a party to a "buy-out" agreement permitting the purchase of stock of a deceased shareholder at book
value. There is some indication in Revenue Ruling 68-601 that the
Internal Revenue Service would be receptive to a definition of
options that did not include contingent rights to acquire stock,
provided that the contingency is ·substantial and not within the
control of the taxpayer. Thus, in arguing that convertible debentures are not realistically different from options, the ruling stated
that in each instance stock may be acquired at the election of the
holder of the option and that no contingencies exist with respect
to his election. On the other hand, the mere fact that an option
is not immediately exercisable should not be sufficient to prevent
attribution. Section 544(b) specifically provides that convertible
securities will be regarded as stock without regard to whether the
conversion date is deferred several years.
It has been ruled under section 318 that when a corporation
holds an option to acquire its own stock, the corporation will not
be considered the owner of the stock for the purpose of reattributing the stock to another shareholder. 111 The reasoning of this ruling, that a corporation acquiring its own stock did not acquire the
rights of a stockholder and therefore such stock holdings should
be disregarded, would seem broad enough to prevent attribution
to the corporation for any purpose. The language of the ruling,
however, suggests that the stock could be regarded as constructively owned by the corporation for other purposes, that is, for
treating the corporation as the owner of its own stock. The regulations provide that a corporation will not be considered to own its
own stock by virtue of back-attribution but are silent with respect
to the option ruleY0
169. Rev. Rul. 69-562, 1969-2 C.B. 47.
170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.318-l(b)(l), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
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MISCELLANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS

Despite the differences in detail, nearly all of the relationship
provisions include the same entities. However, the Code does
contain several unique affinity groupings. A number of sections
add entities to the usual set ofrelationships. For example, section
267(b)(9) relates any person to an organization exempt from tax
under section 501 if the organization is controlled by such person
or, in the case of an individual, by members of his family. In large
part, this provision was rendered obsolete by various sections
added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, particularly
section 4941, which prohibits self-dealing between private foundations and persons related to it. The scope of section 267(b)(9),
however, is broader than that of the 1969 Act and thus has some
continuing importance.
The policy underlying the various relationship sections discussed above is rarely articulated and frequently unclear. To
some extent, it assumes some degree of economic identity of interests and occasionally a concept of domination and control.
Certain substantive law sections of the Code, however, turn solely
upon considerations of domination and control, and the relationship provisions used by those sections occasionally include relationships involving control without economic mutuality of interest. A principal example is section 672(c), which defines a
"related or subordinate party" for various definitional purposes
of the grantor trust rules. This provision includes as a related
party an employee of the grantor and a subordinate employee of
a corporation''in which the grantor is an executive. Similarly, the
ERISA provisions contain a very broad definition of "disqualified
person" that includes the employer, employee organizations, and
officers, directors, and highly compensated employees of disqualified persons. 171
IX.

REA'ITRIBUTION

While the basic attribution rules described previously are
sufficiently complex and quite far-reaching, they only begin the
inquiry. When stock (or, less commonly, a partnership or trust
interest) is attributed from the actual owner to another, the ques171.

I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2) (H).
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tion arises of whether the constructive owner of the stock should
be considered the owner for the purpose of reattributing the stock
to a third party who stands in a relationship to the second person
that would normally permit attribution but who bears no relationship to the actual owner of the stock. Consistent with the
general.tenor of the affinity rules, the Code answers this question
in various ways, depending upon the section involved and the
nature of the initial attribution. These reattribution provisions,
which have the effect of substantially widening the relationships
prescribed by the substantive law, are generally referred to rather
innocently as "operating rules."
A.

In General

The operating rule applicable to section 267 attribution 112
provides that stock constructively owned by a person by virtue of
the normal entity attribution rule shall be considered actually
ownedby him for the purpose of reattributing the ownership of
such stock to another. On the other hand, when stock is attributed to an individual from members of his family or from his
partner, it is not to be reattributed for any other purpose. Thus,
stock owned by an entity may be attributed upwards through
various tiers of trusts, partnerships, and corporations to an individual and thereafter attributed to the individual's spouse or
other family members, but stock attributed to an individual from
his spouse or his brother, for example, cannot then be reattributed to another member of the family. Since section 267 does not
permit back-attribution from individuals to entities, the more
complex reattribution problems presented by such rules do not
arise.
Reattribution upward from entities is necessary to prevent
taxpayers from too easily avoiding the impact of the attribution
rules by separating their ownership of the entity in question by
more than one tier of equally dominated entities. Reattribution,
of course, is accomplished pursuant to the general attribution
rules including the nearly universal proportionality requirement.
Thus, if an individual owns only twenty percent of corporation A,
which owns thirty percent of corporation B, which owns forty
percent of corporation C, the individual is only regarded as own172.

I.R.C. § 267(c)(5).
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ing twenty percent times thirty percent times forty percent or
2.4% of corporation C. At this point reattribution becomes essentially meaningless, but it would not be appropriate to limit arbitrarily the number of tiers through which attribution may be
made because of those circumstances in which the interest of the
ultimate owner is not significantly diluted while passing through
several tiers.
On the other hand, there is no need for family reattribution
if the initial definition of family is sufficiently broad to describe
the full relationship desired. Furthermore, if family reattribution
were required, constructive ownership would pass from one family to their relatives by marriage in an endless chain.
Family attribution following entity attribution has generally
been thought necessary to prevent dispersion of stock ownership
that lacked substance. Presumably the same is to be said for
partner-to-partner attribution following entity attributionassuming that attribution from partners is appropriate at all.
In one not at all uncommon circumstance, however, this attribu·
tion rule produces a clearly unwarranted result. A partner is
treated as the owner of not only his proportionate interest in any
stock owned by the partnership, as might appear from a casual
reading of section 267(c)(1), but rather he is treated as the owner
of the entire amount of such stock by virtue of reattribution from
his partners. Such overly broad attribution is the effect of the
direct sidewise attribution that is limited to partners and sections
267 and 544.
Section 318, which contains considerably more elaborate attribution rules than does section 267, also employs far more complex reattribution rules. Section 318 adopts the limitation contained in section 267 to the effect that stock attributed under the
family attribution rule shall not again be attributed. However,
the prohibition is only applicable to reattribution under the same
rule, that is, the family rule. Since section 318 does employ backattribution, stock constructively owned by an individual because
it was actually owned by his parents or other family members
may be reattributed to a corporation or other entity in which the
individual holds the requisite threshold ownership. 173
Section 318(a)(5)(C) contains a similar limitation on reattri173.

Rev. Rut. 77-218, 1977-1 C.B. 82.
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bution following the application of the back-attribution rules.
Thus, stock that is constructively owned by an entity by virtue
of the rules attributing stock owned by shareholders, partners,
and beneficiaries to entities may not be reattributed under the
normal attribution rules to make another shareholder, partner, or
beneficiary the constructive owner of the·stock. This is the prohibition against so-called "sidewise" attribution.
On the other hand, it is permissible to employ backattribution downward by reattribution through more than one
tier. Thus, stock owned by an individual may be attributed to his
corporation and then to a subsidiary of the corporation. Reattribution, particularly involving back-attribution, can produce
some rather odd and unpredictable results, some of which are
mercifully forclosed by the regulations. For example, assume that
an individual owns all the stock of corporation A, which owns all
of the stock of corporation B. Under section 318(a)(3)(C), corporation A is regarded as owning all of the stock owned by the
individual, which includes the stock in corporation A itself. That
is, corporation A would be regarded as owning itself. Further, all
stock actually and constructively owned by corporation A is regarded as owned by corporation B. Thus, the subsidiary would be
regarded as owning all of the stock of its parent. Section 1.318l(b)(l) of the regulations prevents both results by providing that
a corporation shall not be regarded as owning its own stock by
virtue of section 318(a)(3)(C).
There are no reattribution limitations on entity attribution
nor on reattribution following the application of the option rule.
Moreover, the statute specifically provides that if stock could be
attributed to an individual under either the family attribution
rule or the option rule, it shall be considered to have been attributed under the option rule in order to permit the reattribution of
such stock.
In theory, stock constructively owned may be reattributed
under the option rule. It is not entirely clear, however, what stock
could ever be so reattributed. The only stock attributed under
this rule is the stock subject to the option. In order for an arrangement to constitute a valid option, the stock subject to the arrangement must be described to some extent, and it is difficult
to conceive of a description that would encompass stock constructively owned by virtue of an attribution provision. Even an open-
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ended option, covering all stock owned or thereafter acquired by
the person subject to the option, probably should not be regarded
as extending to stock constructively owned.
The reattribution rules of section 1563 approximate the simplicity of section 267 because of the omission of back-attribution
from that section. As under sections 267 arid 318, attributed
ownership is treated as actual ownership for the purposes of reattribution except when specifically prohibited. Section 1563
adopts the same prohibition against the reattribution of stock
constructively owned by virtue of the family attribution rule that
is contained in section 267. As in the case of the other two provisions, there is no limitation on reattributing stock constructively
owned by virtue of the entity attribution rules.
Similarly, there is no prohibition against reattributing stock
owned by virtue of the option attribution rule. However, section
1563 expands the dominance of the option attribution rule by
providing that if stock is considered owned by virtue of both the
option rule and any other attribution rule, it shall be considered
as owned under the option rule. The priority of the option rule
over the entity attribution rule is not designed to overcome limitations on reattribution, since no limitations exist. Rather, the
entity attribution rules of section 1563 contain threshold requirements barring attribution to the owners of a nominal interest in
the entity, and it is these restrictions that the priority of the
option rule overcomes. Thus, for example, if an individual owns
three percent of the stock of a corporation and holds an option
issued by the corporation to acquire stock in a subsidiary, he
could not be regarded as constructively owning stock in the subsidiary by virtue of the rule attributing stock owned by a corporation to its shareholders because of the five percent threshold requirement. However, he would be regarded as owning all of the
stock of the subsidiary subject to the option by virtue of the
option attribution rule.
Section 544 contains operating rules similar to those contained in section 267. Thus, stock attributed pursuant to the
family attribution rule is not to be reattributed, but stock attributed from an entity to its owner may be reattributed one or more
times either under the same attribution rule or under the family
rule. As under section 267, partners are treated in the same manner as family members. Thus, stock attributed to an individual
from his partner cannot be reattributed to his wife, and vice
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versa, while stock attributed to a partner from an entity, including the partnership, may be reattributed to either. The effect of
these rules under section 544, treating each partner as owning the
entire amount of any stock owned by the partnership, is the same
as under section 267.
Section 544 does not contain a back-attribution rule, but
unlike section 267, it does contain an option rule. As is consistently the case, section 544 provides that stock attributed under
the option rule prevails over the family attribution rule. In contrast to sections 318 and 1563, however, reattribution under the
option rule is not permitted.
There is no specific provision in section 544 pertaining to the
attribution of stock that an individual is deemed to own by virtue
of his ownership of convertible securities. However, it is clear that
when the ownership of such securities is deemed to be ownership
of stock, such characterization prevails for all purposes. Thus,
stock constructively owned by virtue of the convertible securities
rule may be attributed and reattributed under the other attribution rules as if the security actually was stock.

B.

Nature of Operating Rules

It has never been clearly established whether the operating
rules described above constitute specific grants of authority to
treat attributed stock as actually owned for the purposes of reattribution, or whether these rules serve to restrict the otherwise
unlimited scope of reattributionY 4 Since the operating rules,
when they are provided, are complete, that is, they provide for
every possible combination of attribution and reattribution, the
question only arises under the relatively few attribution provisions, such as sections 425(d) and 447, that do not contain operating rules. Accordingly, little authority exists. However, that authority suggests that the Service, at least, views operating rules
as restrictive rather than permissive. The question arose under
section 425(d) with respect to double family attribution, a form
174. One explanation for the lack of authority on such a basic question as
whether the operating rules are restrictive or permissive is that outside the
limited area of double family attribution nonstatutory reattribution has been
characterized as a construction of the pervasive word "indirect," thus providing
at least a pretense of statutory authorization. See text accompanying note 175
infra.
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of reattribution not permitted by any operating rule in the Code.
The obscure answer given by the Service was in effect that such
reattribution was not required-but as a matter of Service policy
only. The ruling characterized section 425 as lacking a prohibition
on double family attribution and implied that such attribution
would be permissible under the statute. m If correct, this analysis
presumably would not be limited to the family attribution rules
or to section 425.
It is not at. all clear that the operating rules should be so
viewed. Reattribution constitutes a substantial broadening of the
scope of attribution and arguably should not be implied in the
absence of affirmative congressional approval. Furthermore, at
least some of the operating rules plainly read as grants of authority rather than as limitations. Section 544(a)(5), for example,
specifically mandates reattribution under paragraphs (1) and (2),
the entity and family rules, but is silent with respect to reattribution under paragraph (3), the option rule. It is obvious that this
silence constitutes a lack of authority to reattribute and that the
approval under paragraphs (1) and (2) is not mere surplusage.
X.

NONSTATUTORY AFFINITY GROUPINGS

Given the complexity and variety of the statutory provisions
defining relationships, attribution, and reattribution, it might
seem only fair that a taxpayer should be entitled to rely on those
provisions and not be required to look beyond the statute for
further definitional provisions. But as with any other area of the
Code, such is not the case. There is a wide variation from section
to section in the scope of these provisions. It has frequently occurred that a taxpayer or, more commonly, the Service has concluded that the statutory language was unduly limited and
should be given an expansive reading. To a limited extent, courts
have been willing to adopt such extensions and have effectively
fashioned nonstatutory relationships or rules of attribution. One
basis for such an extension is the characterization of the operating
rules, discussed above, as restrictive; but the Service has not
pursued this line of reasoning. The same result, however, has
been sought and on occasion achieved through a liberal construction of the word "indirect."
175.

Rev. Rul. 67-262, 1967-2 C.B. 169.
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"Indirect" Ownership

Throughout the affinity provisions of the Code, stock or other
interests in an entity are generally referred to as being owned
"directly or indirectly." One of the most difficult questions of
statutory construction in this area is the meaning, if any, to be
assigned to that phrase in the various contexts in which it appears. When it appears in an attribution provision that is supplemented by operating rules that provide for every possible source
of stock ownership, it is difficult to find any meaning in the
phrase. For example, section 267(c)(2) states that "[a]n individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for his family." As we have seen, the balance of
section 267(c) specifies the circumstances under which the individual family members will be treated as constructively owning
stock, and those rules appear to be complete. Thus, it would seem
that in such an attribution provision, the use of this language
serves only to provide a statutory basis for treating an individual
as owning stock that he beneficially owns but that is registered
in the name of another (for example, a custodian). Since there
clearly is no need for statutory authorization to ignore such technicalities of title, the phrase appears to be meaningless.
On the other hand, when a statutory attribution provision
lacks operating rules, the Service has on occasion undertaken to
construe the word "indirectly" as authorizing reattribution. Between 1934 and 1937, the definition of a personal holding company included a rule attributing stock from corporations, partnerships, estates, and trusts to the owners thereof but did not contain an operating rule. Presumably as an interpretation of the
statutory provisions permitting attribution of stock "directly or
indirectly" owned, the regulations during this period required
reattribution under this provision, at least in the simple case of
direct vertical attribution through various tiers of owners. The
regulations suggested that if two individuals were the sole equal
beneficiaries of a trust that owned all of the outstanding stock of
a corporation, each of the individuals would be regarded as owning fifty percent of the stock of the corporation and of a whollyowned subsidiary of the corporation. 178 The validity of this regulation has not been tested.
176. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 351-2, 1937-1 C.B. 123.
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The example in the regulations was not changed after the
addition of the operating rules to the predecessor of section 544.
Even under present regulations, this same example is used to
illustrate attribution from entities, referred to in the regulation
as indirect ownership. 177 There would appear to be an inconsistency between the elaborate attribution and operating rules contained in section 544 and the ease with which the Treasury Department achieved the same result through an interpretation of
the word indirect. In light of this history, however, there may be
an arguable basis for an equally broad construction of the language "direct or indirect" contained in those attribution sections,
such as section 425(d), lacking operating rules.
A similar question arises in the interpretation of the threshold requirements contained in several of the attribution sections.
Thus, under section 318, if fifty percent or more of the stock of a
corporation is "owned, directly or indirectly, by or for any person," stock owned by the corporation will be attributed to that
shareholder .17A The statute does not define "ownership" for the
purpose of the fifty percent requirement beyond the use of the
word "indirectly." The regulations, however, prescribe their own
operating rules t.o the effect that in determining the fifty percent
threshold requirement, all of the stock actually and constructively owned by the shareholder shall be aggregated. 178 Thus, the
meaning given to the word "indirect" under the threshold requirements of section 318 is far broader than the meaning given
the same word under the predecessor to section 544. The example
used under the latter section only imported the entity attribution
rules, while under section 318 the word is regarded as importing
all of the attribution rules of that section.
It is clearly objectionable for Congress to enact attribution
rules without accompanying operating rules. However, for the
Treasury to prescribe operating rules under such slight authority
as the use of the word "indirectly," seems equally objectionable.
But in one section added to the Code in 1976, Congress required
reattribution solely through the use of the word "indirectly." Section 447(d), while containing the usual rule attributing stock
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.544-2 ( 1960).
178. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C).
179. Treas. Reg.§ 1.318-l(b)(3), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 126.
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owned by partnerships and trusts to their owners, does not contain a general rule attributing stock owned by corporations.
Rather, section 447(d) provides that if fifty percent of the value
of a corporation is owned by members of one family "such members shall be considered as owning each class of stock in a second
corporation (or a wholly owned subsidiary of such second corporation) owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the first corporation. " 180 The family group is thus treated as owning that stock of
the third-tier corporation that is owned, directly or indirectly, by
the first-tier (controlled) corporation. Because the third-tier corporation must be wholly owned by the second-tier corporation,
presumably the first-tier corporation is to be treated as owning
"indirectly" the same proportion of the stock of the third-tier
corporation that it owns in the second-tier corporation. This casual approach to reattribution created several unsatisfactory results. It is unclear why the first-tier corporation should not be
regarded as owning any stock in a ninety-nine percent owned
third-tier corporation or in a wholly owned fourth-tier corporation. Most likely, in view of the style of the basic corporate attribution provision of section 447, the limited reattribution may well
have been dictated solely by a desire to avoid the drafting complexities of a more complete provision. This section appears to be
the only instance of Congress requiring reattribution but providing no more guidance than the word "indirectly."
Outside the realm of reattribution, the Internal Revenue
Service has had little success. Nevertheless, when the Service has
concluded that a relationship or attribution provision contained
in (or omitted from) the Code was inadequate, it has sought a
broader scope for the provision in question, generally through an
expansive reading of the word "indirectly." While the courts have
almost uniformly rejected these efforts, the potential for challenge and litigation remains to complicate efforts by taxpayers to
predict the results of their transactions. For many years, a large
proportion of the Service's effort in this area was focused on the
pre-1976 version of section 1239. This section addressed a relatively common form of transaction that could produce a considerable savings in tax but that employed, prior to its amendment,
only limited relationship and attribution. Thus, while section
1239 only specified the relationship between a corporation and an
180. I.R.C. § 447(d)(3).
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eighty percent stockholder, in Revenue Ruling 69-109 181 the Service stated that the sale of depreciable property between two corporations, each of which was over eighty percent owned by the
same individual, was within the section because the sale was
indirectly between the shareholder and the transferee corporation. That ruling was consistently rejected in the courts. 182 In 1976
section 1239 was amended to include that relationship.
On occasion a court has opted for an expansive construction
of a relationship provision. For example, it has been held under
section 267 that a transaction with an individual constitutes an
indirect transaction with the individual's spouse 183 even though
that relationship is not included in section 267(b). Other cases,
however, have reached a contrary conclusion. 184
The Service has been similarly unsuccessful, even on relatively appealing facts, in attempting to expand the attribution
provisions of sections, such as section 1239, that employ only
limited attribution or none at all. Thus, when a taxpayer sold
depreciable property to a corporation in which he owned seventynine percent of the stock and held an option to acquire the balance, the Tenth Circuit refused to manufacture an option attribution rule for section 1239. 18~
A similar result was ultimately reached in Mitchell v.
181. 1969-1 C.B. 202.
182. Miller v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 294 (1973); 10-42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593 (1971), nonacq.,
1972-2 C.B. 4. Analogous arguments by the Service under other sections of the
Code have been similarly rejected. Fort Walton Square, Inc. v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 653 (1970) (arising under section 178, which employs the section 267(b)
relationships by cross-reference).
183. Barnes v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (D. Mass. 1963) (a sale of
property at a loss from a trust to the spouse of a beneficiary constituted an
indirect sale between the trust and a beneficiary of the trust).
184. Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (accrual
of interest in favor of a wife of a controlling shareholder did not result in the
disallowance of the interest deduction).
185. Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927 (lOth Cir. 1966). In view of its
decision the court did not have occasion to consider whether the option in
question constituted the type of option that should permit attribution in any
event. The stock subject to option was owned by an employee of the corporation
and permitted the acquisition of his stock at book value upon his death or
retirement. As indicated above, the better view is that such options should not
support an attribution of stock prior to the time when they become immediately
exercisable.
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Commissioner 1" 8 in which the Service argued that the reference to
"beneficial" ownership in the regulations 1 ~7 to section 1239 should
be construed to include attribution from entities. The taxpayer
had sold depreciable property to a corporation in which he, to.
gether with his wife and minor children, actually owned 79.54%
of the outstanding stock, and trusts created by the taxpayer for
the benefit of his minor children owned an additional 12.21% (the
balance was owned by adult children). The opinion of the Tax
Court is of special interest because the court undertook an exten.
sive review of both the variety of attribution rules contained in
the Code and the legislative history of section 1239. 1 ~8 The court
was unable to find order in the bewildering diversity that it discovered. It acknowledged that the omission of any suggestion of
attribution in the pre-1976 version of section 1239 most likely
represented a deliberate, although mystifying, decision on the
part of Congress. Nevertheless, it concluded that the taxpayer
had avoided the clear purpose of section 1239 too easily and held
that the beneficiaries of the trust were to be regarded as indirectly
owning the stock held by the trust, which stock was then attributed from them to the taxpayer. In a subsequent decision, 1 ~ 9 the
Tax Court remarked that its decision in Mitchell had been
reached "reluctantly" and only in view of a longstanding regulation that the court interpreted as requiring a trust beneficiary to
be treated as beneficially owning the stock held in trust, an indication that it would not generally endorse efforts to create nonstatutory attribution rules. The decision of the Tax Court in
Mitchell was reversed by the Fourth Circuit on the ground that
the deliberate congressional limitation of the scope of section 1239
could not be ignored. 1110 The result in Mitchell was also changed
186. 300 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1962), rev'g, 35 T.C. 550 (1960).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239·1 (1957).
188. 300 F .2d at 535·38.
189. 10·42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593 (1971), nonacq. 1972·2
C.B. 4.
190. Accord, United States v. Rothenberg, 350 F.2d 319 (lOth Cir. 1965).
Efforts have on occasion been made to apply the attribution rules of section 318
to certain of the corporate reorganization provisions. For an outrageous and
unsuccessful effort by the government, see Breech v. United States, 439 F .2d 409
(9th Cir. 1971). For a successful argument by a taxpayer, see World Service Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Rev. Rul. 76·36,
1976-1 C.B. 105.
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by the 1976 expansion of section 1239.
The general lack of success in the Service's efforts to expand
the affinity provisions on an ad hoc basis is encouraging from the
perspective of restraining the spiraling complexity of these provisions through sound statutory construction. As a matter of substantial justice, however, the Service should have prevailed in
each instance. Thus, this history also illustrates the inadequacy
of the affinity provisions. The solution to this inadequacy should
not be attempted through litigation-such patchwork solutions
do little to prevent evasion of the statutory provisions while doing
much to enhance the difficulty in understanding and applying
those provisions. The proper solution is the one ultimately
adopted for the much litigated section 1239: statutory amendment of the basic Code provisions. It is unfortunate, therefore,
that corrective legislation in the affinity area has been so rarely
achieved.

B.

The Special Case of Dividend Equivalence

In one highly significant area it was unclear for many years
whether attribution rules were applicable. The ultimate resolution of this question may be regarded as an example of judicially
created attribution. Section 302(b) contains a series of tests for
distinguishing true redemptions from redemptions having the effect of an ordinary dividend. It is clear from section 302(c) that
the attribution rules of section 318 are applicable in determining
stock ownership for the purposes of section 302. Paragraphs (2)
and (3) of section 302(b) contain safe-harbor rules that turn quite
mechanically on changes in stock ownership determined after the
application of the attribution rules. Paragraph (1), however, contains a catch-all statement that a redemption will not be treated
as a dividend "if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to
a dividend." Since this language does not expressly refer to stock
ownership, the application of the attribution rules of section 318
to the determination of dividend equivalence was doubtfuL But
logic required their application, and in United States v. Davisn•
the Supreme Court so held.
A provision somewhat similar to section 302(b)(l) appears in
section 356(a), which governs the distribution of "boot" in a cor191.
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porate reorganization. Paragraph (2) thereof specifies that boot
shall be treated as a dividend if it has "the effect of the distribution of a dividend." For many years it was the position of the
Internal Revenue Service that the distribution of boot automatically had the effect of the distribution of a dividend, thus rendering such refinements as the attribution rules irrelevant. 192 In 1974,
however, the "automatic dividend" rule was formally abandoned
by the Service in favor of a flexible test resembling the rules of
section 302(b). 113 While the Service acknowledges that the tests
of section 302 are not strictly applicable to the determination of
dividend equivalence under section 356(a)(2), the rulings adopting the flexible approach to section 356 specified that those tests
would serve as guidelines for decisions under the reorganization
section. The rulings further acknowledge, with respect to the attribution rules, that section 318 is not strictly applicable to section 356 but are silent with respect to whether those attribution
rules could be used to supplement the guidelines of section 302.
In a subsequent ruling, however, the Service cited section 318 in
a manner suggesting its application to section 356 although on the
facts of that ruling the attribution rules would not have been
material to the result. 114 It seems probable that the attribution
rules of section 318 will in time be incorporated into section
356(a)(2) to the same extent that the Supreme Court incorporated them into section 302(b)(l). 195
The ripple effect of United States v. Davis may not end with
section 356. For example, preferred stock distributed in a corporate reorganization will be section 306 stock but only to the extent
that "the effect of the transaction was substantially the same as
the receipt of a stock dividend." ••• It has long been accepted by
both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service that under this
language the recapitalization of a closely held corporation for the
purpose of passing control to the second generation in which all
of the common stock held by the older generation was converted
into nonvoting preferred stock does not create section 306 stock. 1117
192. B.

BITIKER

AND SHAREHOLDERS

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

& J.

EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS

§ 14.34.2 (3d ed. 1971).

Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
I.R.C. § 306(c)(l)(B).
Ehrlich, Corporate Recapitalization as an Estate Planning Business
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However, the regulations to section 306 provide that the distribution of preferred stock in a reorganization will be regarded as
creating section 306 stock if cash received in lieu of such stock
would have been treated as a dividend under section 356(a)(2). m
If the attribution rules of section 318 are applied to section 356,
their application to section 306 may soon follow.
The dividend equivalence test of section 302(b)(l) and the
related tests of sections 356 and 306 are quite different from other
substantive law sections that employ attribution. Under these
sections, stock ownership alone is not determinative of the income tax consequences of a transaction but rather constitutes
only one of several factors to be taken into account. If stock ownership is not determinative, it might seem to follow that the attribution rules should not be determinative of the amount of stock
that the taxpayer should be regarded as owning. That is, for the
purposes of these more flexible tests, perhaps the attribution
rules should not be mechanically applied, and stock should be
attributed to the taxpayer only when the identity of interest presumed by the attribution rules exists in fact. Needless to say,
such an approach to attribution would greatly increase the difficulty of applying the substantive provisions in question and predicting the resolution of tax disputes. Nevertheless, prior to the
decision in Davis, the Tax Court, •~u with some support, 200 had
adopted such an approach to attribution for the purpose of determining section 302(b)(l) dividend equivalence-at least with respect to family attribution.
These decisions held that when intrafamily hostility existed
and the actual owner of stock that otherwise would be attributed
to the taxpayer was not in fact subject to his control because of
such hostility, such stock would not be attributed to the taxpayer-the so-called "bad blood" exception to attribution. The
decision in Davis did not refer to such an exception. In view of
this silence and because the court stressed the necessity for a
meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest
in the corporation to avoid dividend equivalence, after Davis the
Retention Tool, N.Y.U. 34TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1661, 1675-76 (1976).
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d); see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3, 43 Fed.
Reg. 10704 (1978).
199. E.g., Estate of Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
200. Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
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Tax Court approached the application of the attribution rules as
a purely mechanical exercise. 201 However, in Haft Trust v.
Commissioner202 the First Circuit reversed the decision of the Tax
Court and held that the Davis opinion did not preclude an examination of all relevant facts and circumstances, including family
hostility. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determination of the existence of family discord that would have the
effect of negating the taxpayer's presumed continuing control
over the corporation.
The decision of the First Circuit seems correct. It would appear entirely appropriate to construe the catch-all language of
section 302(b)(l) in the most flexible manner possible to counteract the rigidly mechanical approach taken by the balance of the
section. However, the extent to which the bad blood exception
retains vitality remains to be seen.

XL

UsE oF AFFINITY SECTIONs BY CRoss-REFERENCE

From the perspective of the overall complexity of the Code
in general and the affinity provisions in particular, the foregoing
discussion has only scratched the surface. Many of the affinity
provisions thus far described are adopted by cross-reference in
many more sections of the Code. In addition, the majority of
provisions that cross-refer to the basic relationship and attribution sections also modify the definition being adopted in a variety
of ways. Thus, the diversity of definition contained within the
Code is multiplied through the use of modifying cross-references.
Obviously, space does not permit a detailed analysis of each of
the resulting provisions; however, a statistical summary will adequately indicate the extent of diversity within the Code and the
corresponding need for legislative attention.
A.

Cross-References to Basic Sections

The relationship or attribution rules provided by section 267
are employed in at least twenty-one distinct subsections of the
Code. Of these, ten subsections incorporate by cross-reference the
full range of relationships established by section 267(c). Only five
201. See Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974); Haft Trust v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 398 (1973).
202. 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975), vacatinq 61 T.C. 398 (1973).
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adopt the section 267(b) relationships without modification: sections 103(b)(6)(C), 170(a)(3), 178(b)(2), 465(b)(3)(B), and 631(c).
Each of the five sections modifying the 267(b) relationships do so
by initially restricting the definition of family. Three of the sections eliminate brothers and sisters from the relationship; and in
two of those sections, sections 44(c)(3) and 179(d)(2)(A), that is
the only modification in the cross-reference. The two final sections, sections 613A(c)(8) and 48(k)(5), greatly modify the definition of family to include only an individual's spouse and minor
children, but they otherwise adopt the section 267 relationships
and employ the cross-reference to these relationships in an aggregation form of attribution. 203 The one remaining section that eliminates brothers and sisters from the family definition, together
with the one section that does not modify the section 267 relationships, also alters the threshold percentage of ownership of corporate stock that an individual must possess in order to create the
corporation-shareholder relationship. Section 178(b)(2) increases
the percentage from fifty to eighty percent while section 1235(d)
reduces the required ownership to twenty-five percent.
Of these ten sections that cross-refer to section 267, eight
appear to adopt the attribution rules of section 267(c) along with
the cross-reference to the relationship provisions of section
267(b). Sections 170(a)(3) and 465(b)(3)(B), however, cross-refer
to section 267(b) only. The regulations to section 170(a) provide
no hint of whether this cross-reference should be regarded as including the constructive ownership rules of section 267(b), and
there are as yet no regulations to the newly added section 465.
Section 178 has been somewhat arbitrarily classified as crossreferring to the section 267 relationships without modification of
the definition of family. Actually, the cross-reference is more
complex. As in the case of section 170(a)(3), the initial crossreference deviates from the usual language and refers instead to
the relationships described in subsection (b) of section 267. 2114 Sec203. Both sections severely restrict the use of a Code benefit that previously was available-percentage depletion on oil and gas in the case of section
613A and the investment tal[ credit on motion pictures in the case of section
48(k)-and the limited family definition appears to be Congress' way of mildly
reducing the impact of the new limitations. One might suppose that whatever
justification exists for attribution at all would equally support a somewhat
broader family definition.
204.

I.R.C. § 178(b)(2)(B).
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tion 178, however, provides that for the purpose of determining
the existence of the section 267(b) relationships, the attribution
rules of section 267(c) shall be applied except that brothers and
sisters are deleted from the family definition. 205 Thus, while an
individual would be regarded as related to his brother and to a
corporation wholly owned by his child, he is not related to a
corporation wholly owned by his brother. Section 178 appears to
be the only instance of separate cross-references to sections 267(b)
and 267(c) and thus is the only instance in which the Code uses
two different family definitions for the single purpose of defining
one set of relationships.ZM
Six of the ten sections that cross-refer to section 267 supplement the cross-reference by also cross-referring to the similar
provision in section 707(b) relating to partners and partnerships.
Of these six sections, two cross-refer to section 267 without modification (sections 103(c)(6)(C) and 631(c)), two modify 267(b)
only by eliminating attribution from brothers and sisters (sections 44(c)(3) and 179(d)(2)(A)),. and two employ the sharply
limited definition of the family (sections 48(k)(3)(D) and
613A{c)(8)).
Accordingly, while there are ten sections of the Code that
employ the relationship and attribution provisions contained in
section 267 for the purpose of expanding the substantive law provision using the cross-reference, there are seven distinct subcategories of relationships:
1. unmodified adoption without attribution,
2. unmodified adoption with attribution,
3. unmodified adoption adding partnership relationships,
4. unmodified adoption with modified attribution and
increased stock-ownership threshold,
5. elimination of brother-sister attribution and addition
of partnership relationships,
6. elimination of brother-sister attribution and reduction
of stock ownership threshold, and
205. I.R.C. § 178(b)(2) {flush language).
206. Section 178, however, is not the only instance in which a single section of the Code uses two variations of the section 267 definition of family for
quite similar purposes. See note 228 infra.
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7. sharply narrowed family definition but added partnership relationships.
Obviously, there is no consistency among the numerous modifications of section 267.
Of the remaining eleven sections that cross-refer to section
267, six refer only to the definition of family and are discussed
below. The remaining five sections cross-refer only to the attribution rules contained in section 267(c) while prescribing their own
relationships. Of these five sections, only section 50B(c)(5)(A)
uses the section 267(c) attribution rule without modification. Section 707(b), which prescribes its own partnership relationship
rules, essentially adopts section 267(c) attribution without modification although it excludes the application of section 267(c)(3),
which attributes stock from one partner to another. Section
341(e), discussed in somewhat greater detail below, modifies the
definition of family for section 267(c) purposes by eliminating
brothers and sisters. The final two sections using these attribution rules are the prohibited-transaction provisions in sections
4946(a) and 4975(e) pertaining to private foundations and pension plans, respectively. In each instance, the cross-reference to
section 267(c) is modified by eliminating brother-sister attribution and by including spouses of lineal descendants as members
of the family.
Section 318 is used in eighteen distinct ways in fourteen sections of the Code. While section 318 is exclusively an attributionof-stock-ownership section that does not purport to establish relationships in the manner of section 267(b), four of the crossreferences to section 318 are for the purpose of defining relationships rather than prescribing attribution. Three of these four
cross-references do not modify the provisions of section 318. Thus,
section 306(b)(l)(A) sets forth an exception to the normal treatment of the disposition of section 306 stock, provided, among
other things, that the disposition is not to a person the ownership
of whose stock would (under section 318(a)) be attributable to the
stockholder. Section 302(c)(2)(B)(i) requires full attribution in a
''termination of interest" redemption if any stock redeemed was
acquired within ten years from a person whose stock would be
attributed at the time of the redemption to the shareholder under
section 318(a). Section 334(b)(2)(B) also uses section 318 with
respect to the acquisition of stock but with the added complexity
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that it may be necessary to determine the date upon which the
corporate parent "is first considered under section 318(a) as owning stock owned by the corporation {which must stand in the
section 318 relationship] from which such acquisition was
made." The final use of section 318 as a relationship section occurs in section 382(a)(5), which modifies section 318 by eliminating the fifty percent threshold requirement for the ownership of
stock in a corporation.
Twelve of the eighteen cross-references to section 318 are
adoptions of the full attribution rules provided by that section.
Of those twelve, only five sections adopt the attribution rules
without modification: sections 302(c)(l), 306(b)(l)(A), 367(c)(2),
545(c)(3)(B), 207 and 995(e)(10).
The remaining cross-references to section 318 all prescribe
reductions in the fifty percent threshold requirement for ownership of a corporation before attribution may be made. Two of
these references, sections 856(d) and 6038(d), reduce the threshold requirement to ten percent. Sections 304(b), 304(c), 382(a)(3).
and 1239(c) completely eliminate the fifty percent threshold. The
final cross-reference to the attribution rules of section 318 is contained in section 958, discussed below, which modifies the application of that section considerably. The set of attribution rules
resulting in section 958 is used by cross-reference in four sections:
679(c)(2), 1246(b)(2), 1248(a) and (c), and 1249(b). In each instance, these rules are used to establish ownership of a foreign
corporation for which section 958 is specifically adapted. Thus,
these four sections may be added to the list of uses of section 318
by cross-reference.
Two of the cross-references to section 318 are solely to the
definition of family contained in that section and are discussed
below.
The final basic affinity rule contained in the Code is section
1563. This section, although it constitutes a relatively recent addition to the Code, is referenced twenty-two times in eighteen
sections. Of these, sections 243(b)(6) and 404(a)(1)(C) are special
207. The cross-reference to section 318 in section 545 is curious. Section
545 defines undistributed personal holding company income, and it might have
been anticipated that any attribution rules used by that section would be
adopted from section 544, which prescribes the attribution rules that are generally used with respect to personal holding companies, rather than section 318.
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rules that will not be further considered. Of the remaining twenty
cross-references, sixteen involve cross-references to the corporate
relationships established by section 1563(a). Of those, eight do
not modify the provisions of section 1563(a): sections 46(a)(6),
50A(a)(5), 58(b), 250(d), 368(a)(2)(F), 414(b), 86l(e)(l), and
99(e)(3)(A). An equal number modify that definition by reducing
the eighty percent ownership requirement to fifty percent: sections 48(c)(3)(C), 48(k)(3)(D), 52(a), 103(b)(6)(C), 179(d)(7),
415(h), 613A(c)(8)(D), and 993(a)(3).
The cross-reference to section 1563 in section 993(a)(3) is in
the context of defining a controlled group of corporations for the
purpose of the DISC sections of the Code. This definition is in
turn used by cross-reference throughout the DISC provisions. In
1976, when the international boycott provisions were adopted and
the need arose to define a controlled group of corporations, the
definitional cross-reference was made to section 993(a)(3) rather
than to section 1563, as had previously been done throughout the
Code. Thus, sections 908(a) and 999(a) and (b) also in effect
cross-refer to section 1563. 208
One additional section may cross-refer to section 1563. Section 48(c)(l), in defining relationships, uniquely cross-refers to
the relationships established by section 179(d)(2)(A) and (B).
While subparagraph (A) of that provision cross-refers in turn to
sections 267 and 707, subparagraph (B) merely refers to a controlled group of corporations. For the purposes of section 179,
section 179(d)(7) defines such a controlled group by a modified
cross-reference to section 1563. While section 48(c)(l) does not
cross-refer to paragraph (7), it would seem reasonable to assume
that such a reference should be implied by the reference to paragraph (2) (B). This imprecision in draftsmanship is the direct
result of defining relationships by means of double crossreferences through apparently randomly selected and wholly unrelated substantive provisions such as section 179. Such a drafting technique is totally without merit and needlessly complicates
the task of decoding the relationship intended. 201
208.

At one point in the international boycott provisions it was necessary

to refer to a person in control of a corporation; and, for that purpose, section

999(e) contains a unique cross-reference to section 304(c). For the purpose of
defining the relationship established by section 304(c), section 304(c)(2) requires
the use of the attribution rules of section 318, with modifications.
209. The cross-reference to section 304, for example, is for the purpose of
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While the attribution rules prescribed by section 1563 are the
most refined and sophisiticated in the Code, they are employed
by cross-reference in only four sections that-do not also adopt a
cross-reference to the 1563(a) relationship provision. These sections are 993(e)(3)(A), 210 1551(b), 211 120(d)(6), and 415(c)(6)(B).
Within the relatively sophisticated attribution rules of section
1563(e), the definition of family is the most refined. That definition, however, is not employed in any other section of the Code.
Presumably, the restrictions on such attribution, particularly
from a spouse, are regarded as too great for general use.
The cross-references to section 1563 contained in sections 414
and 52 form the basis for the all-inclusive relationship provisions
created by these sections. In the earlier of these two sections,
section 414(b) routinely cross-refers to the section 1563(a) definition of a controlled group of corporations for the purpose of treating all related employers as one employer in the context of the
ERISA provisions. Section 414(c) provides that all businesses,
whether or not incorporated, shall be treated as a single employer
for those specified purposes if they are under common control as
determined under regulations based upon the principles applicable to section 414(b)-presumably the definitions of section 1563
and the attribution rules applicable thereto. The temporarym
and proposed final2 13 regulations that have been issued under section 414 have faithfully undertaken the required adaptation, and
there is no present indication that the resulting relationship prodefining control over a corporation. Section 304 does provide such a definition-in fact an unusual one that could not be incorporated by reference to any
of the commonly cross-referenced provisions. Assuming the control definition in
section 304(c) exactly met the objectives of the draftsmen of section 999(e), the
economy of words achieved by the cross-reference seems a rather modest success
in view of the present length of the Internal Revenue Code. Of far greater
importance is the rationality and simplicity of the draftsmanship of the Code,
and that cannot be obtained when the construction of a provision pertaining to
international boycotts requires referring back some two hundred pages to two
·sections relating to an entirely different subject matter.
210. Section 993(e)(3)(A) separately does cross-refer to the section 1563
definition of a controlled group.
211. This section contains a definition of a controlled group that is similar
to the section 1563 definition.
212. Treas. Reg.§ 11.414(c), T.D. 7388, 1975-2 C.B. 180.
213. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.414(b), .414(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 51467-68
(1975).
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vlSlon is unsatisfactory in either form or scope. Indeed, it was
copied with only a minor revision in 1977. 21 • While these regulations and the resulting relationship cannot be described as uncomplicated, they are far easier to understand than the alternative aggregation form used in sections 613A and 48(k) in the 1969
and 1975 Acts.
The regulations to section 414 supply traditional answers to
the problems posed in adapting the principles of section 1563 to
unincorporated entities. Since the Treasury Department had considerable flexibility in fashioning these regulations, it is somewhat disappointing that the opportunity was not taken to improve various aspects of the relationship and attribution rules.
Section 1563 distinguishes between voting and nonvoting stock
in defining the corporate relationship but not in defining its attribution rules. 215 While the proposed regulations to section 414
restate the voting power or value test for corporations, m ownership of a partnership is measured by interest in profits or capital
with no reference to voting power. 217 The absence of the voting
power alternative means that in a limited partnership in which
the general partners own less than fifty percent of the profits or
capital interest, the partnership will not be regarded as controlled
by those persons who in fact have exclusive control over its daily
activities. This regulatory focus on the traditional formula may
not be consistent with the principles of section 1563.
With respect to trusts and estates, the determination of control is based solely upon the actuarial interest in the entire trust
or estate. 218 This would seem to be the only appropriate test.
Consistent with section 1563, however, attribution from a trust or
estate is made in accordance with the beneficiaries' actuarial
interest in the stock or other ownership interest being attributed.m While again this basis for attribution seems to be appropriate, it must be observed that in the context of section 414, the
214. LR.C. § 52; see text accompanying note 222 infra.
215. Nonvoting preferred stock is ignored entirely. See text accompanying
note 130 supra.
216. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(A), -2(c)(2)(i), 40 Fed. Reg.
51469 (1975).
217. /d. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(C), -2(c)(2)(iii).
218. !d. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(B), -2(c)(2)(ii).
219. /d. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(3)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 51471-72 (1975).
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application of these two different rules can produce unexpected
results. For example, assume that an individual holds an actuarially computed forty percent interest in a trust and thus is not
regarded as controlling the trust. He may nevertheless be regarded as controlling a corporation wholly owned by the trust if
other beneficiaries are excluded under the trust agreement from
obtaining any interest in the stock.
While the regulations prescribe an option attribution rule,
they contain no explanation at all concerning the operation of
that rule. 220 In view of the rather confused case law under the
option rule of section 1563, 221 it is probable that the omission was
deliberate and that the Treasury Department was either unable
or unwilling to prescribe a coherent set of rules governing this
area. One can have sympathy with the Treasury Department's
difficulties, but it seems clear that nothing is to be gained by
leaving the resolution of the doubts under the option rule to further case development. It would be preferable for the Treasury to
take the opportunity presented by section 414 to rationalize this
area.
After developing the aggregation form of all-inclusive relationships in 1976, Congress returned in 1977 to the section 414
approach of modifying a cross-reference to section 1563. Congress
may have reverted to the section 414 approach because of the
similar need in the new section 52 to define a related group of
entities in order to treat the group as a single employer. 222 However, while the cross-reference to section 1563 was not modified
by section 414, the cross-reference in section 52 eliminates the
eighty percent requirement,m thus creating dissimilar definitions. The regulations to section 414 entirely restate the principles of section 1563 while the regulations that have been proposed
under section 52 largely cross-refer to the temporary regulations
under section 414. 224
.Eleven sections cross-refer to the definition of a controlled
220. See id. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 51471 (1975).
221. See text accompanying notes 165-67 supra.
222. Section 52 imposes a limitation on the "new jobs" credit allowed by
section 448 and is unrelated to the ERISA provisions of which section 414 is a
part.
223. I.R.C. § 52(a)(l).
224. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.52-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 62932 (1977).
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group of corporations contained in section 1504, 225 which limits
the relationship to parent-subsidiary chains. Of these crossreferences, five do not modify the section 1504 definition: sections
178(b), 542(d)(3), 904(d), 1313(c)(7), and 137l(a). Section
1504(b) excludes from the definition of an affiliated group certain
types of corporations, and five of the cross-references delete these
exclusions, thus broadening the definition: sections 48(h)(10),
49(b)(8), 279(g), 337(c), and 593(e). Section 593(e), in addition,
reduces from eighty percent to fifty percent the quantity of stock
in the subsidiary that must be owned to establish the relationship. Section 47(a)(7)(B) also reduces the required stock ownership to fifty percent but retains all of the exclusions except foreign
corporations.

B.

Multiple Cross-References

Several of the Code sections that employ cross-references to
section 267, and perhaps to section 707(b), supplement the basically individual orientation of those sections with a crossreference to one of the sections focusing on relationships among
controlled groups of corporations. Thus, sections 48(k)(3)(D),
103(b)(6), 179(d)(2), and 613A(c)(8)(D), in addition to referring
to both sections 267 and 707(b), cross-refer to section 1563(a),
in each case reducing the ownership test to fifty percent. Section
178(b)(2) supplements its reference to section 267 by reference to
an affiliated group of corporations within the meaning of section
1504 but does not include a reference to section 707(b). Other
sections, such as section 631(c), supplement their reference to
section 267 with their own definition of controlled corporations.

C.

Cross-References to the Family Definition

Numerous sections of the Code define the family, generally
to deny a benefit otherwise granted by the Code to transactions
occurring between members of the family or to impute to an
individual activities detrimental to his tax position even if such
activities were actually undertaken by members of the defined
family. Most sections of the Code that define the family do so in
225. This tally does not include those sections that refer to groups of
corporations filing consolidated income tax returns, eligibility for which is defined by section 1504.
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the course of adopting complete relationship rules by crossreference to either section 267 or section 318. As we have seen,
these cross-references are subject to numerous modifications. A
few additional sections cross-refer solely to the family definition
contained in section 267 or section 318 and either do not use
nonfamily relationships at all or supply their own.
Six sections of the Code 228 adopt the definition of family contained in section 267, which includes an individual's spouse,
ancestors, lineal descendants, and brothers and sisters. As noted
above, the regulations may intend that the terms "ancestors" and
"lineal descendants" be limited to two generations. 227 None of the
sections cross-referencing to these rules modify the section 267
definition of family except section 464(c)(2)(E). The other sections are 274(e)(5) (which is atypical because a benefit granted
by the Code is extended to family members under this provision),
280A(d)(2)(A), 1237(a)(2), and two prohibited-transaction sections, 503(b) and 4975(d). 228
The Tax Reform Bill of 1975, as originally passed by the
House of Representatives, contained a provision identical in substance to the present section 464 that adopted by cross-reference
the family definition of section 267. 221 In the Senate, this crossreference was broadened into its present form, which includes the
members of the family, as defined in section 267(c)(4), of "a
grandparent" of the taxpayer. 230 It seems clear that the purpose
226. An unmodified cross-reference to the family definition in section
267(c)(4) is also contained in sections 613A(c)(9)(B)(iii) and 613A(d)(l)(D), but
these are special provisions applicable only to one taxpayer and are not further
considered herein.
227. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
228. The unmodified adoption of the family definition by section 4975(d)
is not for the purpose of defining a so-called disqualified person with respect to
a qualified trust. As we have seen above, the definition of family for such purpose was modified by deleting brothers and sisters and adding any spouse of a
lineal descendant. Section 4975(d), however, contains a series of exceptions from
the definition of a prohibited transaction, and to these exceptions there is in
tum an exception for a qualified plan benefiting owner-employees that engage
in certain activities. In the course of describing those activities, section 4975(d)
employs the unmodified family definition of section 267(c)(4). Thus, the same
section of the Code uses two different definitions of family for essentially identical purposes.
229. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § lOl(a), 121 CoNG. REc. 38598-601
(1975).
230. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1531.
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of this change was to expand the family definition along the lines
of the broad definition contained in section 447. The report of the
Committee on Finance states that "[f]or the purpose of this
provision, the family of an individual includes not only his brothers and sisters (whether by whole or half-blood), his spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants but also other lineal descendants of the individual's parents and grandparents."%3 1 The first
portion of this statement recites the family definition of section
267 exactly, while the balance includes descendants of the individual's grandparents. The simplistic cross-reference to the section 267 family of "a grandparent" does not accomplish that
objective.
The initial interpretation question under section 464 is
whether the reference to "a grandparent" should be construed as
meaning "any grandparent." The plurals used in the committee
report would support this construction as would a comparison
with section 447 (although consistency among such similar uses
of the family definition has not been an earmark of the affinity
provisions). Obviously the defined family will be far broader if the
descendants of all four grandparents are to be included, but the
important difference between these two interpretations is not in
their overall breadth. The descendants of a single grandparent
would only include one of the taxpayer's parents so that under a
literal reading of section 464( c)(2)(E), the taxpayer's family
would include either his father or his mother, but not both.
Of even greater importance, under the present statutory language, is the fact that the taxpayer's spouse is clearly excluded
from the definition of family since a spouse is not commonly a
descendant of any of the taxpayer's grandparents. The Technical
Corrections Bill of 1977 232 proposed adding spouses of each family
member to the definition of family. While this proposal would
have remedied the clearly unintentional omission of the taxpayer's spouse, the addition of all spouses of family members
seems to go beyond the family description contained in the abovequoted committee report. The proposal, however, would be in
conformity with the related section 447 family definition. Pend231. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 59, reprinted in [19761 U.S.
CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEws 3439, 3495.
232. H.R. 6715 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(k)(3), 123 CONG. REc. H 11096
(1977).
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ing the adoption of this or similar corrective legislation, the section 464 definition of family only includes the spouse of the taxpayer's grandparent.
There may even be a question concerning whether the family
of the taxpayer, as so defined, includes his children. It will be
recalled that while section 267(c)(4) refers to an individual's lineal descendants, the regulations thereto define those terms as
including children and grandchildren. 233 If this statement in the
regulations is construed as a limitation rather than as a relatively
pointless illustration, the limitation presumably would be applicable to all uses of section 267(c)(4) by cross-reference. In the
context of section 464, the taxpayer in question is the grandchild
of the "grandparent." If the relationship extends no further, the
children of the taxpayer are not included. This question could be
resolved appropriately by regulation in favor of including all descendants of the taxpayer. It might be hoped, however, that clarification would come by removing the limitation suggested by the
regulations to section 267 rather than by a regulation to section
464. Clarification by a regulation to section 464 would necessarily
suggest that the term ulineal descendants" in section 267 has a
different meaning when applied to section 464 than when applied
elsewhere.
The form and substance of the family definition of section
464 should be compared to the family definition contained in
section 447, discussed above.zs. Both sections 447 and 464 were
added to the Code in 1976 to reduce the attractiveness of farming
as a tax shelter by altering the tax accounting rules that previously had been applicable to all farming operations. Both sections exempt from their application family-owned farms, and
both sections define family quite broadly for this purpose. It is
interesting to compare the different approaches taken to define
the family in section 464 (by way of a modified cross-reference)
and in section 447 (through its own definition). It is also instructive to note the different, although perhaps unintentional, results
reached by these approaches. 235
233. Treas. Reg.§ 1.267(c)-l(a)(4) (1958).
234. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
235. In light of the difficulties encountered in modifying an existing definition to arrive at the desired breadth, it might be concluded that when such a
dramatic deviation from the established definition is sought, a better approach
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Two sections of the Code adopt the definition of family contained in section 318: sections 103(c)(3) and 1379(d). Neither of
these sections modify the definition so adopted:m
D.

Cross-References to Miscellaneous Sections

In addition to the double cross-references referred to above, 237
a few sections of the Code cross-refer, with or without modification, to the affinity provisions defined in sections other than secwould be to draft a new provision as in section 447.
The 1976 Act generally receives very low marks for its approach to attribution. The Act defined family for stock attribution purposes eleven times in the
course of eight different newly added or amended sections. Of these eleven
sections, two cross-refer to the section 267 definition of family, and both then
modify the definition so adopted, one in a unique and extreme way. One section
incorporates the section 318 definition by reference without modification and
another cross-refers to section 958 that itself cross-refers to section 318. One
section cross-refers to section 1563 without modification of its family definition
and three sections cross-refer to section 993(a)(3) that in turn cross-refers to
section 1563-thereby adding a new double cross-reference to the Code. One
section adds a unique cross-reference to section 304 that cross-refers to section
318 for a second new double cross-reference. Finally, two sections contribute
their own family definition, one of which is very narrow and the other very
broad. Of the eleven provisions, seven employ the traditional approach and four
use the aggregation form of attribution.
236. Section 103(c) contains an exception to the general exemption under
section 103 from tax for interest on municipal bonds when such bonds constitute
arbitrage bonds as defined in section 103(c). Section 103(c)(3) contains an exception to the arbitrage bond definition but that exception is in tum subject to
an exception for bonds held by a person who is a substantial user of the property
being financed or a member of his family. For this purpose, the unmodified
definition of family contained in section 318 is employed. Section 103(b) contains a second exception to section 103 for industrial development bonds, but
that exception is in turn subject to a variety of exceptions for particular types
of industrial development bonds, the interest on which remains exempt from
tax. These exceptions are themselves subject to certain exceptions including the
provision subjecting the interest on such a bond to tax during any period of time
in which the bond is held by a substantial user of the facilities being financed
or a person related to the substantial user. For this purpose, a related person is
defined very broadly and includes all of the relationships prescribed by sections
267 and 707(b) as well as an expanded reference to section 1563(a). The crossreference in section 103(b) to section 267 is unmodified. Accordingly, this section
also employs two different definitions of family for substantially identical purposes.
237. See notes 208-09 supra and accompanying text.
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tions 267, 318, 1504, and 1563. 238 Of these, the most significant is
the uniqueZ3' cross-reference in section 341(d) to the "rules prescribed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6) of section
544(a)." 2~0 Section 341(d) is the de minimis exception to collapsible corporation treatment, reserving ordinary-income treatment
for shareholders owning more than five percent of the value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation (subparagraph (A)) or for a
shareholder whose stock is attributable to such a five percent
shareholder (subparagraph (B)). Thus, section 341(d) not only
uses the rules of section 544(a) for attribution purposes, but also
in section 341(d)(1)(B) establishes a relationship among shareholders of a collapsible corporation based upon those attribution
rules. The complexity of the resulting provision has caused understandable confusion.
The cross-reference to section 544(a) specifically includes a
cross-reference to the operating rules contained in paragraph (5).
However, at least one court has concluded that the limitations
upon reattribution contained in the section 544 operating rules
may not be applicable, at least in part, to section 341(d). This
construction, of course, could have the effect of widening the
scope of that provision beyond all reasonable bounds. In that
case, Lewis S. Jacobson, 241 the Tax Court was faced with the
question of whether stock owned by a partner of the husband
could be attributed to the wife. At this time, the predecessor to
section 341(d)(1)m prescribed a ten percent threshold. The wife
held seven and one-half percent of the value of the outstanding
238. For example, section 704(e)(3) defines family to include only the
spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants and thus is identical to the definition
contained in section 267 except for the deletion of the reference to brothers and
sisters (although the regulations to this provision do not suggest that the reference to ancestors and lineal descendants is limited to grandparents and grandchildren only) and section 704(e) is used by cross-reference in section 1375(c).
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
239. Prior to 1964, section 1551 also used the attribution rules of section
544 but that cross-reference was changed to the more closely related attribution
rules contained in section 1563(e) when that section was enacted.
240. See also I.R.C. § 704(e) (used by a cross-reference from section
1375( c)).
241. 32 T.C. 893 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.
1960).
242. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (m), as amended by Revenue Act of
1950, ch. 994, § 211(a), 64 Stat. 933.
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stock of the collapsible corporation, the husband owned no stock,
and his partner owned in excess of ten percent. The taxpayer
argued that the wife could not be regarded as owning the stock
owned by the partner because of the operating rule in the prede.
cessor to section 544 prohibiting double family and partner attribution. However, the court concluded that the predecessor to
section 34l(d)(l)(B) overruled the prohibition against such reattribution and held that the wife was subject to tax on her sale of
the stock at ordinary income rates. This statement by the Tax
Court seems to be based upon a misreading of the section and is
clearly wrong. In fact, the wife was subject to tax under the predecessor to section 341(d)(l)(B), not because she was constructively a ten percent shareholder (which would require an impermissible attribution of the partner's stock to her) but rather
because her stock was attributable to another (her husband)
who was constructively a ten percent shareholder. This case
illustrates the logic of the proposition that attribution rules
should never be used to establish relationships, not only because the resulting statutory language is unduly confusing but
also because of the extreme breadth of the relationship so
created. In any event, the erroneous suggestion that the operating rules of section 544 are not applicable to section 34l(d) pre.
sumably will not be followed.
It may be recalled that section 544 is unique among attribution rules in that it provides a specific and detailed provision
treating convertible securities as stock. However, the crossreference in section 341(d) is only to section 544(a) and therefore
excludes the convertible securities rule contained in subsection
(b). This exclusion raises an interesting question with respect to
the scope of the option rule contained in section 544(a) as applied
to section 34I(d). It may also be recalled that the Service has
interpreted the option rule contained in section 318 as being applicable to convertible securities on the ground that such securities were not realistically different from options. Presumably, a
similar construction of the identical option rule contained in section 544 could not be made because of the superseding specific
rule contained in subsection (b). Cases like Jacobson, 243 however,
have suggested that attribution rules adopted by an unrelated
243. 32 T.C. 893 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.
1960). See also North Am. Indue., Inc., v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275
(1974).
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substantive law section of the Code become in effect a part of that
substantive law and may be subjected to varying interpretations
depending upon the substantive section to which they are being
applied. Thus, a court might regard itself as free to interpret the
option rule of section 544, as applied to section 341(d), entirely
differently from the manner in which that option rule would be
applied for the purpose of the personal holding company provisions. In spite of the specificity of the cross-reference to section
544(a), the question cannot be regarded as free from doubt. If a
court were presented with what it regarded as a clear case of tax
avoidance under section 341(d) through the use of convertible
securities, the pressure for an expansive reading of the option rule
would be considerable.
The cross-reference to the family definition contained in section 544(a) is specifically modified for the purposes of section
341(d) to create the broadest family attribution (and relationship) rules existing in the Code-except for the farm-family definitions of sections 447 and 464. The definition in section 544(a)
is an older, relatively broad definition that includes an individual's spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and siblings. Section
341(d) adds the spouses of the individual's brothers and sisters
and the spouses of his lineal descendants.
The rules of section 544 are also used, for the purposes of
section 341(e), by means of a cross-reference in section 341(e)(10)
to section 341(d). Unfortunately, section 341(e) also cross-refers
to the rules of section 267(c) and blends these cross-references
into a most confusing pattern. With extensive elaboration and
refinement, section 341(e) excludes from ordinary-income treatment any gain on the sale of stock of a collapsible corporation if
the unrealized appreciation inherent in the assets of the corporation is below a specified amount. Under paragraph (1), however,
this treatment is not available to a twenty percent shareholder if
his stock is redeemed or sold to a person "related" to him within
the meaning of paragraph (8). Paragraph (10) prescribes that for
the purposes of section 341(e), including the twenty percent computation, stock ownership shall be determined under section
341(d), that is, under the rules of section 544(a). However, this
provision is expressly inapplicable to the definition of a related
person under paragraph (8). Paragraph (8) establishes its own,
relatively narrow, relationship provisions pursuant to which an
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individual shareholder is regarded as related only to his spouse,
ancestors, lineal descendants, and a corporation in which he owns
fifty percent of the stock based either upon voting power or
value. 24~ To determine ownership of stock for these purposes, paragraph (8) cross-refers, not to section 544(a), but to section 267(c)
and modifies the cross-reference to the section 267(c) definition
of family by eliminating brothers and sisters. 245
The application of these very different rules of section 34l(e)
to the same transaction can produce somewhat surprising results.
For example, if an individual and his brother each owns fifteen
percent of the stock of a collapsible corporation that otherwise
satisfies the requirements for exemption from collapsible treatment provided by section 341(e)(l), the individual will be regarded as a more than twenty percent shareholder of the corporation because of the attribution of the stock owned by his brother
to hini as required by sections 341(e)(10), 341(d), and 544(a).
Nevertheless, he is free to sell stock to his brother, avoiding ordinary income treatment, since his brother is not regarded as related to him under sections 341(e)(8) and 267(c) as modified.
E.

Defining Relationships by Cross-References
to Attribution Rules

On a few occasions the Code has defined relationships among
taxpayers by a cross-reference to attribution rules. Since, in general, attribution may be made from a considerably broader circle
of entities than would normally be regarded as related to the
taxpayer, the effect of this use of attribution rules is to describe
an unusually broad set of relationships. The impropriety of this
244. If the shareholder is a corporation, it is regarded as related to its
parent and its subsidiary, which relationship is established by the same 50% of
voting power or value test, and to a sister corporation if more than 50% of the
value only of the stock of the shareholder is owned by a person who also owns
50% in value of the stock of the sister corporation.
245. It is not at all clear why the draftsmen of section 341(e), which postdates section 341(d), adopted the attribution rules of section 267(c). These rules
differ from the rules contained in section 544 in only two respects. First, both
permit attribution directly from a partner, although section 267(c) requires as
a condition to such attribution. that the individual to whom stock is being
attributed otherwise owns stock in the corporation. Second, section 2671acks the
option rule contained in section 544 and all other principal attribution sections
of the Code.
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device has long been recognized, 2.. and the regulations attempt
to remedy its worst defects. Unfortunately, different regulations
attack different problems, leaving behind a pattern that is more
confused than the statute alone.
Sections 334(b)(2) and 382(a) both prescribe certain consequences to the purchase of corporate stock under the conditions
specified in those sections, and both exclude from the definition
of purchase the acquisition of stock "from a person the ownership
of whose stock would, under section 318(a), be attributed to the
person acquiring such stock."u7 In common with most attribution
rules, section 318 contains an option attribution rule. Taken literally; therefore, if the purchaser of stock first obtains a short-term
option to purchase the stock, the later exercise of the option
would not constitute a "purchase" under these sections since the
stock would be acquired from a person whose stock would be
attributed to the purchaser. Such a rule would not only eliminate
from the definition of "purchase" a large number of arm's length
sales between unrelated persons that clearly should be included
within the substantive provisions of sections 334(b)(2) and
382(a) but would also permit taxpayers to avoid "purchase"
characterization at their election by arranging their acquisitions.
In recognition of these objections, the regulations to section 334
in effect ignore the existence of the option. 248 Unfortunately, a
parallel provision is absent from the regulations to section 382.
The use of section 318 to define the relationships used in
these two sections eliminates what would be the most serious
source of excessive breadth because atypically, under section 318,
attribution is only made from a corporation to a fifty percent
shareholder. Accordingly, the relationship so described conforms
to the usual threshold requirement for relationship purposes.
However, attribution is made to a partner with no threshold requirement, which is inconsistent with the usual cross-reference to
the fifty percent partner definition of section 707 (b) (1). The regulations to the pre-1976 version of section 382(a) attacked this
246. See, e.g., Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Standardization of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and
"Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L. REV. 253, 278 (1960).
247. I.R.C. § 334(b)(3)(C). The pre-1976 version of section 382(a) contained a substantially identical provision in the prior section 382(a)(4).
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.334-l(c)(6)(iii), T.D. 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176.
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problem by ignoring the statutory language and excluding from
the definition of purchase only the shares of stock that would be
attributed to the purchaser immediately before the transaction in
question.uu Under the regulations, therefore, if a partnership
owns sixty shares of stock, all of which are purchased by a fifty
percent partner, only the acquisition of thirty shares is excluded
from the definition of purchase since only fifty percent of the
partnership holdings would be attributable to the purchasing
partner.
Section 382(a) was considerably modified in the 1976 Act.
While the basic structure of this relationship provision was not
changed, the law was conformed to the proportional approach of
the regulation. 2511 The unsatisfactory effect of the cross-reference
to section 318 cannot be remedied so easily. While the result now
reached under section 382(a) may be superior to the prior approach, it is nevertheless totally unsound and inconsistent with
the very concept of the relationship provisions. Taxpayers are
either so closely related that their transactions should not be
accorded the same treatment as transactions between unrelated
taxpayers or they are not so related; it is illogical to assert that
they are sufficiently related with respect to a portion of their
holdings.
The third example of this technique, the cross-reference to
section 544 in section 341(d), has been described above. 251 Typically, under section 544, there are no threshold requirements for
attribution from corporations to their stockholders, and thus
under this provision a corporation is regarded as related to each
owner of a single share of its stock-a patently absurd result.
Unfortunately, the regulations to this section do not address any
of the problems posed by the inordinate breadth of the described
relationships. 252
The opposite problem, the use of relationship provisions for
attribution p·urposes, is more than just a question of improper
cross-referencing; it is the substance of the device referred to
herein as the aggregation form of attribution. The weaknesses in
this drafting style are considered below. 253
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

!d. § 1.382(a).l(e)(1), T.D. 6616, 1962-2 C.B. 106.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806(e), 90 Stat. 1583.
See text accompanying notes 231-32 supra.
See Treas" Reg. § 1.341-4, T.D. 6738, 1964-2 C.B. 95.
See Part XII infra.
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THE ULTIMATE IN ATTRIBUTION: SECTION

958

One section of the Code that in part employs attribution by
a modified cross-reference to section 318 and in part prescribes
its own rules is deserving of more individualized attention than
that given to other uses of attribution by cross-reference. Several
of the particular rules either contained in section 958 itself or in
the regulations thereto are unique although they are not uniquely
required by the substantive law supplemented by these rules. If
the approach of section 958 is meritorious, it should be applied
elsewhere; if it is not, it should be eliminated from the Code
altogether. In any event, from the perspective of sheer complexity, section 958 is the ultimate in attribution.
Sections 951 through 964, collectively referred to as Subpart
F of the Code, 154 set forth a complex series of rules designed to
impose a current tax on certain classes of income earned abroad
by foreign corporations that are controlled by "United States
persons." The "controlled foreign corporations" subject to Subpart F are foreign corporations of which more than fifty percent
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock is owned
by United States shareholders. The effect of the application of
Subpart F is to include a portion of the income actually earned
by a controlled foreign corporation in the tax return of its United
States shareholders. For these purposes, a United States shareholder is a citizen or resident of the United States or a domestic
corporation or other entity that owns ten percent or more of the
combined voting power of the controlled foreign corporation. Subpart F requires a careful definition of stock ownership, and that
definition is supplied by section 958. In addition, for the purposes
of the substantive provisions of Subpart F, a distinction is drawn
between United States persons and nonresident aliens or foreign
corporations. This distinction is also reflected in the stock ownership rules provided by section 958.
Section 958 essentially prescribes two sets of attribution
rules, one of general and one of limited scope, that overlap considerably. Section 958(a) (2) prescribes a rule for attributing stock
from entities to their owners that is similar in operation to the
rule prescribed by section 267. Thus, the shareholders, partners,
or beneficiaries are treated as owning proportionately the stock
254.

Actually, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part III, Subpart F.
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held by the respective entities and there are no threshold requirements. Constructive ownership of stock under this rule is treated
as actual ownership so that stock may be vertically reattributed
indefinitely. However, the provision is only applicable when the
entity from which stock is attributed is a foreign corporation,
partnership, trust, or estate. Accordingly, once stock is attributed
to a United States person pursuant to this provision, attribution
ceases. For example, assume that domestic corporation A owns
twenty percent of domestic corporation B, which owns sixty percent of foreign corporation C, which owns twenty percent of foreign corporation D. Under this provision, domestic corporation B
is regarded as owning twelve percent of foreign corporation D
(sixty percent times twenty percent), but domestic corporation A
is not regarded as owning any stock in either foreign corporation
C or foreign corporation D.
Section 958(b) adopts by cross-reference all of the attribution
rules contained in section 318 but imposes a number of modifications. The fifty percent threshold requirement for the normal
attribution of stock from a corporation to its shareholders is reduced to ten percent although the fifty percent threshold for
back-attribution is not changed. Second, if an entity owns, directly or indirectly, more than fifty percent of the voting power
of all outstanding stock in a corporation, it is regarded as owning
all voting stock in the corporation for the purpose of the rules
attributing stock owned by that entity to its owner. Thus, in the
illustration used above, domestic corporation B, by virtue of its
sixty percent ownership of foreign corporation C, would be regarded as owning one hundred percent of foreign corporation C
and, therefore, would also be regarded as owning twenty percent
(one hundred percent times twenty percent) of foreign corporation D. Domestic corporation A would be regarded as owning
twenty percent (twenty percent times one hundred percent) of
foreign corporation C and four percent (twenty percent times one
hundred percent times twenty percent) of foreign corporation D.
The family definition of section 318 is not modified for the
purposes of section 958 except that in applying the family attribution rules, stock owned by a nonresident alien is not to be attributed to a citizen or resident even though the nonresident alien
otherwise constitutes a member of the family of the United States
individual. Thus, if United States citizen A has two brothers, B
and C, and B is a resident alien but C is a nonresident alien, stock
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owned by B may be attributed to A, but stock owned by C cannot
be attributed to either A or B. Furthermore, the back-attribution
rules of section 318(a)(3) may not be applied to treat a United
States person as owning stock that is actually owned by an individual or entity who is not a United States person. Thus, stock
owned by nonresident aliens or foreign corporations or other foreign entities that are shareholders, partners, beneficiaries, or
grantors of grantor trusts may not be attributed to the United
States corporation, partnership, trust, or estate in which they
have an interest. Stock owned by a non-United States family
member or shareholder can, however, in some instances be attributed to a United States person. For example, the prohibition
against attribution is not applicable to the option rule. Thus, if
individual A held an option on stock owned by his nonresident
alien brother C, such stock would be attributable to A. Of course,
there is no limitation on the attribution of stock held by foreign
entities to United States shareholders, partners, beneficiaries,
and the grantors of grantor trusts.
In contrast to the relatively brief and mechanical regulations
appearing under other attribution sections of the Code, the regulations to section 958 add considerably to the statutory provision.
This elaboration is particularly extensive under the limited attribution rule prescribed by section 958(a)(2) governing indirect
ownership through foreign entities. Section 1.958-l(c)(2) of the
regulations asserts that attribution under this rule is not a mere
mechanical exercise but rather is to be made in light of "all of
the facts and circumstances in each case" and, in particular, the
purpose for which attribution is being made. It will be recalled
that all of the attribution rules discussed above attribute stock
from entities to their owners in accordance with the value of such
owner's interest in the entity (or in the stock being attributed).
Accordingly, a proportionate share of voting stock owned, for example, by a corporation or partnership will be attributed to the
holder of nonvoting preferred stock or to a limited partner. The
regulations to section 958, interpreting substantially identical
statutory language, take a different tack.
Section 951(a), to which the attribution rules of section 958
are applicable, prescribes the amount of income of a controlled
foreign corporation includable in the income of a United States
shareholder. The regulations provide that in applying section
958(a)(2), for the purpose of this provision, a person's proportion-
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ate interest in a foreign corporation will be his proportionate interest in the income of the corporation and not his proportionate
interest in value of all outstanding stock or voting power. 255 On
the other hand, the definitions of a United States shareholder and
of a controlled foreign corporation are in terms of the ownership
of a proportion of the voting power of the controlled foreign corporation. The regulations to section 958 provide that when section
958(a) (2) is applied, for the purpose of these sections, an individual's proportionate interest is to be determined by reference to his
interest in the voting power of the corporation. 15' It would appear
to follow that an individual's interest in a controlled foreign corporation for the purposes of determining whether he is a United
States shareholder may be different from his interest in the corporation for the purpose of determining the amount of its income
to be included on his tax return. 157
With respect to trusts and estates, the regulations adopt the
more refined rule of attribution employed by section 1563: stock
is attributed to a beneficiary with respect to the beneficiary's
interest in the stock, not with respect to his interest in the trust
or estate. Thus, example (4) of section 1.958-l{d) provides that if
pursuant to the terms of a will governing a foreign estate, stock
in a foreign corporation is specifically bequeathed to a United
States individual, he will be considered the owner of the entire
amount of such stock, and the other beneficiaries of the estate
will not be regarded as owning any of such stock.
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.958-l(c)(2) (1966).
256. ld.
257. For example, assume that foreign corporation F has two classes of
stock with an equal number of shares of each class outstanding. The classes are
identical in all respects except that one class possesses all of the voting power
in the corporation. Assume further that foreign corporation F owns 60% of the
single class of stock of foreign corporationS. If domestic corporation Downs 30%
of the outstanding voting stock of foreign corporation F, it will be regarded under
the interpretation of section 958(a)(2) contained in the regulations as owning
18% (30% x 60%) of foreign corporation F for the purpose of determining whether
domestic corporation D constitutes a United States shareholder of foreign corporation S by virtue of its ownership of over 10 percent of the voting control of
foreign corporation S. On the other hand, domestic corporation D will be regarded as owning only 9% (30% x 50% x 60%) of the income of foreign corporationS for the purpose of determining the amount of Subpart F income of foreign
corporationS upon which domestic corporation D will be taxable (assuming that
foreign corporation S constitutes a controlled foreign corporation because of
other United States ownership of its stock).
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The tax avoidance possibilities in the regulatory interpretation to section 958(a)(2) are obvious and were not overlooked by
the Treasury. The regulations indicate that the "facts and circumstances" test may be a one-way street in favor of the collection of tax since they specifically state that an arrangement that
"artificially" decreases a United States· person's proportionate
interest in the foreign entity will not be recognized. For example,
assume that United States corporation A is the sole limited partner of foreign partnership P, which in turn owns one hundred
percent of the only class of stock outstanding of foreign corporation B. Assume further that ninety percent of the income of the
partnership was attributable to the limited partner and that pursuant to the partnership agreement, the partnership could be
dissolved at any time without delay by the limited partner.
Applying the regulatory interpretation of section 958(a)(2) literally, while ninety percent of the Subpart F income of foreign
corporation B would be attributable to domestic corporation A,
domestic corporation A would not constitute a United States
shareholder nor would foreign corporation B constitute a controlled foreign corporation because of the absence of voting control. Accordingly, Subpart F would be inapplicable and domestic
corporation A would not be subject to taxation with respect to the
income of foreign corporation B. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, it may be assumed that the Internal Revenue Service
would seek to invoke the qualification in the regulations and treat
domestic corporation A as constructively owning over fifty percent of the voting stock of foreign corporation B. u8
The regulatory refinement of the attribution rules contained
in section 958(a)(2) is not applicable to the adaptation of section
318 incorporated in subsection 958(b). Presumably, therefore,
stock is attributed in accordance with the regulations to section
318 subject to the statutory modifications of section 958(b)(l)
through (4). Thus, attribution from a corporation to its shareholders under section 958(b) is strictly in proportion to the value
of the stock owned by the stockholder, and attribution from trusts
is solely in proportion to the beneficiary's actuarial interest in the
trust.:z:;' Accordingly, the process of determining stock ownership
258. See also Kraus v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974); Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973).
259.

Treas. Reg. § 1.958-2(c)(l)(ii) (1966).
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under section 958 requires the computation of constructive ownership pursuant to two entirely different sets of rules. As might
be expected, the regulations provide that the Service will apply
whichever of the two attribution rules, section 958(a) or section
958(b), that would result in the attribution of the largest amount
of stock to United States shareholders. 280 Generally, the adaptation of section 318 used in section 958(b) will result in the greatest
attribution unless such attribution is prohibited by a failure to
meet the threshold requirements of those provisions. 261
While the cross-reference to section 318 naturally includes
the operating rules of that section for the purposes of reattribution, there are no operating rules in section 958(b) itself with
respect to its modifications of section 318. The two provisions
barring the attribution of stock owned by a non-United States
person to a United States person pose few questions because if
stock actually owned by the foreigner cannot be so attributed,
obviously stock constructively owned by the foreigner cannot be
so attributed. However, a question could arise with respect to
stock actually owned by a United States person that might be
attributed to another United States person through a foreign individual or entity.
A more difficult question arises under the provision deeming
a stockholder that "owns, directly or indirectly" more than fifty
percent of the voting power of the stock of a corporation to be the
owner of all of such voting stock. 2' 2 The regulations, perhaps deliberately, do not indicate whether stock attributed to the stockholder may be aggregated with stock actually owned by him for
the purpose of determining whether the fifty percent threshold
requirement has been met. 283 The regulations to section 318, in
interpreting the fifty percent threshold requirement of that section, require that stock constructively owned by the shareholder
be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the
threshold requirement has been met. 284 It is unfortunate that the
regulations to section 958 do not disclose the views of the Treas260. ld. § 1.958-2(!)(2) (1966).
261. The "facts and circumstances" test of section 958(a) can produce a
different result when two classes of ownership are involved.
262. I.R.C. § 958(b)(2).
263. See Treas. Reg. § 1.958·2(c) (2} (1966).
264. ld. § 1.318-l(b)(3), T.D. 6969, 1968-2 C.B. 131.
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ury with respect to this fifty percent threshold requirement since
it is not clear that the same rule should be applied. The effect of
this special rule in section 958(b), which is not mirrored by any
other section of the Code, is severe. The provision can only be
justified by the analysis that fifty percent voting control' of a
corporation in practice permits complete domination of its affairs. Thus, in the context of attributing stock in a subsidiary of
such a corporation to the stockholder, the analysis must be that
such attribution should not be diluted by the existence of ineffectual minority ownership. It is not clear that stock of the parent
corporation attributed to the stockholder, the voting of which he
does not in fact control, should be taken into account in determining that there is such a complete domination of the parent by
the stockholder that the stockholder should be regarded as owning all of the subsidiary's stock. Nevertheless, it is probable that
the Internal Revenue Service, should the question arise, would
seek to interpret the word "indirectly" in section 958(b)(2) in the
same manner as it interprets the same language used for a similar
purpose in section 318. 265
Xffi.

THE AGGREGATION FORM OF ATTRIBUTION

It has been repeatedly observed that the Code employs two
distinct forms of attribution, the traditional form and what has
been referred to herein as aggregation, and that the aggregation
form is becoming increasingly popular with the draftsmen of tax
legislation. Conceptually, the aggregation form is appealing; but
as thus far reduced to statutory expression, it is not. Traditional
attribution is authoritarian: it assumes a single source of wealth
and· the diffusion of that wealth, -presumably for tax avoidance
purposes, throughout the members of a family and into various
entities dominated by them. The traditional attribution rules
constructively reverse the process and treat that wealth as again
concentrated in its source. The aggregation form is more democratic and perhaps more contemporary in outlook. It discards the
concept of a single dominant figure and assumes instead a community of interest among a number of economically related taxpayers. Rather than focusing on the largely artificial relationship
between the reconstructed dominant figure and a business entity,
265.

See text accompanying note 173 supra.
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the substantive law is addressed to the relationship between the
entity and the economic group as a whole.
The flaw in the seemingly more realistic aggregation approach lies in the assumption that an economic community of
interest among a diversity of entities can clearly be defined. For
the purposes of the traditional relationship provisions, such a
community of interest is defined because it must be defined;
taxpayers are either so closely related that their transactions
should be accorded exceptional treatment or they are not so related.2118 There is an obvious arbitrariness in the definition of family and in the establishment of the threshold ownership requirements, but the arbitrariness is tolerated because of the necessity
of definition.
On the other hand, when the focus shifts from the definition
of the primary relationship to the determination of whether that
relationship exists, that is, to the definition of the secondary relationship, the traditional attribution rules have permitted far
greater flexibility. A partner, for example, need not be treated as
the owner of either all or none of the stock owned by his partnership. Instead, the partner may be treated as the owner of only the
proportion of its holdings that corresponds to his interest in the
partnership. It is this flexibility that the aggregation form of attribution eliminates. As a result, this newer form of attribution
produces a less realistic result than the traditional approach.
A second difficulty with the aggregation approach as it has
been drafted lies in the definition of the aggregate-those taxpayers having the requisite community of interest. Not surprisingly,
the draftsmen of both sections 613A and 48(k) turned to the traditional relationship provisions for this definition. The inadequacies of those provisions become aggravated when they are used for
attribution purposes.
The operation of the aggregation form can best be understood
by examining section 48(k). The section itself is of only minor
interest since it constitutes an elective alternative for the compu266. Such has been the virtually uniform treatment of relationship provisions under the Code, including the aggregation provisions. A proportional approach to the relationship provisions is not logically impossible, but it presents
a variety of problems that have not to date been given thoughtful attention. For
one such relationship provision under the Code and some of the problems it
raises, see text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
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tation of the useful life of motion picture films and video tapes
for investment tax credit purposes. However, the aggregation
form of attribution used in the section is an expanded version of
the form first used in section 613A, and it seems probable that
any future use of this form will be patterned on section 48(k).
The objective of section 48(k) is to define a controlled group
of business entities for the purpose of requiring a uniform election
by all such entities. The traditional approach to this objective is
represented by the cross-reference to section 1563(a) in sections
414 and 52. 281 Section 48(k), however, defines the primary relationship as the ownership of a fifty percent or greater interest in
each potentially related entity by the "same or related persons."
Persons are related if they are within the relationships described
in sections 267(b) or 707(b)(l) or if they are members of a section
1563(a) controlled group.ze 8 Finally, the holdings of a related person are not counted towards the required fifty percent unless the
person owns at least ten percent of the interest in the business
entity.
When the cross-referenced relationship provision does not
contain a threshold limitation, as in the case of a trust and its
beneficiaries under section 267(b)(6), the section 48(k) aggregation approach will cause far more tangentially related entities to
be regarded as under common control than would the traditional
approach. Thus, under section 48(k) the entire stock holdings of
a trust in a business corporation will be aggregated with the
stockholdings of a beneficiary of the trust even though the beneficiary's interest in the trust may be less than one percent. If the
beneficiary and the trust each owned thirty percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation, the corporation would be regarded as controlled under the aggregation approach since related
persons own over fifty percent of its stock. Under the traditional
proportional attribution approach, the beneficiary would be regarded as owning only one percent of the trust's thirty percent
interest, and therefore the beneficiary would not be regarded as
controlling the corporation.
On the other hand, when the cross-referenced relationship
provision contains threshold requirements, the "all or nothing"
267.
268.

See text preceding note 212 supra.
I.R.C. § 48(k)(3)(D). Both cross-references are slightly modified.
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aspect of the aggregation approach will produce results that are
either more or less restrictive than those produced by traditional
attribution. Thus, while under section 48(k) the holdings of a
trust are aggregated with the holdings of any beneficiary, none of
the holdings of a corporation are aggregated with the holdings of
an owner of forty-nine percent of its stock. All of its holdings, of
course, are aggregated with the holdings of an owner of fifty-one
percent of its stock. 289
These rather dubious results are inherent in the use of relationship concepts for attribution purposes and would not be altered by changes in the definition of a related person (although
the thresholds used in the definition might be changed). In addition, the cross-references in both section 48(k) and section 613A
to the existing Code relationship provisions have created further
irrationalities. Most prominently, the list of types of taxpayers
included in the cross-referenced relationship provisions is less
complete than are the lists of taxpayers from whom traditional
attribution is made. Thus, section 267(b) does not include any
reference to estates or to partnerships although attribution is
made from both such entities under section 267(c). With respect
to partnerships, this omission is partially corrected by the further
cross-reference in section 48(k) to section 707(b), which defines
269. As a further illustration, assume that an individual owns over 50%
of corporation A and the question if whether corporation B is related to corporation A. The corporations will be related if 50% of the stock in B is owned by the
individual or a corporation 50% owned by the individual (because under section
267(b)(2) such a corporation would be related to the individual). Assume that
the individual owns 40% of corporation B and 40% of corporation X and that
corporation X owns the remaining 60% of B. Since the individual is not related
to corporation X, corporations A and Bare not related. If the normal attribution
rules applied and the individual were regarded as owning a proportionate share
of the stock owned by corporation X, he would be regarded as constructively
owning 24% of corporation B by attribution from corporation X, which when
added to his actual 40% results in a deemed 64% ownership of corporation Band
thus corporations A and B would be regarded as related. Now assume that the
individual owns 60% of corporation X, which owns 20% of corporation B. Since
the individual is now related to corporation X, their 40% and 20% is combined
to cause corporation B to be under common control with corporation A. Under
proportional attribution, however, the individual would now only be regarded
as constructively owning 18% of corporation B in addition to this actual 40%,
or 6% less than in the first example. The problem, of course, is that the threshold
requirements used in the relationship provisions make those provisions inappropriate for use as attribution provisions.
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relationships between a partner and a partnership. But the separate references to sections 267 and 707 do not result in defining a
relationship between a partnership and any other entity. Nothing, however, rectifies the omission of estates. Thus, for example,
if two business entities subject to section 48(k) were owned, one
by a husband and one by a wife, they would be regarded as
related, but upon the death of the husband they would no longer
be related since estates are not included in the section 267(b) list
of related taxpayers-even if the wife were the sole beneficiary of
the estate. 270 Under the traditional attribution rules, of course,
the wife would be regarded as owning the interest held by the
estate and the businesses would continue to be regarded as related. It is unclear why this omission has been tolerated in section
267, but it should not be tolerated under 48(k). 271
There is a question as to the purpose served by excluding
from the category of related persons the owners of less than ten
percent of the interests in a business enterprise. In fact, it is not
altogether clear how the exclusion is to be applied. For example,
if an individual owns a twelve percent interest in business A and
a seven percent interest in business B, it is questionable whether
his ownership in business A is to be counted or whether he must
own a ten percent interest in both entities. If his interest in business A is counted, it is also unclear whether he then qualifies as
a related person for all purposes so that his interest in business
B can also be counted.
Aside from these ambiguities, the ten percent exclusion superficially resembles the threshold requirements for attribution
that the traditional provisions employ to restrict the otherwise
excessive breadth of attribution-such as the condition for attribution from trusts under section 1563(e) that the beneficiary own
a five percent interest in the trust. These provisions, however,
270. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
271. A further difficulty with the aggregation form is that it only describes
horizontal or brother-sister relationships among business entities and does not
specifically describe vertical or parent-subsidiary relationships. Rather, the
application of these provisions to such relationships must be determined indirectly. For example, assume that an individual owns 100% of trust A, which in
turn owns 100% of trust B. Trust A and trust B are related business entities,
not because trust A owns all of trust B, but because the individual and trust A
are related within the meaning of section 267 and the individual owns in excess
of 50% of trust A and trust A owns in excess of 50% of trust B.
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serve an entirely different purpose. Under the section 1563 type
restriction, regardless of the extent of the interest of the trust in
a corporation, its holdings will not be attributed to a beneficiary
unless the relationship between the trust and the beneficiary is
large enough (in excess of five percent) to warrant that result.
Under section 48(k), regardless of how closely related the trust is
to the beneficiary, the trust's holdings are disregarded if they fall
below ten percent. Indeed, it appears that under the section 48(k)
approach, a business entity will never be regarded as controlled
if the ownership of the business is spread equally among eleven
or more persons, regardless of how closely related those persons
may be-which is exactly the tax avoidance technique that the
attribution rules were created to prevent. A de minimis rule
might be sensible but only if the ten percent computation were
made after the application of appropriate attribution rules. Such
traditional rules, however, are not applied by section 48(k) for
this purpose. Unless the regulations can construe this ten percent
limitation differently, it opens an easy path to avoiding the related business entity provision of section 48(k). ·
If, on balance, the aggregation form possesses any advantages over traditional attribution, they are not evident. Even
worse than the use of aggregation alone, however, is the possibility of combining the two approaches and creating a hybrid form
of attribution. Presently, only section 447 employs such a provision. The aggregation is limited to members of the family, and
stock is traditionally attributed to the family from entities in
which they have an interest. 272 The resulting inadequacies of that
section have been detailed elsewhere. 273 Here it is sufficient to
observe that once the established form is abandoned, the possible
alternatives, and the ensuing complexity of the Code, are Vlftually without limit.
272. I.R.C. § 447(d)( 1)-(3). As noted above, it vastly oversimplifies section
447 to characterize it as using traditional attribution rules. Estates of deceased
family members are treated as members of the family rather than as entities,
and estates of nonfamily members are ignored even if a family member is a
beneficiary. While attribution from trusts and partnerships is in the traditional
mold, attribution from corporations is unique in that stock is attributed to the
members of the family as a group if they own in the aggregate 50% or more in
value of the stock of the corporation from which attribution is to be made.
273. See text accompanying notes 147 & 180 supra.
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ToWARD UNIFORM RuLES

By this point, it should be obvious that the relationship and
attribution rules used throughout the Code are badly in need of
repair. The rules range from the grossly inadequate to the excessive, and at all times are inconsistent and frequently imprecise.
It is not difficult to see how the Code reached such a state. The
earliest relationship and attribution rules were incorporated into
the Code during a simpler era and at a time when social and
business relationships differed from those prevailing today. These
early rules were primitive in design and were expanded on an ad
hoc basis through efforts to eliminate specific abuses. At no time
were these early rules the subject of a rational investigation designed to produce comprehensive rules appropriate in· scope. Occasionally, these initial rules were adopted for use in other sections, again with modifications that seemed appropriate at the
time.
The decision to add attribution rules applicable to the corporate adjustment provisions in 1954 occasioned the adoption of an
entirely new set of attribution rules that corrected many of the
faults of the earlier provisions. However, no attempt was made
to revise the earlier provisions. In turn, several of the decisions
contained in section 318 proved to be unsatisfactory and were
extensively criticized, principally by an American Law Institute
(ALI) study. 274 While section 318 was thereafter modified to eliminate sidewise attribution, perhaps the most serious defect, the
provision has never been comprehensively modified. However,
section 1563, enacted several years later, substantially adopted
the AU recommendations. Thus, the Code attribution and relationship rules have been subject to a generation of fine tuning,
but almost without exception the result has been the addition of
new improved models without a revision of prior efforts; and in
some instances, the new models were far from improved.
In addition to the inconsistency inherent in the statute, the
Treasury regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions in this area
all have injected further inconsistency and confusion as efforts
were made to fill perceived gaps in the statutory scheme. Thus,
identical statutory wording in different attribution rules may
274.

ALI

SHAREHOLDERS

REPORT ON INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND
REPORT].

548 (Oct. 31, 1958) [hereinafter referred to as ALl
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have different meanings, and in some instances the same language in the same attribution rule may have different meanings
depending upon the substantive section applying the rules.
It is clear that, in spite of the ronsiderable diversity among
these provisions that presently exi~ts, a substantial uniformity
could be achieved with little sacrifice of the individual policies
contained in the affected substantive provisions. Twenty years
ago the American Law Institute determined that substantial uniformity could be achieved, although the task becomes more difficult each year as additional relationship and attribution rules are
adopted, modified, and referred to throughout the Code.m Nevertheless, it does not appear that uniformity has not been achieved
because of the inherent impossibility of the task but rather because of the natural disinclination of the legislative process to
replow old ground.
Given the sheer number and diversity of the affinity provisions and the variety of ways that they are used throughout the
Code, the task of drafting acceptable uniform rules is considerable. Clearly, it would be presumptuous to attempt such a draft
here. It is possible, however, to distill some general notions or
principles that would be of assistance should Congress wish to
undertake such an effort.
If the goal were to achieve a perfectly drafted Internal Revenue Code, theoretically it would be necessary to identify the purpose underlying each of the relationship provisions established by
the various sections of the Code. Then each relationship provision
and its accompanying attribution rules could be tailored precisely
to that policy. Quite likely, the enormity of such a task would
discourage any general revision of these provisions. However,
practical obstacles to such a complete overhaul do not mean that
substantial improvement could not be achieved by undertaking
a far more modest investigation.
The relationship provisions generally may be classified into
a comparatively small number of categories. Several sections of
the Code that grant a specific benefit require that one such benefit be shared by two or more taxpayers. Examples of such sections
include the ceiling on the investment tax credit for used property
in section 48(c), the floor on taxable items of tax preference in
275.

/d. at 487.
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section 58, and the independent producers allowance for percentage depletion in section 613A(c)(8). Because these provisions
directly conflict with the individualistic orientation of our tax
laws, the relationship provisions established by these sections
have always been highly limited. With one exception, these relationships extend only to husbands and wives and to controlled
groups of corporations within the meaning of section 1563. The
one exception is the recently adopted section 613A in which the
draftsmen, encouraged by the successful attack on oil depletion,
required that a husband and wife share their allowable production with their minor children. It is doubtful that minor children
should be deprived of their own entitlement to percentage depletion any more than they should be deprived, for example, of their
own untaxed items of tax preference. In both instances, it is
equally likely that their ownership of the property in question is
derived from their parents and subject to their control. Regardless of whether it is now the view of Congress that such tax benefits should be shared by the entire family unit or only by the
parents, there would not appear to be any valid reasons for distinguishing among these situations.
With respect to controlled corporations subject to such single
benefit provisions, there is similarily a difference between adopting the section 1563(a) definition intact and modifying it by reducing the ownership requirement from eighty percent to fifty
percent. Thus, a fifty percent controlled group must share the
maximum investment tax credit on used property, but each
member is entitled to his own floor on items of tax preference
unless the eighty percent test is met. Similarly, the eighty percent
test is applicable to the sharing of the work incentive program
credit provided by section 50A, but the fifty percent limitation is
applicable to the percentage depletion allowance. There appears
to be no rationality behind these varying treatments, and with no
loss of equity, Congress could adopt a uniform single benefit relationship definition. It does appear, however, that the sections
using these relatively narrow relationships are in a separate category and should not be broadened by a cross-reference to a general relationship provision.
A second category of relationships that would appear to warrant special treatment are relationships that are not established
in connection with a revenue producing or protecting provision of
the Code but rather stem from essentially regulatory provisions,
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particularly the supervisory functions recently imposed upon the
Internal Revenue Service. These sections include the several
prohibited-transaction provisions, such as those applicable to
private foundations and qualified pension trusts. 276 Such sections
are designed to control conduct that may be beneficial to all
parties concerned (except the charity or pension trust). Thus, it
would appear appropriate to adopt an expanded definition of
relationships for the purposes of these sections.
The balance of the relationship provisions fall in two principal categories. While quite different in their operation, both categories generally reflect similar policy limitations and thus could
appropriately be of similar scope. 217 These provisions either impute a status or activity of one taxpayer to another or treat transactions between related taxpayers differently from the manner in
which such transactions are treated for tax purposes when they
occur between wholly unrelated taxpayers, typically either by
ignoring the transaction or by imposing a higher tax· burden on
its consummation. The imputation sections may be illustrated by
section 103(b), which in effect taxes what would otherwise be
exempt interest attributable to an industrial revenue bond if the
holder of the bond is either a user of the facilities financed
through the issuance of the bond or a person related to the
holder-thus imputing the use of the facilities to the holder of the
bond. In the absence of such a provision, the user of the facility
would be entitled to a full income tax deduction for amounts paid
in the nature of interest with respect to the bonds, which interest
(upon receipt by him) would be free of tax.. 218
276. I.R.C. §§ 503(b), 4946(a), 4975(e).
277. Excluded from consideration here are (1) the 80% control requirement specified by section 368(c) for a variety of corporate adjustment purposes,
which constitutes a problem distinct from that considered herein, and (2) a
small number of special purpose sections that only involve particular categories
of relationships and thus must be considered separately on their individual
merits. An example of the latter is contained in section 4942, which restricts the
ability of a private foundation to make grants to a public charity that is
"controlled (directly or indirectly)" by the private foundation or by disqualified
persons with respect to the private foundation.
278. Similarly, section 1237 was designed to allow limited sales of real
property to be eligible for capital gains taxation without regard to the case law
definition of a dealer, a definition that had developed along somewhat vague but
quite restrictive lines. Among other requirements, the property subject to this
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The provisions affecting transactions among related taxpayers are the most common form of relationship provisions and do
not require extended illustration. Several sections exclude acquisitions from related persons from the definition of purchase, either for the purpose of barring a credit with respect to the purchase (the residence credit provided by section 44), barring a
depreciation advantage (first-year depreciation under section
179), or permitting a step-up in tax basis (the step-up received
in a liquidation subject to section 334(b)(2)). Section 1235 prohibits capital gain taxation on the sale of certain patents to a related
person, and section 1239 taxes gain on the sale of depreciable
property between related taxpayers as ordinary income.
All of these sections assume that the taxpayers within the
prescribed relationship have a sufficient identity of economic interest, and perhaps also a measure of mutual control, that transactions between them could be manufactured or modified in an
unbusinesslike manner in order to obtain or increase tax benefits.
Even absent deliberate tax avoidance, such parties are so related
that a transfer of property from one to another does not amount
to a sufficiently complete disposition to occasion the imposition
of the normal tax consequences. A rational approach to unifying
the affinity rules could quite properly begin with the presumption
that the identity of economic interest and control required for
each of these sections is the same or at least so nearly the same
that each such section could be revised to cross-refer to the same
relationship definition. If upon close scrutiny of each substantive
provision it appeared to Congress that the tax reduction device
being attacked was relatively easier or more difficult to accomplish or would have more serious consequences if accomplished,
modifications of the cross-reference could be made within the
substantive section-a practice too common under the existing
Code. However, the presumption should be to the contrary, and
each section should at least begin with the same cross-reference.
Certainly, there does not appear to be any obvious reason
that a taxpayer would trust his brother with depreciated stock
over which he did not wish to lose control any more than he would
provision may not have been substantially improved by either the taxpayer or
a person related to him within the special definition of related person provided
by that section.
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be willing to trust him with his patents, although section 267
would deny a loss on the stock while section 1235 permits capital
gain treatment on the patent sale. On the other hand, if the
taxpayer sold these properties to a thirty-five percent owned corporation, for some reason the loss would be allowed but capital
gain treatment denied. It is unclear why borrowing from one's
brother is treated as a sham for purposes of section 465 while the
purchase of property for purposes of section 179 is not. Nor is it
clear why provisions designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain should be highly limited when sales
of depreciable property under section 1239 are involved, subject
to unique rules when iron ore is involved under section 631(c) or
subject to unusually broad rules under sections 306 and 341(e).
Although the primary relationships that involve entities are
subject to enlargement through the attribution rules to ensure a
proper scope of the substantive law, the relationship provisions
should be drafted wholly without regard to this effect. The relationship provisions establish the minimum connection appropriate for substantive law purposes and therefore must be given a
sufficiently broad reach to ensure that in the absence of any attribution all appropriate relationships among entities will become
subject to the substantive law. Presumably, the starting point for
a uniform relationship rule would be section 267, which contains
the most comprehensive list of relationships in the Code.
Section 267(b), however, is seriously defective in a number
of respects. The definition of family contained in that provision
should be modified to conform to the more recent Congressional
decisions with respect to the scope of an individual's family for
relationship purposes. Most of the recent cross-references to the
section 267 family definition, as well as most special definitions,
have excluded brothers and sisters, presumably on the premise
that an individual's economic· relationship with his siblings is not
sufficiently close to justify inclusion of the relationship. Naturally, there are individual circumstances inconsistent with that
assumption, and there may be cases in which Congress would
seek to employ a broader family definition in order to achieve a
greater assurance that a particular tax reduction device cannot
be used. However, for general purposes, it is believed that the
definition of family should exclude brothers and sisters.
Perhaps more as a matter of style than substance, a revised
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section 267 should refer to children and grandchildren and parents and grandparentsm rather than to lineal descendants and
ancestors. In the relatively rare circumstances in which more
remote generations are in existence, it is unreasonable to conclu.
sively presume a sufficiently close identity of interest to justify
inclusion in the relationship. While there has been considerable
diversity in treatment in the more recent attribution provisions
of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, and even of the
parent-adult child relationship, the identity of interest among
such persons is sufficiently close to be included in a general relationship section.
Naturally, an individual's spouse should be included within
the relationship. However, the exception contained in section
1563 for spouses under an interlocutory or final decree of divorce
or separate maintenance does seem appropriate. With the appar·
ently increasing popularity of cohabitation by unmarried couples, precision might require an extension of the concept of
common-law marriage, but the difficulties of definition and the
relatively small number of financial transactions involving such
relationships would militate against such a revision.
A second defect in section 267 is its omission of estates. Without question, an estate should be treated in exactly the same
manner as a trust under the relationship provisions.
The relationship between persons and exempt organizations
establi~hed under section 267 is largely obsolete and since 1969
279. The ALI criticism of section 318 concluded that grandparents should
be returned to the family, and that was done in section 1563. The premise for
this decision was that a grandchild had a reasonable expectation through inheritance of obtaining an interest in stock owned by the grandparent and that
accordingly this relationship should be included. ALl REPORT, supra note 274,
at 471. There may, however, be an inconsistency in this decision with the exclusion of brothers and sisters for it is probable that holdings of a grandparent will
be divided between two generations, and it may more properly be said that an
individual may reasonably expect to acquire an actual interest in only a minor
fraction of such stock, perhaps less than 20% of such stock in a normal family.
Since an individual is not deemed to have a sufficiently close relationship to his
brothers and sisters and, a fortiori to his cousins, the factual basis for attributing
all of such holdings to the grandchild is weak. It would certainly be unduly
complex to attribute only a fraction of such stock computed on the basis of the
number of grandchildren who may be presumed to have an expectation of inheritance from the grandparent, and thus the choice is between full attribution or
none at all. Given this choice, the ALI conclusion seems to be better.
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has had little effect except with respect to noncharitable exempt
organizations. Rather than suggest the creation of a complex set
of rules applicable to all exempt organizations, similar to those
currently applicable to private foundations, it would seem appropriate to retain this relationship in substantially its present form.
However, to the extent that this provision is currently applicable
to private foundations, it is redundant, and such charities should
be removed from its scope.
Trusts have been treated in section 267(b) in the same manner as members of a family rather than as separate entities, as
corporations are treated. Thus, any quantum of interest in a trust
is assumed to be sufficient to justify including the trustbeneficiary relationship, while a shareholder is only regarded as
related to a corporation in which he owns, actually or constructively, a certain threshold interest. Frequently, however, a beneficiary does not own even a significant portion of the assets of a
trust, and the identity of interest of a minor beneficiary with a
trust cannot be assumed. The absence of a threshold requirement
can only be justified if it is assumed that other individuals related
to the beneficiary own the major portion of the assets of a trust.
The factual basis of this assumption would be significantly
eroded if brothers and sisters are deleted from the definition of
family for relationship purposes. Even in the absence of such a
deletion, there is no justification for making such an assumption
rather than referring to the actual factual circumstances, as is
done with corporations and, under section 707(b), with partnerships. In fact, the more recent efforts toward an all-inclusive relationship provision in sections 414 and 52 have treated trusts in
the same manner as other entities.
It seems preferable to treat all entities that may have more
than one beneficial owner in the same manner. Thus, the prescribed relationship should not exist unless, after the application
of appropriate attribution rules, an individual is regarded as owning at least fifty percent of the trust. The added complexity of this
approach is slight and well justified by the greater precision it
achieves. For example, under present section 267, if an individual
only owns one percent of a trust and the balance is owned by
individuals outside the section 267 family (for example, aunts
and uncles), the individual's transactions with the trust are proscribed. However, since transactions directly between the individual and the other trust beneficiaries would not be proscribed,
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his transactions with such a trust should also be permissible.
Under the rule here suggested, a taxpayer may to some extent
avoid the proscription against dealing with members of his family. However, since unrelated persons must by definition possess
at least fifty percent of the value of the trust, in most instances
the trust would be sufficiently independent of the individual to
bar manipulative transactions. Furthermore, the situation presented is no different from that now generally prevailing for
closely held corporations.
The problem of defining the extent of a beneficiary's relationship to a trust or estate does not presently arise under section
267. However, the problem would arise if the modification suggested here is adopted. Since it is necessary to quantify a beneficiary's interest in trusts and estates for the purpose of the attribution rules, no additional complexity is presented by the need to
quantify such interests for relationship purposes-provided, of
course, that the same computation is employed. As has been seen,
the Steuben Securities rule is probably no longer applicable to
trusts under any provision but seems to be applicable to estates
under section 318. The consensus in favor of the all-encompassing
actuarial approach is clear, and that measure should be used in
determining the extent of a beneficiary's interest for relationship
purposes.
For attribution purposes, section 958 and 1563 require that
the actuarial interest be computed, not with reference to the entire assets of the trust or estate, but only with reference to the
interests of the beneficiaries in the stock subject to attribution.
This basis for attribution is in recognition of the fact that it is not
uncommon for the interests of beneficiaries to extend to such
assets unequally. The greater precision of this rule has much to
recommend it when the inquiry concerns a specific identifiable
trust asset, which is always the case when attribution is involved.
However, the relationship provisions are used for a wide variety
of purposes-some, as when conduct of one person is imputed to
a related entity, not directly involving specific assets at all. Any
attempt to be more precise than determining a beneficiary's interest in the entire trust or estate for relationship purposes would
require an intolerably difficult section-by-section analysis of the
uses of the relationship provision without corresponding equitable benefit. Thus, for relationship purposes, the actuarial interest
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should always be computed with respect to the entire trust or
estate. 280
For the suggested revision of the trust rules to operate effectively, it is necessary to establish a device attributing the ownership of an interest in a trust from one beneficiary to another in a
manner similar to the attribution rules presently employed by
section 267 with respect to corporations and adopted by section
707(b) with respect to partnerships. This problem is considered
below.
The primarily personal orientation of section 267(b) is reflected both by its failure to include partnerships in its enumeration of relationships and by the very limited inclusion of corporate relationships. While there is no important reason for the
partnership relationships provision to be contained in subchapter
K, there is a very sound reason for the creation of a universal
relationship provision. Section 707(b)(l), the partnership provision corresponding to section 267(b), specifies the relationship of
a partnership and a partner owning more than fifty percent of the
profits or capital interest in the partnership, whichever is the
greater. This definition is consistent with the general tenor of the
relationship provisions and evidently has proven satisfactory in
practice since the definition has never been modified by a crossreferencing provision. As discussed below in connection with corporations, however, it is doubtful that a general relationship provision should be based solely on value. If the corporate relationship definition were to be based on an alternative voting power
or value test, it follows that the partnership provision should be
similarly based. The voting power test would be met if as a matter
of state law or the partnership agreement, a partner is entitled
to cast more than fifty percent of the votes on questions of partnership business. Thus, in a partnership in which each partner
has one vote, the test will not be met with respect to any partner-in the absence of attribution. Limited partners, under a law
conforming to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, should not
be regarded as possessing voting power even though they are entitled to vote on certain extraordinary questions or in case of certain contingencies. 281
280. The proposed regulations to section 414 adopt this approach. See
Proposed Treas. Reg.§ 1.414(c).(2}(b)(2)(i)(B), 40 Fed. Reg. 51469 (1975).
281. Such contingent rights are analogous to the rights typically granted
holders of "nonvoting" stock when, for example, dividends are in arrears.
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The relationship established by section 267 between a corporation and an individual owning fifty percent of its stock should
be retained, but its single test based upon value of stock owned
should be reexamined. The several sections of the Code addressed
to corporate relationships vary widely on whether votes or
value, or both, are to be taken into account.2ll 2 Expension of the
section 267 test to include the greater of voting power or value
would affect a relatively small number of taxpayers. The only
shareholder-corporation relationships that would be added would
be when the requisite shareholder group had retained voting control of the corporation but had permitted nonvoting stock to be
held by others. It would seem that the possession of control over
corporate transactions would establish a sufficient identity of economic interest between the shareholders and the corporation to
justify the inclusion of the relationship.
There would seem to be good reason to exclude from consideration, under either test, stock that is both nonvoting and limited and preferred as to dividends. The holder of such stock not
only does not possess any measure of control over the corporation
but also does not stand to be benefited materially by transactions
entered into by the corporation since his interest in the income
of the corporation is limited. 183 Both the alternative reference to
voting power and value and the exclusion of nonvoting preferred
stock are consistent with section 1563, the most recent comprehensive statement by Congress of the basis for measuring corporate relationships.
By far the most serious defect in the existing scheme of the
affinity provisions is the absence of a generally applicable provision defining relationships among different types of entities. Section 267, with its personal orientation, is extremely weak in this
respect; the section does not refer to partnerships at all. When the
draftsmen of a particular substantive provision wish to include
282. In. some cases the differences are related to the substantive law using
the relationships.
283. The holder of a preferred stock, of course, has some interest in the
economic health of the corporation, particularly if earnings are sufficiently depressed that the payment of dividends is in arrears. Nevertheless, it is not
believed that this interest is sufficient to bring the shareholder within the proscribed relationship. The AU recommendations were to the same effect. See
AU REPORT, supra note 274, at 467.
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partnership relationships, the standard approach has been to
cross-refer to section 707(b). That section, however, is addressed
solely to partnerships, and thus a cross-reference to it does not
include relationships between a partnership and a trust or corporation. Corporations are related under the present section 267
only to other corporations that are personal holding companies
and to trusts that own fifty percent of the stock of the corporation
(or the grantor of such a trust). After section 1563 was added, a
cross-reference to that section could accompany the crossreference to section 267 and 707(b); but, as in the case of partnerships, that addition would solve only the problem of corporationto-corporation relationships. A growing number of sections have
addressed this problem on an ad hoc basis. While the overall
relationships established under these sections are vastly improved over the pre-1969 provisions, the piecemeal approach to
all-inclusive relationships has greatly increased the pointless diversity within the Code. As part of a comprehensive scheme of
revision, these ad hoc solutions should be repealed and replaced
with a single, uniform, all-inclusive relationship provision.
When defining the relationship between an individual and an
entity, it is necessary that the individual, after attribution, own
fifty percent of the interests in the entity; otherwise, a sufficient
identity of interest will be lacking. In relating entities, however,
it is only necessary that fifty percent of the interests in each
entity be commonly owned for the entities to have the same degree of identity of interest. Such common ownership need not be
in one person; indeed, in theory, the number of common owners
could be unlimited. Thus, if the same one hundred persons each
owned a one percent interest in each of two corporations, it might
fairly be presumed that the interests of the corporations were
identical and that they should be regarded as related. As a practical matter, however, when ownership is so diffused, the likelihood
that the corporations will be acting in concert is too remote to
justify the complexity and difficulty of application that such a
sweeping relationship provision would entail. Thus, it is desirable
to limit the number of owners that can be taken into account for
the purpose of this fifty percent test. Section 1563 limits this
number of owners to five, thus permitting the relationship to be
found if the degree of overlap exceeds five ten percent shareholders. This degree of ownership concentration finds supj:mrt in other
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sections of the Code. 28' Unless experience under section 1563(a)
indicates that this test is too narrow, it should be adopted in a
uniform relationship rule.
In addition to being closely held, of course, the ownership of
the entities must actually overlap to the extent of fifty percent
of the interests in the entities. The section 1563(a)(2)(B) defini·
tion of this requirement seems appropriate: the common owners
must own fifty percent of each entity taking into account only
that degree of ownership that is identical in each entity.
The ALI proposals were both broader and more flexible. The
ALI relationship provision would have found entities to be under
common control if the entities were owned by up to twenty per·
sons, after attribution, and their interests in each entity were "in
approximately the same proportion."ZM The twenty.person test
seems far too broad. After giving effect to the attribution rules,
the test would include entities having a very large number of
shareholders. The benefits from such a broad definition simply do
not justify requiring all entities in the quasi·public
range-entities having up to one hundred shareholders before
attribution-to keep track of the relationships among their share.
holders and the shareholders of entities with which they have
dealings ·in order to ensure that they do not fall within the scope
of this provision. The administrative cost is too great a price to
pay to reach the very few entities that have such highly diffused
ownership and are in fact being operated in concert to obtain an
undue tax advantage. 288
The section 1563 definition of horizontally related entities
adds one further requirement that would not be appropriate for
general application. Not only must fifty percent of the stock be
commonly owned, but eighty percent of the stock in each corpo·
ration must be owned by the sarne five persons, although not
necessarily in the same proportion. There does not appear to be
any reason that entities must be so closely held before they can
be regarded as related to other entities. In fact, about one-half of
284. E.g., I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (defining a personal holding company);
I.R.C. § 957(a) (defining a controlled foreign corporation).
285. ALI REPORT, supra note 274, at 469.
286. Furthermore, the "approximately proportional" requirement is unacceptably vague for use in a relationship provision, even assuming that some
degree of mechanical content to the phrase were provided by regulation.
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the provisions that cross-refer to section 1563 drop this requirement. It should not be included in a uniform relationship provision.
Similarly, section 1563 imposes an eighty percent ownership
requirement for vertical relationships among entities. Such a requirement is too high for use in a uniform provision. An eighty
percent ownership requirement is employed in the reorganization
and consolidated return provisions as indicating such a substantial identity of interest that the two corporations may properly be
regarded as one. This degree of identity is far too stringent a
requirement for a general relationship provision; a substantial
identity of interest is sufficient. The vertical relationship between
entities should be subject to the same fifty percent test as that
used for the relationship between an individual owner and the
entity._
The present section 1563 uses the concept of a parentsubsidiary chain in defining vertical relationships, a definitional
style that would seem too broad for a uniform relationship provision, particularly if the ownership requirement were reduced to
fifty percent. Thus, under 1563 (a)(l), all corporations are regarded as related if eighty percent of their stock is owned by one
or more other members of the chain (except the common parent).
Thus, if corporation A owns eighty percent of corporation B,
which owns eighty percent of corporation C, which owns eighty
percent of corporation D; all four corporations are related even
though corporation A only owns, actually and constructively,
fifty-one percent of corporation C and forty-one percent of corporation D. The premise for this result is that the twenty percent
minority should be disregarded and that through its ownership,
corporation A effectively dominates each tier and thus possesses
substantial economic identity of interest with each corporation in
the chain. Even with the required ownership at the eighty percent
level, this result may be too extreme for use with all of the substantive provisions that employ relationship definitions. For example, in connection with transaction provisions such as section
267(a)(1), when the underlying issue is whether there has been a
meaningful change in ownership, a transfer of property from corporation A to corporation D would result in a reduction of interest
in the property transferred of fifty-nine percent. Under other
branches of the relationship definition, this would be sufficient to
avoid relationship status.
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If the required ownership percentage is reduced to fifty percent, the assumptions of the chain concept become more doubtful
and the reach of the relationship definition clearly too broad. If
the ownership in the above example were reduced to fifty-one
percent, corporation A would constructively own twenty-six percent of corporation C and only thirteen percent of corporation
D-clearly not a sufficient interest to justify inclusion in a general
relationship provision. Thus, it would seem appropriate to abandon the chain concept and require that an entity own, actually
or constructively, over fifty percent of a second entity before they
would be regarded as related. Thus, assuming a chain of eighty
percent ownership, corporation A would be related to corporation
B and C but not to corporation D although corporations B and C
would be related to corporation D.
The resulting definition of related entities would generally
provide that an entity of any type would be regarded as related
to another entity if it controlled or was controlled by such other
entity or if the two entities were under common control-in each
instance with reference to both actual and constructive ownership.
There is a far greater consensus with respect to the broad
outlines of the attribution provisions than there is with respect
to the relationship provisions. The considerable diversity that
does exist among these provisions goes generally to their detail-for example, the use of varying threshold requirements. The
one exception to this relative uniformity is in the family, for
which, as with the family relationship, there is a total absence of
uniformity.
Initially, it may be observed that there is no inherent reason
that the definition of family for the purpose of the attribution
rules should be identical to the definition of family for relationship purposes although almost uniformly that has been the case.
Previously, it was suggested that brothers and sisters be excluded
from the family for relationship purposes because their identity
of economic interest was not sufficient to justify disregarding
transactions among brothers and sisters. However, it may not
follow that an ownership interest in an entity, such as stock,
should never be attributed to a taxpayer from his brother. It
might be thought, for example, that when a taxpayer owns, actually or constructively, forty-five percent of the stock of a corporation and his sister owns an additional six percent, there is a
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strong factual basis for concluding that the economic interest of
the taxpayer in the corporation is just as strong as when the
additional six percent interest is owned by the taxpayer's daughter. On the other hand, if the taxpayer owned only six percent of
the corporation, it would appear that his relationship to the corporation would be substantially less if his sister owned forty-five
percent of the stock than if his son owned the forty-five percent.
Section 1563 introduced the appealing concept of a threshold for
attribution among family members in appropriate circumstances.2K7 It would seem proper, therefore, to require attribution to
an individual from brothers and sisters ifthe individual otherwise
held a dominant interest in the entity. However, the fifty percent
threshold established by section 1563 is excessively high in the
context of defining section 267 relationships, which themselves
only require a fifty percent ownership interest. Perhaps a thirty
percent threshold for brother-sister attribution would be more
appropriate.
Section 1563 provides a complicated pattern for family attribution involving threshold requirements depending on whether or
not an individual is a minor. That pattern is too complex, as well
as too restrictive, for use in a generally applicable attribution
rule. The well-thought-out limitations on family attribution contained in section 1563 are designed to ensure a substantial likelihood of both identity of economic interest and control. However,
an adequate factual basis exists for attributing stock among parents and adult children, and, therefore, the older rules of sections
267 and 318 should be retained. If these rules are found to be
overly broad, the use of a threshold requirement would be preferable to deleting entirely a family member (as in the section 318
deletion of grandparents).
With respect to attribution from entities, the rules contained
in section 1563(e), which are substantially similar to the ALI
recommendations, do not require any considerable modification.
Attribution from all such entities-corporations, partnerships,
trusts, and estates-should be proportional to the ownership interest of the shareholder, partner, or beneficiary. The five percent
de minimis rule contained in 1563 should be retained to elimi287. Prior to section 1563, section 267 required that an individual own
some stock before stock owned by his partner was attributed to him but did not
establish a threshold requirement.
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nate attribution of insignificant holdings that would generally be
irrelevant to the relationship definition. Of course, for the purpose of determining the existence of a five percent or greater
interest, the attribution rules should be applied.
The reference to proportionality, however, conceals some
quite difficult questions. With respect to stock, attribution rules
have invariably attributed stock in proportion to the value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation held by the taxpayer. However, if the corporation from which stock is being attributed has
outstanding more than one class of stock and the purpose of the
attribution is to determine voting control of the corporation
whose stock is being attributed, sole reliance upon a value test
can produce inappropriate results.
Relatively few relationship provisions in the Code that employ attribution rules are bas~d upon ownership of a specified
percentage of voting power; value is far more commonly used.
Accordingly, in the past, the problem of attributing voting stock
through an entity to an individual who only held a nonvoting
interest (such as nonvoting stock or a limited partnership interest) in the entity from which attribution was being made has not
commonly arisen. However, if the suggestion herein-that the
relationships for section 267 purposes between individuals and
entities be defined, in the alternative, with reference to voting
power-were adopted, the problem would achieve far more significant dimensions.
To a substantial degree, the anomalies produced in this area
can be eliminated by excluding from consideration nonvoting
stock that is preferred and limited as to dividends. This exclusion
has been suggested with respect to the definition of relationships
and would be equally applicable for attribution purposes. However, such an exclusion does not solve the problem of nonvoting
common stock. For example, assume that an individual owned
stock in corporation P that possessed over fifty percent of the
voting power but, because of an outstanding issue of nonvoting
class A stock having dividend rights equal to the common stock,
represented only forty percent of the value of corporation P. Further assume that corporation P owned all of the outstanding stock
in corporation S. The relationship between the individual and
corporation P would meet the fifty percent of voting power test.
However, corporation S would only fall within the defined relationship with the individual if fifty percent of the stock of corpo-
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ration S were attributed to him. If the attribution rules were
based upon value alone, only forty percent of the stock of corporation S would be so attributed, and the required relationship
would not exist. Clearly, such a result is untenable.
The only provision focusing on this problem is contained in
the regulations to section 958, which attribute ownership based
upon voting power or interest in income, depending upon the
purpose for which attribution is being made. If attribution is
being made for the purpose of a relationship provision that employs an alternative definition based upon voting power or value,
then under the rule of section 958 attribution from entities should
be computed twice, once for each branch of the relationship test.
For example, assume that an individual held both voting and
nonvoting stock in corporation A and possessed ten percent of the
voting power but thirty percent of the value of corporation A.
Further, assume that corporation A held fifty percent of the voting power of the stock in corporation B but that such stock represented only twenty percent of the value of B. The issue is the
extent of the individual's constructive ownership of corporation
B's wholly owned subsidiary, corporation X. With respect to voting power, the individual would own five percent (fifty percent
times ten percent) of the voting power of X; with respect to value,
he would constructively own six percent (twenty percent times
thirty percent) of the value of the outstanding stock of corporation X. Thus, for relationship purposes, the individual would be
regarded as owning six percent-the greater of the two computations-of corporation X. Of course, attribution with respect to
voting power and value must be entirely separate. It would be
clearly inappropriate to combine the individual's thirty percent
by value interest in corporation A with corporation A's fifty percent voting power in corporation B to conclude that the individual held a fifteen percent interest in corporation X.
Attribution from partnerships should follow substantially
the same format with one modest increase in complexity: the
value branch of the test applicable to corporations should be
replaced by the partner's proportionate interest in profits or capital, whichever is greater, as under the current section 707(b).
There is no technical reason that the partnership provision could
not be conformed fully to -the corporate provision and be based
upon valuation of the entire partnership interest-a weighing of
the profits and capital interest. The objection to this approach is
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purely practical: an accurate valuation of the partnership interest
will rarely be readily available while the proportionate interest in
profits and capital will be apparent from the partnership agreement. If in the preceding example corporation A was a ten-man
partnership in which the individual held a thirty percent interest
in profits and a twenty percent interest in capital but was only
entitled to one vote along with each of his partners, the same
attribution of the stock of corporation X would be made.
The addition of the alternative voting power test admittedly
adds to the complexity of the affinity provisions and may thus
seem out of place in an argument for greater mechanical simplicity. However, if the variety of affinity provisions presently in the
Code were replaced with a single uniform provision, substantial
simplification would be achieved regardless of the complexity of
that provision. Furthermore, it is expected that the alternative
test will not often be used. If nonvoting preferred stock is eliminated from the value computation, the alternative test will be
necessary only for corporations having particularly complex capital structures. Similarly, in most partnerships, voting power corresponds to the partner's interest in profits and capital. Perhaps
most importantly, however, it is believed that the added complexity is amply justified by the greater consistency of the alternative approach with the realities of mutual interest and control.
With respect to trusts and estates, attribution should generally be made in accordance with the same actuarial formula used
in determining relationships with such entities. These entities,
however, pose a special problem since, more commonly than in
the case of corporations and partnerships, the interests of the
several beneficiaries may not constitute an undivided interest in
the entire corpus. Rather, either the income from or the ultimate
entitlement to certain assets of the trust or the estate may be
greater with respect to a particular beneficiary. In this situation,
attribution under a single mechanical formula will not produce a
proper result. For example, the trust instrument may provide
that upon the death of the life beneficiary, all of the stock that
would be the subject of attribution is to be distributed to A while
the balance of the assets are to be distributed to B. In this situation, the life beneficiary has an interest in the stock being attributed equal to his actuarial interest in the entire trust. A's interest
in the stock is equal to the actuarial interest of the entire remainder interest. B has no interest in the stock, and it would be inap-
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propriate to attribute any of such stock to him, either for the
purpose of treating him as the owner thereof or for the purpose
of diluting the ownership interest therein of A or the life beneficiary.
Although this problem has long been recognized, no statutory provision has yet attempted to provide special attribution
rules for such trusts. The regulations to section 958 appear to
require a special allocation but do so by way of an example, not
by attempting to state a specific allocation rule.m The ALI draft
proposal suggested statutory language requiring a special allocation, but the proposal was vague and its operation unclear. 289
Because of the considerable flexibility that exists in the drafting
of wills and trust instruments, it may not be feasible to provide
a definitive statutory provision that will not require ad hoc development. However, it would appear that the statute generally
should provide that stock (or the partnership or other interest
that is the subject of attribution) shall not be attributed to a
beneficiary who, under the express terms of the will or agreement
establishing the estate or trust or pursuant to the law governing
the distribution of income or assets held by the entity, cannot
under any circumstance obtain by virtue of his interest in the
trust or estate any interest in the stock (or other interest) including the income therefrom or the proceeds of any distribution
thereof. Rather, such stock (or other interest) shall be attributed
to those beneficiaries who may obtain an interest therein in proportion to their actuarial interests in the stock (or other interest)
that is the subject of attribution.
288. Treas. Reg. § 1.958-l(d), ex.(4) (1966).
289. AU REPORT, supra note 274, at 461. The ALI provision specified that
stock would not be attributed to a beneficiary who could not obtain any interest
therein and continued to provide that the stock would be considered owned by
the other beneficiaries "in proportion to their relative actuarial interests in the
balance of the estate or trusts." By balance of the trusts, the draft presumably
is referring to the actuarially computed portions of the trust determined after
subtracting the actuarial interest of the beneficiaries who could not obtain any
interest in the stock. This formulation appears defective when the trust creates
income and remainder interests in different persons as would normally be the
case. Referring to the example in the text, it would not be appropriate to treat
the income beneficiary as having a greater interest in the stock than would be
his actuarial interest in the trust. Rather, only the interest of A should be
enlarged by the inability of B to obtain any interest in the stock.
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Back-attribution, that is, attribution from owners to entities,
presents the most complex problems of attribution. There is a
strong factual basis for treating closely held entities as mere creatures of their owners and treating the owners as directly owning
their proportional interest of the assets of the entity. The reverse,
however, is not necessarily the case. The economic interest of, for
example, a shareholder-even a substantial shareholder-may
not be identical to the interest of the corporation, and clearly the
shareholder is not controlled by the corporation. Thus, backattribution is never appropriate except in the case of a controlling
owner. Furthermore, the field of attribution should not, and generally does not, include widely held corporations and partnerships; rather, it is a concept applicable to closely held entities.
However, unrestrained back-attribution may easily result in such
overly broad relationship provisions that widely held entities become affected. Thus, corporation A, which does not actually own
any stock in corporation B, may be regarded as owning stock in
corporation B that is actually owned not only by a stockholder in
corporation A, but also by members of his family or by other
entities in which the shareholder or the members of his family
hold an interest. Thus, in the absence of appropriately high
threshold requirements, General Motors would be regarded as
controlling IBM if shareholders of General Motors and their families, trusts, and personal holding companies in the aggregate controlled IBM.
Even when such results of back-attribution are eliminated by
high threshold requirements, such as the fifty percent requirement employed by section 318, back-attribution is generally unnecessary.no The function of back-attribution is to enhance the
290. The AU study, which recommended a considerably broader scope of
relationships for section 267(b) than is here recommended, concluded that the
list of relationships so described did not require back-attribution.
Congress has accepted the proposition that back-attribution is not required
if the relationships described are sufficiently complete since such attribution
was deliberately omitted from section 1563(d) and (e). The relationships established in this section constitute an extension of the definition of controlled
corporations contained in section 1551. Section 1551 requires ownership of a
second corporation by only a single corporation but employs a limited form of
back-attribution for this purpose, specifying that the ownership must be by "the
transferor corporation, its shareholders or both." Section 1563 eliminates back·
attribution and relies upon a complete definition of controlled groups.
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ownership interest in one entity by another for the purposes of
establishing a relationship among such entities. If the relationship provision to which attribution is applicable is complete,
specifying all of the relationships between various entities to
which the substantive law is to be applicable, back-attribution is
unnecessary and, if applied, would result in an overly broad relationship. 281
291. For example, assume that an individual holds an actuarially determined 80% interest in a trust, that the individual owns a 20% interest in a
corporation, that the trust owns a 40% interest in the same corporation, and that
the balance of both the trust and the corporation was owned by unrelated
persons. Under a relationship provision such as recommended here (including
entities if one owned a 50% interest in the other or if 50% of each is owned by
an individual or a third entity), the individual and the trust would be related
as would the individual and the corporation since the individual directly owned
20% and indirectly 32% of the corporation, producing a 52% constructive ownership. However, the trust and the corporation would not be related based solely
upon direct ownership of the corporation by the trust. However, since the relationship provision includes a 50% common ownership provision, the trust and
the corporation would be related because the individual actually or constructively owned 50% of each and back-attribution is not required to reach that
result. If the relationship provision lacked a common control feature, the use of
back-attribution would be required in order to find the trust and the corporation
related: the trust would be regarded as owning the 20% of the corporation owned
by the individual in addition to the 40% it owned directly.
Assume now that the individual's beneficial interest in the trust was only
a 60% interest. The individual and the trust are still related, but the individual
and the corporation are not because the individual would constructively own
only 24% of the corporation that, when added to his actual20% interest, would
fall below the required 50%. In addition, the trust and the corporation would
not fall within the relationship provision because 50% of the corporation was not
owned by the individual. This result seems clearly correct. By itself, the interest
of the trust in the corporation is not sufficient to cause the entities to be regarded as related: were property sold from the trust to the corporation, for
example, the retained indirect ownership in the property by the trust would be
over 50% less than its interest prior to the transfer. The fact that a related
beneficiary of the trust held an additional interest in the corporation should not
change this result. Prior to the transfer, the individual together with the other
beneficiaries of the trust indirectly owned the entire property; after the transfer
only the individual retained an indirect interest and that interest is only a 44%
interest. Thus, the trust and the corporation should not be regarded as related.
If we were to assume in addition that a second individual owned a 10%
interest in both the trust and the corporation, these two entities would be related
because the relationship provision takes into account overlapping ownership by
up to five persons. In other words, if the relationship provision is of proper
breadth, back-attribution is not necessary.
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There are, however, certain substantive provisions of the
Code that employ attribution but do not use general relationship
provisions. Certain of these provisions, principally those governing corporate distribution and adjustments, require backattribution in order to reach a proper result. For example, for the
purpose of section 302, which establishes the distinction between
redemptions and dividends, it is not relevant whether the corporation is related to the redeeming shareholder. Rather, the inquiry focuses on the precise number of shares of stock that the
shareholder is deemed to own after the application of the attribution rules. 292 For the purposes of these sections, back-attribution
must be retained-but only for the purposes of these sections. 293
The back-attribution provision, presumably in substantially the
form now contained in section 318, must be separated from the
balance of the attribution rules so as to be included in a casual
cross-reference.
The possession of an option presents a clear basis for attribution, and there should be relatively little controversy concerning
either the need for such a rule or its preferred scope. The holder
On the other hand, if back-attribution were applicable to this example,
ignoring the second individual, the trust would be regarded as owning the 20%
of the corporation's stock actually owned by the individual, which, when added
to the 40% actually owned by the trust, would exceed the required 50%. Thus,
these entities would be regarded as related, which would give the relationship
provisions excessive breadth.
292. If both an individual and a trust of which the individual was the
primary beneficiary owned stock in a corporation and stock held by the individual were redeemed, the stock held by the trust would nevertheless be attributed
to the individual under the normal entity attribution rule for the purpose of
determining whether the redemption should be taxable as a dividend. This
result is entirely proper, and it is clear that the reverse should also be true. That
is, a redemption of stock held by the trust should be tested for dividend equivalence by taking into account the stock owned by the individual. Backattribution is required in order to achieve that result.
293. It would be considerably beyond any proper scope of this review to
examine all of the substantive provisions of the Code to which attribution is
applicable to determine whether back-attribution would be appropriate. Such
a study, undertaken by the ALI, concluded with respect to sections of the Code
existing in 1958 that back-attribution was only required in sections 302, 306, 341
(assuming certain other revisions were made in that section), and might be
necessary in sections 334 and 382 unless the definition of purchase contained in
those sections were revised by employing a reference to general relationship
provisions-a change that would seem eminently proper.
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of an option should be regarded as owning the stock subject to the
option, and it should make no difference whether the stock subject to the option is treasury stock, unissued stock, or stock presently outstanding in the hands of shareholders. Nor should it
matter whether the optiqn is held against the issuer of the stock
subject to the option or against another or whether the option is
a separate security or a part of a larger security (as in the case of
a convertible debenture).
On the other hand, options that do not represent a significant
present economic interest in the corporation should not form the
basis for attribution of stock. In particular, when there are substantial conditions on the exercise of the option that are not certain to occur, the factual premise for attribution-that the option
is the substantial equivalent of stock-does not exist, and attribution would be improper.
What constitutes a substantial condition for this purpose
would best be left to case law development; nevertheless, some
principles seem clear. Consistent with section 544(b), time alone
(which is certain to pass) should not be regarded as a substantial
contingency. Thus, that the option is not immediately exercisable should not itself prevent attribution. One who has a right
to increase his interest in a corporation at a future date possesses, by virtue of that right, a substantial economic interest
in the corporation. However, if an individual has an option to
acquire stock held by another only if the holder of the option
survives the stockholder, there should be no attribution to the
holder of the option until the death of the stockholder. While the
holder of such an option may have an economic interest in the
corporation by virtue of his option, the interest is speculative.
Thus, the relationship between the holder and the corporate issuer of the stock subject to the option is not sufficient to justify
treating the holder of the option as a present stockholder. The
adoption of such a limitation on the option rule would make it
clear that stock that may be acquired by a shareholder of a corporation pursuant to a standard "buy-out" agreement would not
be attributed to the shareholder during the lifetime of other
shareholders. 214 On the other hand, when the contingency is
294. Such agreements normally provide that upon the death of a shareholder, his stock must be sold, or at least offered, to the corporation or other
shareholders. If such an agreement formed the basis for attribution, it would
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within the control of the holder of the option, such as the payment of a certain price in connection with the exercise of the
option, the contingency should not be a bar to attribution.2i5
In the case of an option to acquire unissued stock, it is obvious that the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation, determined after attribution, should be computed by assuming that the stock subject to option was outstanding in the
same manner as computations under section 544(b) are presently
made.
The more difficult question is whether options held by persons other than the person to whom stock is being attributed
should be regarded as also having been exercised for the purpose
of enlarging the denominator of the fraction representing that
person's proportionate interest in the corporation, generally to
the benefit of the taxpayer. This question only arises when the
option is to acquire unissued stock and ultimately involves a
prediction concerning a question of fact. Since the prediction
cannot be made with certainty, it would be. appropriate to provide
assistance in the form of conclusive presumptions contained in
operating rules, similar to those applicable to section 544(b). For
example, it might be provided that attribution should be made
only with respect to options that would increase the stock ownership of the individual in question, regardless of whether such
cause wholly inappropriate results. For example, it might be impossible for any
shareholder of the corporation to cause his stock to be redeemed at capital gains
rates under the substantially disproportionate test of section 302(b)(2).
Attribution under such agreements would pose the further problem of determining the number of shares to be attributed to the holder of the option if the
corporation had more than two shareholders. Such agreements typically permit
the surviving shareholders to purchase the stock of the deceased shareholder in
proportion to the survivors' interests in the corporation. However, if some survivors do nat exercise their rights, the stock is reoffered to those stockholders that
do. Thus, each shareholder has an option (albeit doubly contingent) to acquire
all of the stock of each of the other shareholders.
295. There are certain situations in which the mere requirement that a
price be paid for the stock under option might be regarded as sufficient to
prevent attribution. If at the time attribution is to be made the option is worth·
less in that the exercise price is so high that it would be economic~lly irrational
to exercise the option, the option might be ignored. Also, where an option may
only be exercised upon the payment of a price for the stock subject to option
equal to the fair market value of the stock determined at the time the option is
exercised, the holder of the option does not have a present economic interest in
the corporation.
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options are held by him or by another whose stock would be
attributed to him-subject to specified exceptions. Those exceptions might include a rule attributing stock to all options held by
other persons if stock is attributed to the individual in question
by virtue of the option rule and the options held by others are
substantially identical to such option with respect to their terms
and conditions. Further, an option held by another should be
regarded as exercised if the option in question may not be exercised unless such other option is also exercised. Clearly the rule
should be sufficiently flexible to permit case law development of
the exceptions.
XV.

CONCLUSION

The process of producing tax legislation has always been
complex and frequently subject to intense pressure. Perhaps, it
is not surprising that supplementary material like the affinity
provisions is inserted in an arbitrary, inconsistent, and sometimes clearly erroneous fashion. However, the substantive provisions of the Code are sufficiently complex, and it can no longer
be acceptable for such secondary material to contribute its own
needless confusion.
By the time of the adoption of the 1976 Act, complexity was
no longer just the object of complaints by practitioners unable to
charge for their time. It had become publicly acknowledged as a
serious problem. Nevertheless, the draftsmen of that Act seemed
particularly prone to use the worst techniques of drafting that
had appeared in the pre-1976 Code. There is no question that the
attribution provisions added in 1976 are less consistent, more
difficult to use, and contain more drafting errors than the pre1976 provisions. The trend alone is disturbing; in light of the
acknowledged necessity for simplification, it is no less than outrageous.
Under the current priorities, each piece of tax reform legislation pushes the Code further from human comprehension. Unless
Congress is willing to devote a greater portion of its reform energies to mechanical simplification-and the affinity provisions are
merely illustrative of the need-the time will soon arise (if it has
not already) when experienced tax specialists can no longer have
confidence in their ability to understand and apply the tax law.
And, if these practitioners cannot perform confidently, surely nei-
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ther they nor the public at large will have confidence that the
Internal Revenue agent in the field, or his superiors in Washington, can understand or fairly apply the law. At that point, our
voluntary compliance system collapses. It has been suggested
here that such a crisis of complexity can be avoided without
foregoing the equitable fine tuning that ·necessarily complicates
the substance of the Code. But the need to rationalize legislatively the affinity provisions is urgent for the task becomes progressively more difficult each year.

